Essays On The Chinese Labor Market by Song, Yang
  
 
ESSAYS ON THE CHINESE LABOR MARKET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Yang Song 
January 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 Yang Song
  
ESSAYS ON THE CHINESE LABOR MARKET 
 
 
Yang Song, Ph. D. 
Cornell University 2013 
 
This dissertation examines the central features of the current Chinese labor market, 
investigates the functioning of China’s labor market by constructing a theoretical model, and 
conducts a comprehensive welfare economic analysis using the model to study welfare 
consequences of various labor market policies.  
 
The dissertation consists of six chapters. Following the introduction of Chapter 1, Chapter 2 
reviews key features of the current Chinese labor market based on previous literature, including 
labor market segmentation, household registration system, wage evolution, employment structure, 
etc. However, previous studies have not provided a satisfactory answer about the extent of 
hukou-based labor market discrimination in firms with different ownerships. Chapter 3 fills in 
this gap by providing more convincing empirical evidence on this particular feature using a 
double-selectivity approach. The results show that state-owned enterprises (SOE) are much more 
discriminatory than private firms against rural-to-urban migrants who carry their rural hukou to 
cities. The SOE sector practices both wage and hiring discrimination against rural hukou holders.  
 
Based on these empirical results, Chapter 4 constructs a theoretical model for the current 
Chinese labor market. The model has two geographically distinct areas (urban and rural), three 
 segmented economic sectors (SOE, private, and agriculture), and two types of workers 
distinguished by the hukou status (urban and rural hukou). The paper first formulates the model 
and obtains a closed form solution before modeling any policy interventions. Chapter 5 then 
works out the labor market and welfare consequences of three policy interventions which include 
promoting rural development, reducing the cost-of-living in urban areas for rural hukou holders, 
and offering some rural workers the chance to convert from rural to urban hukou status. The 
policy analysis includes small increases in each of these three areas, followed by the allocation of 
a specified development budget among these three alternative uses. It is shown that the rural 
development policy is unambiguously welfare-improving, while the other two policies have 
ambiguous effects on social welfare. Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation reviews the literature on the central features of the current Chinese 
labor market, incorporates these features to construct a theoretical labor market model for 
China, and then conducts a comprehensive welfare economic analysis using the model to 
study welfare consequences of various labor market policies. 
 
China’s labor market was freed up greatly beginning in 1978 as part of the larger 
economic reforms introduced at that time. Previously, there had been no labor market; all 
workers had been assigned to jobs. Since the 1990s, workers have been largely free to 
search for better jobs, and employers have been largely free to hire and fire workers as 
desired. Moreover, the past twenty years witnessed also a steady urbanization process in 
China featuring an increasing flow of labor from rural areas to cities as regulations on 
rural-urban migration have been slowly relaxed. 
 
However, the current Chinese labor market has some unique features that are not 
only different from other countries’ labor market, but also different from what it used to 
be two decades ago. The main features include labor market segmentation and household 
registration system (hukou). First, the current Chinese labor market is segmented 
involving state-owned enterprises (SOE), private enterprises, and agriculture sector. The 
  
 
2 
three employment sectors pay different wages to comparable workers, with the SOE 
sector on top, private sector in middle, and agriculture sector at bottom. Furthermore, 
high-wage jobs are rationed meaning that there are qualified individuals who would like 
to find a high-wage job but cannot find a job there due to the lack of good jobs in this 
sector. Second, the household registration system requires that each person born in China 
should be classified either rural hukou or urban hukou in a given location. Workers with 
different hukou are treated differently in the urban labor market, face different costs of 
living in cities, and have different access to government-provided public service and 
welfare programs in the urban area. 
 
Based on these unique features, this dissertation constructs a theoretical labor market 
model for China, and utilizes the model to examine the welfare consequences of various 
labor market policies.   
 
The dissertation consists of six chapters. Following the introduction of chapter 1, 
Chapter 2 reviews key features of the current Chinese labor market based on previous 
literature. Chapter 3 provides new empirical evidence on the degree of hukou-based labor 
market discrimination in different segmented ownership sectors in urban China including 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) and private firms. Based on these empirical results, 
Chapter 4 constructs a theoretical model for the current Chinese labor market, and 
Chapter 5 studies the effects of various labor market policies on social welfare using the 
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model by various policy evaluation criteria. Chapter 6 concludes and provides directions 
for future research. 
 
Both empirical and theoretical analysis is carried out on the Chinese labor market 
throughout the dissertation. Chapter 2 and 3 are mainly empirical chapters and are written 
by myself. Chapter 4 and 5 are two theoretical papers, which are the joint work with 
Professor Gary Fields.  
 
Chapter 2 attempts to be hitherto the most comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 
central features of the current Chinese labor market from labor economists’ point of view. 
A considerable number of previous studies have only touched on several pieces of 
China’s labor market, but none of them have given us a clear and complete picture. 
Moreover, many previous studies on this topic lacked economics foundation and failed to 
utilize the framework of economics to describe and explain the Chinese labor market, 
such as demand and supply, wages, and so on. This paper intends to fill in this gap and 
tries to analyze the main features of the current Chinese labor market from the 
perspective of labor economics. The paper summarizes 10 central features of China’s 
labor market as follows.  
 
1. Nearly half of total labor force in China is working in rural areas and the other half 
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is working in urban China; Within rural areas, more than one half of the rural labor force 
is still working in agriculture sector, and the rest is working in rural non-agriculture 
sector concentrated in eastern China; Within urban labor force, more than three quarters 
are working in private sector. 
 
2. Urban and rural wages have both been increasing, but urban wages have grown 
much faster than rural wages, and now the average urban wage is approximately four 
times as high as the average rural wage. 
 
3. Urban and rural hukou holders face different costs of living in cities and have 
different access to government-provided public service and welfare programs in the urban 
area.  
 
4. Workers with rural hukou earn lower wages and are less likely to be hired in the 
high-wage sector in urban areas compared to workers with local urban hukou due to both 
differences in human capital and labor market discrimination. 
 
5. The phenomena of urban labor shortage and rural labor surplus are co-existent in 
the current Chinese labor market.  
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6. Open unemployment is low in China and is mainly concentrated in cities of central 
and western China. 
 
7. There exists labor market segmentation between rural and urban labor market as 
well as within urban labor market between different ownerships  
 
8. Wages in urban private sector are largely market-determined, and institutional 
interventions play a small role in wage-setting mechanism in urban private sector. 
 
9. Skilled workers have experienced a much larger wage increase than unskilled 
workers.  
 
10. About 10 percent of urban labor force in China is self-employed, and a 
substantial share of wage and salary employees in urban areas is not covered by social 
insurance programs.   
 
Chapter 3 is the first empirical study in China comparing the extent of labor market 
discrimination against rural hukou in two segmented ownership sectors in urban China, 
including state-owned enterprises and private firms. This paper also makes a 
methodological contribution to the empirical literature on labor market discrimination in 
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China by adopting a double-selectivity approach to account for selectivity both in sector 
determination and in hukou status. The first selectivity comes from the possibility that 
people working in the SOE sector are not a random sample of the underlying population. 
For example, people with certain characteristics such as more government networking 
may be favored by stated-owned enterprises (SOE) and thus more likely to work there. 
Another selection problem arises because the hukou status can be endogenous in that 
some Chinese people are now allowed to convert their hukou from rural to urban upon 
meeting some criteria specified by each local government.  
 
By utilizing the 2008 wave of the Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) survey, 
I find that rural migrants who carry their rural hukou to cities face both wage 
discrimination and hiring discrimination in urban China, especially in the high-wage SOE 
sector. Specifically, the the selectivity-corrected results show that for 
observationally-equivalent workers, urban hukou holders earn about 50% more than rural 
hukou holders do in the SOE sector, but only 5% more in the private sector. In addition, 
there exists obvious hiring discrimination against rural hukou holders in the SOE sector. 
Comparable workers with rural hukou are 35 percentage points less likely to be hired in 
the high-wage SOE sector than urban hukou holders.  
 
Chapter 4 formulates a theoretical model to incorporate the most important features 
of the current Chinese labor market and to demonstrate how this model might be utilized 
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to analyze the labor allocation as well as the wages in different economic sectors. As 
Fields (2007) pointed out, good policy work requires sound theoretical foundations. The 
major existing theoretical models of employment and development-the Lewis-Fei-Ranis 
model, the integrated labor market model, the Harris-Todaro model, and various 
segmented labor market models – stylize different developing countries’ labor markets in 
different ways. None, however, stylizes conditions in any of the major developing 
countries. This paper is the first one aimed at remedying this gap in the literature.  
 
The model developed in Chapter 4 has two geographically distinct areas (urban and 
rural), three segmented economic sectors (SOE, private, and agriculture), and two types 
of workers distinguished by the hukou status (urban and rural hukou). The paper 
formulates the model and obtains a closed form solution, and then models a number of 
policy interventions. It shows that the hukou system affects the current Chinese labor 
market through two major channels. One is that there are both hiring discrimination and 
wage discrimination in the urban state-owned enterprises (SOE) against rural hukou 
holders which reduce their expected payoffs associated with migrating to the city. 
Another is that rural hukou holders have to bear a large amount of cost of living in the 
city, but cannot have enough access to various welfare programs and public services 
provided by city governments as urban hukou holders do. These two mechanisms 
together in fact explain the puzzle observed in current China that a considerable number 
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of rural hukou holders still choose to stay in the poor rural area and earn very little, 
instead of migrating to the coastal city where labor shortages are endemic and wages are 
higher. 
 
Based on the newly-developed theoretical model, Chapter 5 then conducts a careful 
and comprehensive welfare economic analysis of three labor market policies, including 
rural development (RD), reducing the cost of living for rural hukou holders in the city 
(RC), and converting some rural migrants’ hukou status from rural to urban (HC), which 
are the most discussed and relevant policies in the current Chinese labor market policy 
agenda (Hertal and Zhai, 2006; Whalley and Zhang, 2007; Ito, 2008). There is no 
consensus among policy analysts and decision makers about whether each of the three 
policies above is desirable for the society or not, and also about which policy among the 
three alternatives should deserve priority.  
 
Firstly, by ignoring the costs associated with implementing each policy, I adopt two 
alternative policy evaluation criteria including first-order welfare dominance approach 
and abbreviated social welfare function to compare the income distributions generated by 
each of the three policies with the original distribution, respectively, answering the 
question that which policy would increase social welfare and which would not. Secondly, 
I conduct a social cost-benefit analysis by taking into account of the costs of each policy 
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and using a public finance framework, examining which policy the central government 
should choose given a fixed budget to increase social welfare the most measured by 
first-order-welfare-dominance and first-order-poverty-dominance criteria, respectively. 
The following conclusions are drawn from these analyses.  
 
First, according to the first-order-welfare-dominance criterion, only the rural 
development policy yields an unambiguously welfare-improving income distribution. The 
reduced cost policy and hukou conversion policy have ambiguous effects on social 
welfare using the first-order-welfare-dominance approach in that neither the distribution 
generated by each policy first-order-welfare-dominates the original distribution nor 
dominated by it. None of the three policies is welfare-decreasing using the first-order 
welfare dominance criterion.  
 
Second, according to the abbreviated social welfare function in which social welfare 
depends positively on total income, and negatively on income inequality and poverty, we 
obtain similar results as above that only the rural development policy unambiguously 
increases social welfare, while the other two policies have ambiguous effects on social 
welfare.  
 
Third, we take into account the cost of each policy and examine which policy the 
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central government should choose with a fixed budget to increase social welfare the most 
measured by first-order-welfare-dominance and first-order-poverty-dominance criteria, 
respectively. We compare the three hypothetical income distributions resulting from the 
three respective policies using the fixed amount of budget. The budget is assumed to be 
not large enough to change the ordering of discretionary income among groups in the 
original equilibrium before any policy interventions. 
 
According to the first-order-welfare-dominance criterion, none of the three policies 
with the same fixed budget would generate an income distribution that 
first-order-welfare-dominates the income distributions resulting from either of the other 
two policies. That is, no single policy among the three alternatives is unambiguously 
better than another one by first-order welfare dominance approach. 
 
Fourth, by assuming that one dollar budget allocated to an agriculture worker for the 
rural development policy could generate M dollar income increase for each agriculture 
worker, we find that the results using the first-order-poverty-dominance approach depend 
on how large the multiplier effect (measured by the value of M) is. If the multiplier is 
sufficiently small, no policy would generate an income distribution that 
first-order-poverty-dominates the distributions resulting from either of the other two 
policies. If the multiplier is sufficiently large, then the rural development policy has a 
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larger effect on poverty reduction than the reduced cost policy. However, neither the rural 
development policy first-order-poverty-dominates the hukou conversion policy nor 
dominated by it, in that the very poor people have higher income under the rural 
development policy than the hukou conversion policy, whereas the richer of the poor 
people have lower income under the rural development policy than the hukou conversion 
policy.   
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Chapter 2 Central Features of the Current Chinese 
Labor Market 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the market-oriented economic reform began in 1978, China has undergone a 
fundamental transformation in the labor market. In the planned economy before 1978, the 
Chinese government had control over nearly every aspect of the labor market, including 
employment and wages. Job-seekers were assigned employment, through universities or 
local governments. Most people worked in state-owned enterprises and enjoyed lifetime 
employment with no risk of being fired. Labor mobility was almost non-existent. It was 
the government, rather than the market, that arranged the allocation of labor. The Chinese 
labor system was characterized by immobility, lack of incentives, overstaffing, and 
underemployment (Knight and Song, 1995). 
 
From 1978, China has shifted gradually from planned allocation of labor in 
state-sector jobs to a more open labor market with increasing numbers of workers 
employed in the private sector. In particular, from the mid-1990s, job-seekers have 
become free to choose jobs, and employers have more flexibility to make decisions on 
hiring and firing. Since then, Chinese labor market started to burgeon, in which 
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employers make hiring decisions to maximize profit while workers make labor supply 
decisions to maximize utility. Thus, we could conclude that Chinese labor market in pure 
economics sense has only lasted for about fifteen years. 
 
The past thirty years witnessed also a steady urbanization process in China featuring 
an increasing flow of labor from rural areas to cities as regulations on rural-urban 
migration have been slowly relaxed. Based on official data, Cai, Park, and Zhao (2009) 
reported that from 1978 to 2005, the share of labor employed primarily in agriculture fell 
from 71 percent to 45 percent.  
 
Although the large structural changes in Chinese labor market are impressive, labor 
market reform is still limited in comparison with other market reforms in China. The 
main challenge lies in the political difficulty of eliminating a set of institutions and 
policies that privileged the welfare of some urban workers by paying high wages in 
state-owned enterprises. Due to these limitations, Chinese labor market is currently 
highly segmented. According to Fields (2007), labor market segmentation is defined as 
follows: different wages are paid in different sectors to comparable workers. Specifically, 
there are two critical elements within segmented labor market (Dickens and Lang, 1985). 
First, workers with the same level of human capital earn different wages in different 
sectors. Second, more importantly, better jobs are rationed. That is, there are qualified 
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individuals who would like to find a higher-pay job but cannot find a job there due to the 
lack of good jobs in this sector. That the current Chinese labor market in China is 
segmented is a main consensus among economists on the Chinese labor market (Song and 
Li, 2010; Chen and Huang, 2010; Chen and Huang, 2009; Zhao, 2005).  
 
The recent economic recession had a big negative effect on the Chinese labor market. 
The abruptness of the economic downturn caused nearly 70 million of rural migrant 
working in cities to return home in 2008. The fall was short-lived, however, and 
employment has been rising since the beginning of 2009. To date, the Chinese labor 
market has proved exceptionally resilient in the face of the financial crisis and economic 
recession. As far as migrant workers were concerned, government reports suggest that by 
August 2009, 67 million of those who returned home in late 2008 had gone back to cities, 
and an extra 7 million new migrants moved to cities in the first half of 2009. The 
unemployment rate amongst migrants was only 3% by June 2009 (Wang, 2009). The 
Chinese government’s macroeconomic policy in response to the financial crisis led the 
number of rural migrant workers to rebound to pre-crisis levels by the end of 2009 (Li, 
2010a). 
 
Due to the institutional changes and reforms, the current Chinese labor market has 
some special features. It is different from the classical textbook labor market in which 
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different firms pay the same wage to comparable workers, the wage being set by supply 
and demand to clear the market. The current Chinese labor market is way more 
complicated than the classical model. For instance, we observe the fact that different 
wages are paid for observationally-equivalent workers in different sectors.  
 
The biggest contribution of this chapter is that it attempts to be hitherto the most 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the central features of the current Chinese labor 
market from labor economists’ point of view. A considerable number of previous studies 
have only touched on several pieces of China’s labor market, but none of them have 
given us a clear and complete picture. Moreover, many previous studies on this topic 
lacked economics foundation and failed to utilize the framework of economics to 
describe and explain the Chinese labor market, such as demand and supply, wages, and so 
on. This paper intends to fill in this gap and tries to analyze the main features of the 
current Chinese labor market from the perspective of labor economics. Based on a 
comprehensive literature research, I summarize 10 central features as follows. 
 
2.2 Ten central features of the current Chinese labor market  
2.2.1 Employment structure 
Nearly half of total labor force in China is working in rural areas and the other half is 
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working in urban China; Within rural areas, more than one half of the rural labor force is 
still working in agriculture sector, and the rest is working in rural non-agriculture sector 
concentrated in eastern China; Within urban labor force, more than three quarters are 
working in private sector. 
 
2.2.1.1 Division of rural and urban labor force 
By the end of 2010, the total labor force in China was about 760 million, of which 
350 million worked in urban areas (National bureau of Statistics, 2011). The share of 
urban and rural labor force was 46% and 54%, respectively.  
 
Over the last decade, the share of urban labor force has been increasing dramatically. 
An evident change in the structure of urban labor force in the past ten years is the influx 
of rural migrants. The most recent data shows that the total number of rural migrants in 
cities is approximate to 220 million (National bureau of Statistics, 2011). Rural-to-urban 
migration has been a particularly important social phenomenon and has attracted much 
attention from both policy makers and academic scholars. Hundreds of millions of rural 
workers migrated to cities to pursue higher income. Due to this huge migration, the share 
of rural labor force becomes close to the share of urban labor. 
 
2.2.1.2 Rural employment structure 
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The rural labor force can be divided into agricultural and non-agricultural workers. 
As noted in the introduction, the percentage of total labor in China working in agriculture 
fell rapidly by an average of 0.8 percent per year over the last three decades. Currently, 
nearly 55 percent of the rural people are working in agriculture, and the rest of rural 
workers are employed in non-agriculture enterprises (National bureau of Statistics, 2011).  
 
The share of agriculture workers in total rural labor has declined substantially over 
the past three decades, partly owing to the introduction of household responsibility 
system.  In 1978, the Chinese government introduced the household responsibility 
system (HRS). Under this new system, land is owned by the collectives and contracted 
out to households. The introduction of HRS meant that labor allocation among family 
members became household decisions. Families decided who worked on which plot of 
land or which off-farm activity according to individual members’ abilities. Since rural 
families have more options and flexibility to arrange their labor allocation after the 
introduction of HRS, as a share of rural labor, the agricultural labor share declined from 
91 percent in 1979 to 61 percent in 2003, and to 56 percent in 2008. Figure 2.1 plots this 
changing trend in the structure of rural employment. 
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Data source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
Note: “Others” in the above figure includes private enterprises and self-employed workers. TVE 
denotes township and village enterprises in rural areas. 
Figure 2.1 Structure of Rural Employment (percent) 
 
As is shown in the figure above, most of non-agriculture rural people are employed 
in rural enterprises, especially township and village enterprises (TVEs), which are 
concentrated in coastal provinces. TVEs played a dominant role in creating employment 
for rural workers. According to the official statistics from the Statistical Bureau of China 
in 1995, in the 15 years from 1980 and 1994, the number of TVEs had grown 16.5 times 
and reached 8.75 millions by the end of 1994. In 1994, TVEs employed 120 million 
workers and contributed to 55.4% of the national industrial output. Currently, nearly 150 
million Chinese workers are employed in TVEs (Sun, 2008). 
 
However, the growth of rural non-agricultural activities has been faster along the 
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coast than in the interior. In 2007, for example, eastern provinces contributed two-thirds 
of TVEs’ GDP, compared with less than one-quarter from central China, 6 percent from 
the northeast and a mere 5 percent from western regions (Ash, 2010). Most of rural 
non-agricultural employment is concentrated in rich regions such as eastern coast of 
China.  
 
In addition, the majority of employers in rural enterprises prefer local residents, and 
thus most of migrants from poor areas do not have any opportunity to obtain a job in rural 
non-agricultural firms in rich areas (Shi, 2007). For example, it is almost impossible for a 
migrant from Inner Mongolia to obtain a job in rural enterprises in Beijing. Yao (1999) 
argued that when TVEs started to burgeon in 1990s, the local government had much 
control in the decision-making of town and village enterprises. However, two recent 
papers show that most of TVEs have made market-oriented reforms and aim to maximize 
profits, and the intervention from local governments has been largely reduced (Sun, 2008; 
Shi, 2007).  
 
In terms of rural agricultural employment, self-employment is still dominant. In most 
places, a person born in the rural area will be automatically allocated a piece of land. 
Farmers cultivate crops on their own land and sell the products. Due to the “One Child” 
policy initiated in 1978, the family size has become smaller and similar across rural 
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families. Accordingly, each family has similar land area. Sun (2008) claimed that 
agricultural wage is similar across families owing to land allocation policy and similar 
family size. Feng (2008) said that the land rental market is still in its infancy. Chen et al 
(2010) provided a specific example of small scale agriculture production in rural China. 
They investigated agricultural production in Yucheng City, located in the northwest of 
Shandong Province. Figure 2.2 shows the frequency distribution of per capita arable land 
in Yucheng city. As is seen, 83.8% of households operated less than 0.2 ha, and just 3.9% 
did more than 0.3 ha. It indicates that agricultural production in Yucheng is still at the 
stage of traditional small-business farming. 
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Figure 2.2 Frequency Distribution of Per-capita Arable Land  
 
2.2.1.3 Urban employment structure  
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In the past twenty years, the share of urban employment in private sector has 
increased from 24% in 1995 to 76% in 2008. In contrast, the public sector has 
experienced huge downsizing. 
  
One of the most notable features of Chinese urban labor market is the categorization 
of employment by ownership. There were two main types of ownerships up to the early 
phase of the economic reforms: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), urban collective 
enterprises (UCEs). Things changed quite dramatically starting in 1997, when the 
Chinese government moved forward with long-delayed plans to diversify ownership of 
enterprises, and private firms were encouraged. The Chinese Communist Party’s 15th 
Congress held in September 1997 recognized private enterprises as an important 
component of the economy.  
 
On the other hand, the state sector reform was speeded up after the same Congress 
held in September 1997, which encouraged both the corporatization of large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the restructuring of small SOEs, and allowed inefficient firms to 
reduce employment or go bankrupt (Lu and Jiang, 2008). The objective of this reform 
was to shut down loss-making SOEs, to establish modern forms of corporate governance, 
and to de-link the provision of social services from individual employers.  
 
Since the watershed of 1997, the urban labor market has been reshaped with massive 
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layoffs by state-owned companies. Due to the previous lifetime employment system in 
the public sector, until the mid-1990s, SOEs and UCEs still had a huge pool of hidden 
unemployment featuring overstaffing, shirking, and low productivity. The aggressive 
economic restructuring led to the layoffs of at least 30 million workers by 2004, mostly 
from the public sector (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2009). The huge-scale massive layoffs 
caused a sharp decrease in the share of urban employment in state sector. Zhang (2010) 
estimated that from 1998 to 2002, the net employment in SOEs and UCEs experienced a 
reduction of about 40 million and 20 million, respectively. During the five-year period, 
nearly 60 million workers lost their jobs in the public sector where they used to enjoy 
secure employment. Since then, the number of workers in both SOEs and urban collective 
enterprises (UCEs) kept decreasing, from 144.6 million in 1995 to 71.1 million in 2008 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2011), a total decrease of fifty percent.  
 
2.2.2 Rising wages and rising rural-urban wage inequality 
Urban and rural wages have been both increasing, but urban wages have grown much 
faster than rural wages, and now the average urban wage is approximately four times as 
high as the average rural wage. 
  
Over the last decade, the wages in both urban and rural areas have been increasing. 
Cai and Wang (2010) selected 16 sectors where data on average wages were available and 
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showed that nearly the real average wages in all of those sectors have increased since the 
mid of 1990s. Figure 2.3 illustrates the increase in the real earnings in urban sector using 
official data from National bureau of Statistics. The data on labor income below is based 
on surveys for registered agencies and enterprises in urban sector, including state-owned 
enterprises, private firms, government agencies, and foreign-owned enterprises. That is, 
these figures only cover the workers employed in registered establishments in the urban 
area of China. Self-employment workers and workers in un-registered establishments are 
excluded from the figures below.  
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Figure 2.3 Average Real Urban Annual Earnings (yuan) 
 
On the other hand, Zhang, Yang, and Wang (2010) use a long-term data from 1993 to 
2007 on rural wages in six provinces, and discover that the real wages both in the peak 
and slack seasons in rural China have begun to rise substantially since 2003. One possible 
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reason for the rising rural wage is that since 2003, the government has implemented many 
public policies favoring rural development, including the abolition of agricultural taxes, 
the provision of subsidies for purchasing agricultural machines or equipment, the 
accelerated development of rural public services, increased investment in rural 
infrastructure and the provision of small loans to rural households (Ash, 2010). 
 
However, few existing studies have compared the rural and urban wages, in large 
part because the nation-wide wage data in rural sector is not available (Zhang, 2010). In 
order to make this comparison, I employ the labor income as a proxy for wages and 
calculated the average real annual labor income for urban sector and rural sector 
respectively, by virtue of utilizing the data from Chinese Statistics Yearbook in various 
years. Labor income comprises wages and supplementary labor income and is defined as 
all compensation paid to workers. The following table demonstrates the results.  
 
Table 2.1 Average Real Annual Labor Income (yuan) 
Year Rural Urban Ratio(U/R) 
1995 2766  5348  1.93  
2000 3723  9333  2.51  
2005 5003  18200  3.64  
2007 6323  24721  3.91  
2008 7265  28898  3.98  
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The data above for rural workers comes from household surveys in the rural area, 
while the urban data only covers workers in registered establishments in the urban area of 
China, including state-owned enterprises, private firms, government agencies, and 
foreign-owned enterprises. Table 2.1 indicates that the average real annual labor income 
in urban areas is approximately four times as high as the counterpart in rural areas in 
2008. Since the supplementary labor income still plays a small role in the total 
compensation, I use the labor income as a proxy for wages. Therefore, I can cautiously 
conclude that the average urban wage is roughly four times as high as the average rural 
wage. 
 
Moreover, within the urban sector, after a long stagnation of rural migrants’ wage in 
the previous decade, the latest change is that rural migrants’ wage started to rise. Based 
on surveys for migrant population, Figure 2.4 indicates that rural migrants earned twice in 
2009 as much as they earned ten years ago. 
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Sources: National bureau of Statistics for 2001-6; Ministry of Agriculture (2010) for 
2007-9. 
Figure 2.4 Rural Migrants’ Real Annual Earnings (yuan) 
 
However, even in 2008, the average earning of rural migrants in cities was only 
13,872 yuan, which is much lower than the average urban income in the same year, i.e. 
29,229 yuan. Table 2.2 makes a comparison between the average urban annual earnings 
and annual earnings for migrants from rural areas from 2005 to 2008, and the results 
imply that the gap in real earnings between rural migrants and urban residents has been 
indeed widening. 
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Table 2.2 Rural Migrants’ Wages and Average Urban Wage 
Year Real Annual Earnings (yuan) 
 
Average Urban Sector 
(1) Rural Migrants (2) Gap (1)-(2) Ratio (1)/(2) 
2005 18200 10332 7868 1.76  
2006 20856 11352 9504 1.83  
2007 24721 12720 12001 1.94 
2008 28898 13872 15026 2.08  
 
2.2.3 Household registration system (hukou) 
Workers with different hukou face different costs of living in cities and have different 
access to government-provided public service and welfare programs in the urban area.  
 
In China, the most often cited labor market intervention is the continued enforcement 
of the household registration system (hukou), which was designed to strictly limit labor 
mobility within China. This section attempts to summarize the main aspects of current 
hukou system from labor economists’ point of view in order to uncover what role the 
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hukou system plays in the current Chinese labor market.  
 
The restrictions on labor mobility within China regulated by the hukou system have 
been relaxed significantly. At present, Chinese workers are free to move and work in any 
place within China. Accordingly, any internal migration is legal regardless of a worker’s 
hukou status. The hukou system has lost its significance on strictly prohibiting Chinese 
workers from migrating to places different from where they were born.  
 
However, although internal migration is not forbidden, the current hukou system 
assigns different benefits and costs associated with migration based on people’s hukou 
statuses. For instance, although workers are allowed to migrate to any place, their 
children may not be able to attend public schools in the new place. Therefore, the hukou 
policy still has a large effect on influencing people’s migration decisions. 
 
2.2.3.1 What is the hukou system? 
Hukou means household registration system in China. The current hukou system in 
China is very complicated. Since the late 1980s, China has devolved the power of the 
hukou management and hukou-related policy-making from central government to local 
governments (cities and towns) (Chan, 2010). Thus, local governments have now 
received full power and discretion to make their own hukou policies within their 
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administrative jurisdictions. As a consequence, hukou-related policies may vary 
substantially from one place to another. Given the complexity of the current hukou 
system and the enormity of the information accumulated on this subject, I will focus on 
the central elements of the current hukou system that labor economists are most interested 
in, leaving out unnecessary details and other possible digressions.  
 
All Chinese nationals’ personal hukou is categorized according to two classifications: 
one by hukou type and the other by hukou location.  
 
(1) Hukou type.  
The hukou “type” or “nature” is differentiated into “agricultural” and 
“non-agricultural” hukou. In January 1958, the central government issued the Regulations 
of Hukou Registration which required that each person born in China should be classified 
either agriculture hukou or non-agriculture hukou. Since the early 1960s, this distinction 
between agricultural and non-agricultural status defined one’s relationship with the state 
and eligibility for an array of state-provided welfare (Chan, 2009). Non-agricultural status 
entitled the bearer to state-provided housing, employment, grain rations, education, and 
access to medical care as well as other benefits, which were not available to agricultural 
hukou holders (Cheng and Selden, 1994). The hukou type originated from the 
occupational division in China’s economy in the 1950s, but as the system evolved, the 
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“agricultural” and “nonagricultural” distinction bore no necessary relationship to the 
actual occupations of the holders.  
 
Currently, the most important determinant of a person’s hukou type when the person 
was born is parental hukou types. If both of a couple hold agricultural hukou, their 
children would be automatically admitted as agricultural hukou. That is, children of both 
parents with agricultural hukou, even if physically born in the city, are still granted 
agricultural hukou (Chan, 2010). If the couple differs in terms of hukou type, their 
children can freely choose between agricultural or non-agricultural hukou. 
 
Sometimes the agricultural and non-agricultural hukous are referred to as rural and 
urban hukous, respectively (Knight, Deng and Li, 2010; Naughton, 2007). Nonetheless, 
we should keep in mind that “rural” and “urban” here are not referring to a person’s 
current physical location, whereas they are synonyms of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural hukou, respectively. Due to a considerable amount of labor mobility in 
current China, it is imprudent to judge a person’s physical location by hukou type, i.e. 
agricultural or non-agricultural hukou status. Table 2.3 illustrates the possible mixtures. 
As can be seen, cities1 have both non-agricultural and agricultural hukou populations 
residing within them and, similarly, agricultural hukou population may exist in the rural 
areas or in the cities. With China’s complicated hukou system, the fine differences in the 
                                                        
1 Cities and urban areas are synonyms throughout the dissertation. 
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terminology of hukou classification– especially after translation – can easily be 
overlooked, leading to confusion and misunderstanding. For an accurate understanding of 
China’s current hukou system, it is essential to differentiate these terms carefully.  
 
Table 2.3 Population Groups by Hukou Type and Actual Location  
 Agricultural Hukou Non-agricultural Hukou 
Urban Areas 
Rural Migrants and Their 
Dependents 
Urban Permanent Residents 
Urban-Urban Migrants 
Rural Areas Agriculture Workers Some Workers in TVEs* 
*TVEs refer to township and village enterprises. 
 
Starting from the early 2000s, some regions and cities (e.g., Zhejiang, Shijiazhuang), 
have implemented experimental hukou reforms, making it easy for rural residents to 
obtain a non-agricultural hukou. To date, the distinction between agricultural hukou and 
non-agricultural hukou has been removed in 13 of 31 provinces in China, such as 
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Shanghai, Hebei, Jiangsu, etc, of which the majority are 
located in eastern China. That is, these provinces have abolished the “agricultural” and 
“non-agricultural” hukou distinction within individual jurisdictions.  
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(2) Hukou location  
In addition to the hukou type, each person is also categorized according to his or her 
place of hukou registration. This is the individual’s official and only “permanent” 
residence (Chan, 2009). Similar to hukou type, under the current hukou system, a person’s 
residential location of hukou when born is also determined by parental hukou locations. If 
both of the parents hold a hukou in city A, then their children would be admitted as a 
local hukou specific to city A. If parents differ in terms of hukou locations, then their 
children can freely choose hukou location the same as either their father’s or mother’s.  
 
In other words, in addition to the hukou type described above, each person is also 
distinguished by whether he has local hukou or non-local hukou with respect to an 
administrative unit (such as city or town). The local hukou registration defined one’s 
rights to pursue many activities and eligibility for services in a specific locality. Because 
labor mobility was very rare before 1980, almost all people actually remained where they 
were “supposed” to be. The number of people residing in a location different from the 
place of hukou registration was quite small. However, in current China, labor mobility is 
so widespread that non-local hukou holders account for a significant proportion of total 
population in urban areas, especially in big cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai.  
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Since there are two classifications of hukou status in current China, in most cities 
there exist four types of people, excluding foreign nationals, based on the dual 
classifications of hukou above. Table 2.4 illustrates the four possible hukou statuses in a 
given administrative unit.  
 
Table 2.4 Four Types of Hukou Status 
 Agricultural Hukou Non-agricultural Hukou 
Living in a place the 
same as hukou 
location 
Local Agricultural Hukou Local Non-agricultural Hukou 
Living in a place 
different from hukou 
location 
Non-Local Agricultural 
Hukou 
Non-Local Non-Agricultural 
Hukou 
 
The distinction between hukou type and hukou location is crucial for understanding 
current hukou system in China, because policy changes to the hukou system will have 
differential impacts on people with different hukou statuses based on the dual 
classifications. To clarify this point, we use Beijing (as one ‘‘local’’ place) city to provide 
an illustrative example of these four types of people. First, those holding local (Beijing) 
and non-agricultural hukou are mostly called Beijing permanent residents, or urban 
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residents for short. Second, those holding local and agricultural hukou are migrants 
coming from Beijing rural area and are thus called rural residents. Third, those holding 
non-local (non-Beijing) and non-agricultural hukou are mostly migrants from other cities 
and are commonly called urban migrants. Finally, those holding non-local and 
agricultural hukou are named as rural migrants. In the past two decades, the majority of 
migrating population are people with agricultural hukou going into other cities, falling 
into the final category. Table 2.5 displays the definitions for these groups, and these 
definitions will be used consistently throughout the paper. 
 
 Table 2.5 Definitions of Four Types of Workers in a Given City 
Group Name Hukou Status 
Urban Residents Local Non-agricultural Hukou 
Rural Residents Local Agricultural Hukou 
Urban Migrants Non-Local Non-Agricultural Hukou 
Rural Migrants Non-Local Agricultural Hukou 
 
2.2.3.2 Hukou-related public service and welfare benefits 
The current hukou system is related to the access to a variety of public service and 
welfare programs, such as children education, medicare, housing subsidies, social 
security coverage, and so on (Li and Qiu, 2010; Li, 2010a; Yang, 2006). In current China, 
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most of public service and welfare benefits are attached to a person’s hukou status, rather 
than the physical location. One can physically move to a new place but can be 
permanently barred access to local services and welfare programs. People who have 
moved to a new place but do not possess local hukou are usually called “floating” 
population. Conceptually, this is the group that has moved away from the location where 
their hukou is registered. Although the right of the police to expel migrants was abolished 
in 2003, hukou status still matters to a great extent with regards to the accessibility to 
welfare programs and public service.  
 
Again, we need to keep in mind the two classifications of hukou status when 
examining the hukou-related benefits. In terms of agricultural hukou, the most important 
benefit associated with it is the land-use rights. In most places, a person with agricultural 
hukou will be automatically allocated a piece of land. However, the ownership of land 
belongs to the state, which means people can only use the land but cannot sell it or rent it 
out. Recently, the Chinese government issued a document to allow farmers to “transfer 
the right to operate on contracted land in the form of sub-contracting, leasing out, swap, 
transfer, shareholder cooperation, etc.” (Ash 2009). This initiative appeared to sanction 
the right of farmers to rent out their land to others, including companies. As a 
consequence, several provinces have initiated some experimental reforms on land renting, 
and now allow people to rent out their land for a short time period. However, in 
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present-day China land rental arrangements are generally informal, short term, and 
between households living in the same village (Feng et al., 2010; Jin and Deininger, 
2009). In addition to the land-use rights, agricultural hukou holders can currently have 
access to agriculture subsidies and some kinds of social security programs due to the 
policy changes favoring rural areas which have been carried out in recent years. In spite 
of increasing benefits associated with agricultural hukou, only a few people are actually 
willing to pursue the agricultural hukou because the benefit related to non-agricultural 
hukou is still larger in most places.  
 
On the other hand, in terms of the benefits of non-agricultural hukou, we have to take 
into account the hukou location which matters substantially. Hence, I will investigate the 
benefits associated with non-agricultural hukou in small cities and big cities separately.  
   
As stated before, having a local hukou in small cities is associated with very few 
welfare benefits. Most of good schools and hospitals in China are located in large cities. 
Even though a person does not have a local hukou in a small city, his or her children can 
still go to public schools in this city and only bears a small amount of additional fees. 
Moreover, small cities usually have few generous social welfare programs, such as 
housing subsidies or minimum living guarantee. In sum, hukou-related welfare benefits 
are very limited in small cities, which is the main reason why local hukou in these cities 
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is less desirable.  
 
On the contrary, possessing a hukou in a big city is accompanied by a great number 
of welfare benefits and public services, including housing subsidies, children education, 
social security programs, and so forth. A large proportion of migrants and their children 
cannot enjoy welfare benefits as urban residents do.  
 
(1) Housing  
Nowadays, the housing prices in China’s big cities are surprisingly high. In order to 
avoid the housing prices to continue to sky-rocket, the governments of more than thirty 
big cities have implemented a policy called “restricted transaction” since January 2011, 
which basically means that people without a local hukou in these big cities cannot buy a 
new house there. For instance, people without Beijing hukou are no longer permitted to 
purchase a house in Beijing city unless they have had formal jobs (defined by the 
coverage of social security programs) in Beijing for more than five consecutive years. As 
a consequence, most people without Beijing hukou are not able to own a new house no 
matter whether or not they already have a house in Beijing. 
 
In addition to the right to buy a house, low-income local hukou holders in big cities 
can enjoy generous housing subsidies. They can either rent a house at a low price or buy a 
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small house at a rate at least 30% lower than the market price (Li et al., 2010; Stephens, 
2010).  
 
(2) Children education  
In terms of education for migrant children, a major policy document issued by the 
State Council in May 2001 stipulated that local governments take up the responsibility of 
providing nine-year compulsory education for migrants’ children through the public 
school system. However, the enforcement is very weak in big cities. In fact, few local 
governments have actually implemented this policy of accommodating migrant children 
in public schools (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). 
 
It appears that there has been progress in a few big cities in the past several years in 
terms of permission of migrants’ children to public schools, such as Beijing and Shenzhen. 
But many serious problems still remain. Currently, in the majority of big cities, children 
with local hukou can receive nine-year mandatory schooling in public schools at a very 
low cost, whereas migrant children often have to pay a school fee several times that of 
local residents (Chen and Yang, 2010). As Liu and Zheng (2008) said, on average, the 
school fees per child in the city nearly account for one third of a rural migrant’ annual 
income. 
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(3) Social security programs 
The social security system in China has three elements: social relief, social welfare, 
and social insurance. Social relief mainly refers to social assistance programs, such as 
minimum living guarantee, which is limited to residents with local urban hukou. Local 
residents whose family income is lower than a given threshold would be eligible for a 
fixed amount of income guarantee provided by the local government. Social welfare 
includes disability benefits, free access to parks and libraries for senior local residents, 
and so forth. Most of migrants without local hukou are not eligible for urban social relief 
and social welfare programs. They are only eligible for urban social insurance programs, 
including pension, medical, unemployment, work-related injury and maternity insurance.  
 
Even though migrants now have access to social insurance programs in urban areas, 
local hukou holders and migrants whose hukou location is somewhere else usually have 
separate social insurance systems. For instance, Yang (2006) stated that young women in 
Beijing without a local hukou are not covered by maternity insurance, which is only 
applicable for local hukou holders.  
 
Li and Qiu (2010) compared the pension systems between local residents and 
migrants in several big cities, and discovered two main differences. First, local hukou 
holders belong to an old-age insurance system which is a combination of pay-as-you-go 
  
 
41 
system and individual accounts. In this system, people can not only enjoy the 
accumulation of pension funds, they can also be provided a guaranteed amount of 
pension each month after retirement via pay-as-you-go system. In contrast, migrants 
without local hukou are only eligible for individual account system, similar to private 
insurance. Secondly, the amount of pension for local residents increases with the overall 
price level, that is, with adjustment for inflation. However, people without local hukou in 
these cities are not eligible for this adjustment.  
 
To recapitulate, various welfare programs are linked to applicants’ hukou location. 
Small cities usually have few generous social welfare programs, whereas having a local 
hukou in big cities of China can generate numerous monetary benefits, though the amount 
of the benefits may vary from place to place. However, most of rural migrants are 
working in big cities of China. A report from the Chinese government says that nearly 
64% of rural migrants are working in big cities defined by population size (Zhang et al., 
2010). These migrants have very limited access to local welfare programs.  
 
2.2.3.3 How can a person change the hukou status in current China? 
I close this section by introducing ways in which an individual’s hukou status might 
be changed. One’s hukou status would remain unchanged no matter where the individual 
physically moved, unless he or she goes through a formal procedure of hukou conversion. 
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Since there are two classifications of hukou status, this section will explain the ways of 
hukou conversion based on the two classifications.  
 
(1) Hukou type 
As mentioned in the above section, recent hukou reforms have made the hukou type 
lose much of its substantive and symbolic significance. Thirteen provinces have 
eliminated the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou within their 
jurisdictions. Consequently, people whose hukou location are in these provinces have the 
same hukou type. In addition, several other provinces are also beginning to eliminate the 
distinction in hukou type in some cities and most towns.  
 
In places where the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou still 
exists, obtaining a non-agricultural hukou has also become easier than before. For 
example, in most places, people can change the hukou type from agricultural hukou to 
non-agriculural hukou by obtaining a salary job in urban areas, being admitted to college 
or buying a house in cities (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). All in all, the conversion of 
hukou type has become less difficult due to recent hukou reforms since 2000.  
 
However, in most places, there is notable opportunity cost of the conversion of hukou 
type that needs to be mentioned: those accepting a non-agricultural hukou in cities are 
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mostly required to give up their entitlement to land permanently in their home village, a 
potentially huge financial loss in some areas. In recent years, China has implemented 
various policies to promote rural development, such as agriculture subsidies and 
elimination of agriculture taxes. These policies have made agricultural hukou in some 
areas more attractive than before. Therefore, some agricultural hukou holders are 
reluctant to obtain non-agricultural hukou at the expense of giving up their land for ever. 
As a result, people who have an urban hukou still account for a small share of the total 
population. In 2009, the proportion of the population with non-agricultural hukou status, 
which all native urban residents hold, was 34 percent (Cai, 2011). 
 
Li (2010b) conducted an empirical research to investigate the effect of the 
elimination of the distinction between agricultural hukou and non-agricultural hukou in 
eastern China on rural-urban migration. Using the difference-in difference approach, He 
found that for farmers with small piece of land, the policy effect is positive and 
statistically significant on their probability to migrate out, whereas for farmers with large 
piece of land, the effect is very small in magnitude and not significant. As it turns out, 
owing to rural development strategies, the opportunity cost of moving to cities to work is 
increasing for farmers.  
 
Theoretically, there is another possibility of hukou conversion, from non-agricultural 
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to agricultural hukou. However, in reality, this case is rare due to the two reasons as below. 
One is that in most places, the conversion to agricultural hukou can only be done locally, 
that is, within an administrative jurisdiction. It is almost impossible for an urban worker 
in Gansu province (a relatively poor area in western China) to obtain an agricultural 
hukou in Beijing to take agriculture work. Secondly, even though some policies favoring 
agriculture work have been carried out, a majority of urban workers still prefer 
non-agriculture work and hence non-agricultural hukou due to the availability to 
better-pay urban jobs and already formed life style in urban areas. Thus, so far, very few 
people have chosen to change their hukou type from non-agricultural to agricultural 
hukou in practice.  
 
(2) Hukou location 
The ways to change hukou location vary significantly from place to place. As 
mentioned in the previous section, beginning in the late 1980s, China has gradually 
implemented various programs to devolve fiscal and administrative powers to lower-level 
governments. This trend has included changes in the management of the hukou system. 
Most local governments (cities and towns) now have full power to set their own local 
hukou admission criteria and the number of new local hukou they admit each year within 
their respective administrative jurisdictions. 
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Since there are no uniform criteria for hukou conversion in terms of hukou location 
across the whole country, I will analyze both small and big cities, respectively, in an 
attempt to capture the ways to change hukou location throughout the country.  
 
Starting from 1997, hukou conversions to small cities and towns where 
state-provided welfare is minimal have been made much easier (Chan, 2009). A variety of 
policies have been put into effect to ease the hukou conversions to small cities. For 
example, some local governments admit local hukou to people who have salaried jobs or 
own a house in their administrative areas, or possess some types of occupational skills 
fitting the requirements stipulated by local governments (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). 
Despite the apparent ease of migrating to small cities and obtain a hukou in those cities 
under the initiatives in 1997, a small portion of people actually choose to do this since 
small cities tend not to attract migrants due to relative lack of job opportunities and less 
or almost no public service or welfare programs.  
 
In contrast, as expected, many large cities where there are more 
government-provided benefits tend to put up the most stringent entry conditions to admit 
local hukou. For a sample of large cities, the destinations of tens of millions of migrants, 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Nanjing, city governments grant 
local permanent hukou mostly to those who are very wealthy (for example, able to 
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purchase a top-end apartment in the market or make large investments to open a company 
in those cities) or highly educated (usually with a master degree or professional 
qualification), and to those who take very decent jobs in public sector or in big private 
companies, and to those make a big investment in a large city. For instance, taking 
Beijing as an example, people who make an investment in Beijing over five hundred 
thousand dollars can receive Beijing hukou. In Chongqing, migrant workers who have 
worked and undertaken business for a certain period of time, bought a house, invested, or 
who pay taxes of a certain amount are eligible to obtain local hukou status and to receive 
equal access to welfare benefits, such as social insurance, subsidized housing, education 
and medical care. In Guangdong, the government converts various criteria, such as 
schooling, working skills, contributions to social insurance, volunteering and blood 
donation, into credit points, which accumulate to help obtaining local urban hukou status 
(Cai, 2011). Thus, I conclude that the present hukou conversion policy in big cities is 
almost totally geared towards the super rich and the highly educated and is irrelevant to 
most of migrants. Rural migrants from poor areas, who account for the largest proportion 
of total migration, do not usually belong to any of the above categories. The strict 
requirements of hukou conversion are clearly beyond their reach. For example, if an 
ordinary worker from a poor area migrates to Beijing and takes a typist job, this worker 
will have almost no hope to obtain a Beijing hukou, no matter how long he or she stays in 
Beijing.  
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To summarize this section, although restrictions on internal migration within China 
have been gradually relaxed especially in the last decade, they have not been totally 
removed. The hukou system still has a large influence on the expected benefits and costs 
associated with migration behaviors, and thus remains the most significant policy 
affecting China’s labor market.  
 
2.2.4 Hukou-related labor market discrimination 
Workers with rural hukou earn lower wages and are less likely to be hired in the 
high-wage sector in urban areas compared to workers with local urban hukou due to both 
differences in human capital and labor market discrimination. 
 
2.2.4.1 Wage and hiring differentials  
(1) Different wages 
Although there are two classifications of hukou status, i.e., hukou type and location, 
respectively, most of previous research has not considered the separate the effect of each 
classification. Rather, the vast majority of studies have compared the wages between rural 
migrants with non-local agricultural hukou and urban residents with local 
non-agricultural hukou. Chen and Huang (2010) reported the widening wage differential 
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between rural migrants and urban residents. Demurger et al. (2009) ran wage regressions 
controlling for observed characteristics, and concluded that the wage differential between 
rural migrants and urban residents cannot be fully explained by migrants’ lower 
productivity. Park, Zhao, and Huang (2006) claimed that wage gap does not result solely 
from differentials in human capital attributes such as education, but is also clearly an 
outcome of the state's control over hukou status. Meng (2000) discovered that the huge 
wage gap between urban residents and rural migrants cannot be fully explained by 
individuals' productivity-related endowments. A significant part of the earnings 
differential is attributable to institutional job rationing in favor of permanent urban 
residents. Yao and Lai (2004) employed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach and 
concluded that rural migrants in Zhejiang province earn 30% less than urban residents 
even controlling for observed characteristics, such as education and work experience. 
Deng (2007) used the China Household Income Project (CHIP) data which basically 
covers the whole country, and found that 60 per cent of the income differential between 
rural migrants and urban residents originates from unexplained factors. Wang (2005) 
conducted econometric analysis and claimed that 57% of the wage differential between 
rural migrants and urban residents can be explained by human capital variables after 
controlling occupation and industry, but the remaining 43% of the wage differential 
remain unexplained. 
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Since rural migrants differ from urban residents in both hukou type and location, it is 
hard to identify which hukou classification is the true source of the observed wage 
differentials from the above studies. Gravemeyer, Gries and Xue (2010) investigated the 
wage differential solely based on hukou type. They employed a Blinder–Oaxaca 
decomposition analysis to estimate the wage differential between workers with urban and 
rural hukou in Shenzhen city, and found that on average and all else being equal, 52.9 per 
cent of the higher wage of urban hukou holders is due to higher returns to the different 
characteristics and attributes, while 47 per cent is due to the higher endowments in 
characteristics such as education. This would imply that 52.9 perdcent of the average 
wage difference between the two groups cannot be explained by observed characteristics 
related to productivity.  
 
Liu (2010) employed a similar approach as above and obtained similar results using 
household surveys in 21 cities in Guangdong province in 2007. The sample in total 
covered 38,012 workers with four different hukou statuses. Liu compared the wages 
between urban migrants and rural migrants, and found that urban migrants earned much 
more than rural migrants and nearly 50% of this wage differential cannot be explained by 
human capital variables.  
 
Gagnon et al (2011) compared three groups including urban residents, urban 
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migrants, and rural migrants using the Census data, and concluded that comparable 
workers with agricultural hukou earn much less than those with non-agricultural hukou. 
They found that urban migrants earn nearly 40% more than rural migrants, and 
furthermore, 40 percent of this income differential cannot be explained by observed 
characteristics. In contrast, by comparing urban migrants with urban residents, they 
discovered that urban migrants on average earn even more than urban residents after 
controlling for observed characteristics. Thus, they argued that hukou-based wage 
discrimination is only attributed to hukou type, rather than to hukou location.  
 
According to a sample survey conducted by the Guangdong provincial government 
in 2005, among the 10,000 workers with agricultural hukou, 57% believed the hukou 
system caused them to be paid less than urban workers even when they were in similar 
positions (Research Team of Guangdong Provincial Government, 2006).  
 
(2) Different access to high-pay jobs  
In China, deliberate exclusion for migrants in cities in terms of job access still 
remains in some high-pay sectors (Gagnon et al., 2011). Some job positions still require 
or prefer workers with local and non-agricultural hukou.  
 
Chen and Hoy (2011) said that workers with rural hukou account for a very small 
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portion of workers in the high-wage SOE sector. This is in contrast with the private 
companies, where migrants outnumber local workers with urban hukou. Park, Zhao, and 
Huang (2006) measured the extent of occupational and sectoral segregation between local 
residents and rural migrants in urban areas of different provinces in multinomial logit 
models. They find that rural migrants are more likely to work in service industry and take 
manual jobs in private sector. In contrast, the majority of urban residents enjoy 
commercial and professional jobs. Zhao (2005) demonstrated that rural migrants find it 
difficult to gain access to formal jobs covered by social insurance programs due to their 
hukou status. The majority of migrants work in low-pay private firms. According to an 
official survey in 2005, most of rural migrants were working in low-pay industries, such 
as manufacturing and construction. The figure below displays the employment share in 
each industry for rural migrants in 2005. 
27%
12%
26%
9%
11%
15%
Manufacturing
Wholesale and retail trade
Construction
Community service
Hotels and Catering Services
Others
 
Data source: Sun (2008) 
Figure 2.5 Employment Share across Industries for Rural Migrants 
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Gagnon et al (2011) made a comparison of three groups with different hukou status 
to disentangle the respective effect of hukou type and location on job access. They said 
that there exists hiring discrimination against both rural hukou and non-local hukou. 
Compared with urban residents, urban migrants are 17 percent less likely to enter the 
formal sector defined by having formal labor contract, and more than 80 percent of this 
gap is unexplained and considered as discrimination based on hukou location. On the 
other hand, rural migrants are also nearly 17% less likely to enter formal sector than 
urban migrants, and about 50% of this difference is due to discrimination. Therefore, 
rural migrants are disadvantaged due to both hukou type and location. 
  
As it turns out, although non-local hukou workers are not disadvantaged in terms of 
wage discrimination, they seem to face hiring discrimination with regards to access to 
high-pay jobs. Moreover, workers with non-local rural hukou face not only the 
discrimination against agricultural hukou, but also against non-local hukou. The double 
disadvantage makes rural migrants very difficult to find urban high-pay jobs.  
 
2.2.4.2 Reasons for wage and hiring differentials 
As shown in decomposition studies above, some proportion of the wage and hiring 
differentials between urban and rural hukou holders can be explained by observed 
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characteristics, such as human capital variables, whereas there is still an unexplained 
proportion most likely due to labor market discrimination 
 
(1) Reasons for wage differentials 
The portion of the wage that is not explained by productivity-related observed 
characteristics is commonly used as an estimate of the impact of labor market 
discrimination. Arrow (1973) defines labor market discrimination as the valuation in the 
market place of personal characteristics of the worker that are unrelated to worker 
productivity. Specifically, the wage discrimination means that two groups of workers who 
have the same productivity receive different wages (Becker, 1971; Aigner and Cain, 
1977). Most of previous research on labor market discrimination that have been done in 
western countries focused on gender or race-based discrimination (Price and Wolfers, 
2010; Blau and Kahn, 2000; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1991). Most of previous studies 
argued that the wage differentials between observationally-equivalent workers with urban 
and rural hukou are due to wage discrimination (Gravemeyer et al., 2010; Xue and Gries, 
2007). Li (2010a) claimed that rural migrants are discriminated against in the urban labor 
market and are regarded as “second class citizens” in urban society. 
 
However, it should be noted that there could be another important reason for the 
wage differential. That is, the observationally-equivalent workers may not be truly 
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equivalent, while there may be some unobserved productivity differentials between the 
two types of workers responsible for the wage gap. These unobserved characteristics are 
known to the employers, but not known to the econometricians who run the wage 
regressions. Chen and Hoy (2011) conducted a comprehensive investigation of the 
underlying reasons for such observed wage differentials by utilizing a survey of both 
migrants and local workers in 21 manufacturing companies in Shanghai, and qualitative 
interviews with personnel managers in the surveyed companies. They found that many 
employers are concerned about migrants’ high job mobility and instability, but low 
morale. Moreover, workers with rural hukou usually have their local accent, and 
sometimes have difficulties communicating with employers. A final disadvantage of 
employing migrants concerns migrants’ accountability. For example, migrants have 
known to provide fake certificates of qualifications to obtain jobs. These unobserved 
characteristics related to productivity may explain some of the wage differentials found in 
econometric results.  
 
The ideal way to prove the existence of discrimination and separate the effect of 
unobserved productivity is to conduct experiments or natural experiments. Unfortunately, 
since no empirical studies have been done in China on this topic using the experiment 
technique, it is impossible to rigorously prove the existence of wage discrimination 
against workers with rural hukou. Some of the factors that affect earnings, such as 
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motivation or work effort, cannot easily be quantified. Others (e.g., college major) are 
frequently unavailable in a particular dataset. Hence, in general, it is not possible to 
include all relevant job qualifications in a study of wage differentials between workers 
with different hukou. We have to acknowledge that the regression techniques have 
limitations on estimating the extent of wage discrimination.  
 
Nonetheless, since most studies have found that in the urban areas, the wage 
differentials between workers with urban and rural hukou are around 50% after 
controlling for various observables, it is unlikely that the wage gaps found in all of the 
literature are solely due to unmeasured productivities. Moreover, several studies have 
included some additional control variables or target on homogenous groups to make the 
estimates more convincing and accurate. For example, Wang (2005) controlled for 
occupation and industry, and Zhang et al (2010) only focused on similar positions. Both 
of these studies find that around 50% of wage differentials between workers with urban 
and rural hukou cannot be explained by observed variables. Moreover, Liu (2010) 
compared the wages between urban migrants and rural migrants, and found that urban 
migrants earned much more than rural migrants and nearly 50% of this wage differential 
cannot be explained by human capital variables. These studies at least indicate some 
degree of wage discrimination in the urban areas.  
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According to results from Gagnon et al (2011), the wage differential between urban 
and rural hukou holders is much larger in the formal sector with written labor contract 
than in the informal sector without written labor contract. Controlling for observables, 
they found that urban hukou holders earn 15% more than rural hukou holders in the 
informal sector, but about 50% in the formal sector.   
 
If any, why is there wage discrimination against rural hukou especially in the formal 
sector? The wage discrimination may arise from the fact that some employers in urban 
areas think that migrants, as a group, are low skilled and less reliable. Employers’ 
negative perceptions are likely to be used as stereotypes to discriminate against migrants 
(Chen and Hoy, 2011). In addition, the employers in the SOE sector may have prejudice 
against rural hukou holders, which is similar to taste-based model of labor market 
discrimination. Since the seminal work of Becker (1971), economists have sought to 
understand how the tastes of employers, customers, or co-workers could result in labor 
market discrimination. Becker's original analysis of discrimination sought to explain how, 
in a competitive system, two groups with equivalent labor could be paid different wages. 
Zhang, Nyland, and Zhu (2010) claimed that workers with rural hukou tend to suffer 
from wage discrimination in the high-wage SOE sector because the SOE sector has 
distinct wage structures and HR policies for urban residents and rural migrants. That is, it 
is the employers in the SOE who discriminate against rural hukou holders.  
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(2) Reasons for hiring differentials 
Ge (2007) argued that the observed differentials in hiring probability in the SOE 
sector indicate the existence of hiring discrimination against non-local rural hukou 
holders in this high wage sector. 
 
Again, we need to be very cautious about interpreting the regression results. It is also 
possible that the differential in hiring probability is due to unobserved productivity. Chen 
and Hoy (2011) claimed that the employers in the SOE sector believe that rural migrants 
are less reliable. Therefore, some positions that are relevant to money management such 
as accountant, cashier, and financial officer usually require or at least prefer local hukou 
holders. Moreover, employers may believe that local workers have more social networks 
in local areas, and these networks may help firms to extend their business in the SOE 
sector. These unobserved differentials may be partly responsible for the hiring differential 
observed in empirical literature. 
 
However, it is unlikely that all of the hiring differentials found in previous studies are 
only attributed to unmeasured characteristics. It is very plausible that there exists some 
degree of hiring discrimination against non-local rural hukou in the SOE sector. 
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Hiring discrimination is defined as workers with the same level of productivity have 
different access to the same jobs (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). One excellent paper 
by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) identified the race-based hiring discrimination in 
the US. By sending fictitious resumes to US firms, they found out that white-sounding 
names received 50% more call-backs than African American ones.  
 
If any, why is there hiring discrimination against certain hukou status? In my opinion, 
the answers in previous studies to this question are mostly misleading. A vast majority of 
previous literature argued that the main reason for the hiring discrimination was that 
urban governments had implemented policies such as occupation reservation for local 
residents in order to protect local workers. That is, the discrimination was caused by 
government policies favoring local residents. It is the government rather than employers 
that discriminates against non-local workers. For instance, Shen and Zhang (2010) said 
that “according to labor regulations in Shanghai city, firms in Shanghai have to give 
priority to local residents when making hiring decisions. Rural migrants with agricultural 
hukou could be hired only if local workers are not enough to fill in the vacancies. More 
than this, rural migrants are not allowed to take jobs in almost 20 industries including 
finance and insurance, government agencies, and high-technology industry. Similar 
regulations exist in some other cities, such as Wuhan in Hubei province, in which rural 
migrants cannot take positions in management and other professional work”.  
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Zhang et al (2010) said that governments in most of big cities set three different 
kinds of jobs: (1) jobs that are not accessible to certain hukou status; (2) jobs that should 
give priority to certain hukou status; (3) Hukou status does not matter. These three 
categories of jobs were ranked roughly by skills. For the last category of jobs that need 
low skills, all people had the same probability to be hired regardless of their hukou status. 
These policies had made firms treat workers differently with different hukou status when 
making hiring decisions. Workers with local non-agricultural hukou were assigned 
priority to receive good job offers. The government discrimination reduced the 
probability of getting a job in high-pay industries for migrants without local hukou, even 
though the migrants were able to perform jobs equally well in high-pay industries.  
 
As we know, the most widely-recognized theories of labor market discrimination are 
taste model, model of statistical discrimination, and crowding model (Becker, 1971; Cain, 
1986). Previous literature claimed that the empirical evidence on the hiring 
discrimination against workers with agricultural hukou is broadly consistent with the 
“crowding” model, in which some groups of workers are restricted to particular job 
markets and thus may be crowded into lower paying occupations. The crowding 
hypothesis has been proposed that as a result of discrimination in employment, some 
workers are crowded into certain occupations because of the refusal of most employers to 
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consider hiring them for jobs in other occupations (Bergmann, 1971). Crowding models 
of the labor market have been applied most frequently as an explanation for the 
discrimination generated by occupational segregation (Higgs, 1977; Hirsch and 
Schumacher, 1992). The following two figures illustrate how the wage gap is probably 
generated for comparable workers with different hukou type.  
 
“Crowding-Out” Sector            “Crowding-In” Sector 
 
Figure 2.6 Crowding Model of Labor Market Discrimination 
 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the crowding model of labor market discrimination. Assuming 
that without discrimination, the two sectors have the same wage. Since the government 
regulations prevent some workers with “bad” hukou (non-local or agricultural hukou) 
from entering certain jobs, these workers are crowded out, which generates high-pay 
sector and low-pay sector. The discrimination makes comparable workers with “good” 
hukou earn more but those with “bad” hukou earn less, generating the wage differential 
between comparable workers with different hukou statuses.  
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Nevertheless, these explanations for hiring discrimination have been out-dated. In 
fact, all of these kinds of discriminatory regulations mentioned above had been 
eliminated since 2004 (Chen and Hoy, 2011). Therefore, the discrimination found in 
recent literature should not be initiated by local governments. Rather, the employers in 
the SOE sector are discriminating against workers with non-local rural hukou.  
 
Based on interviews with employers, I think the following reason is mainly 
responsible for the hiring discrimination we observe in the current Chinese labor market. 
Employers in the SOE sector have prejudice against non-local workers because they think 
that as a group, are characterized by low education, less accountability and stability. Due 
to these prejudiced taste, the SOE sector is not willing to hire migrants even though they 
are observationally similar to local residents. Moreover, since the SOE sector is 
commonly thought as part of government, the political power helps the SOE sector afford 
the discrimination against workers without local urban hukou. 
 
For high-skill positions, there may be another reason for the hiring discrimination. 
When non-local hukou holders with high skill level search for high-pay jobs in the SOE 
sector, they also intend to change their hukou status to the local hukou after getting the 
job. Thus, employers who hire non-local hukou workers may have to take initiatives to 
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apply for local hukou quotas from the government. This application process usually takes 
much time and some financial cost, which makes employers in the SOE sector not willing 
to hire some migrants even though they are high skilled. That is, high-skilled workers 
with local hukou would possibly be hired preferentially compared to non-local hukou 
workers with identical skills.  
 
To recapitulate, on average, urban hukou holders earn more than rural hukou holders 
in urban areas, and are more likely to be hired in the high-wage sector, such as 
state-owned enterprises. The differences in productivity-related characteristics cannot 
fully explain these wage and hiring differentials, so it is very likely there exists both wage 
and hiring discrimination against rural hukou holders in the urban labor market. The main 
reason for possible discrimination is that in some high-pay sectors, employers’ negative 
perceptions on migrants make them generate some prejudice in favor of local residents. 
Furthermore, the protection from the government enables them to afford some degree of 
labor market discrimination. I will look further into this issue in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation.  
 
2.2.5 Simultaneous urban labor shortage and rural labor surplus 
The phenomena of urban labor shortage and rural labor surplus are co-existent in the 
current Chinese labor market.  
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In the terminology of labor economics, the labor shortage refers to the situation 
where the quantity of labor demanded exceeds the quantity of labor supplied at the wage 
lower than market-clearing level. As early as in 2003, a shortage of workers occurred in 
coastal region of China. The labor shortage was first noticed when many firms reported 
that they cannot hire enough workers as they want, and fewer migrants from the 
countryside arrived to look for urban jobs after Chinese New Year in February 2004.  
 
As time has gone by, the phenomenon of labor shortages has not disappeared but has 
spread to the Yangtze River Delta region, and even to provinces in central China, from 
which migrant laborers are generally sent out (Cai and Wang, 2010). Since the early 
months of 2010, Chinese factories in a few coastal cities have been struggling to find 
workers to help satisfy export orders. In July 2010, the media reported that factories in 
Guangdong have even hired many workers from Vietnam and elsewhere (Chan, 2010).  
 
In contrast, there is still evidence of a substantial pool of surplus labor available in 
rural China (Knight, Deng, and Li, 2010; Kwan, 2009; Minami and Ma, 2009; Green, 
2008). In Chinese context, most scholars either explicitly or implicitly, refer to rural labor 
surplus as a situation in which the marginal product of labor is very low and almost equal 
to zero (Knight et al., 2010; Chan, 2010; Garnaut, 2010; Yao and Zhang, 2010; Minami 
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and Ma, 2009). The labor surplus in this context is also called hidden unemployment or 
disguised unemployment in some literature. As Basu (1987) defined, broadly speaking, 
an economy is said to have surplus labor or disguised unemployment if it is possible to 
remove a part of its employed labor force without causing a fall in aggregate output. 
When there is a zero marginal product of labor, withdrawal of a certain amount of the 
labor force will not reduce production. On the other hand, a positive marginal product of 
labor does not exclude the possibility of the existence of disguised unemployment. 
Withdrawal of farm labor under this situation would cause a decline in farm output unless 
the remaining farmers were willing to work harder and longer (Liu and Swanson, 1967). 
According to Cai (2007), there are 490 million rural laborers in China, of which close to 
200 million are employed in non-agricultural work. With current agricultural production 
technology, 180 million rural laborers are needed to maintain the current level of 
agriculture output. Hence, there are approximately 110 million rural surplus of laborers 
with about 58 million under the age of 40. In other words, Cai claimed that if 110 million 
people working in agriculture sector migrate out to urban areas, the total agriculture 
output in China would not decrease. Chan (2010) agreed with Cai and argued that the 
current agriculture sector is overstaffed, and thus further rural-urban migration would not 
reduce the rural output in the short run.   
 
The estimated number of rural surplus ranges from 100 million to 150 million in the 
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above studies, since they employed different datasets and methods. The Development 
Research Center of the State Council, in a 2007 survey covering 2749 villages claimed 
that nearly one-quarter of these villages reported having young workers who can be 
transferred out of agriculture. This remaining population is still, in absolute terms, a huge 
untapped labor pool.  
 
How can we explain the co-existence of urban labor shortage and rural labor surplus? 
This issue has become a contentious topic in the current Chinese media. I propose two 
reasons to explain this phenomenon after investigating a considerable amount of previous 
literature.  
 
2.2.5.1 Institutional constraints 
There still exist substantial institutional constraints which create difficulties for 
migrants living in urban areas, and deter or prevent migrant workers from bringing their 
families with them (Knight, Deng, and Li, 2010). Currently, the hukou system is still the 
largest institutional constraint to prevent further migration from rural to urban areas even 
though migration to cities is not officially prohibited. As discussed in the previous section, 
the hukou system increases the costs of living in the city for rural hukou holders while 
decreasing the benefits associated with rural-to-urban migration. For instance, the 
migrants’ children have to pay a very high fee to attend public schools in the destination 
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city. Migrants without a local hukou in big cities cannot enjoy welfare benefit, such as 
minimum living guarantee or housing subsidies. The government still provides urban 
residents with some subsidies and benefits which are not available to some of rural 
migrants. This reduces the expected benefits for potential migrants. Furthermore, a large 
amount of transaction costs for rural migrants should not be ignored, such as the disutility 
of being away from family, expensive food and other necessities, high price of urban 
housing (Zhao, 1999; Shi 2002).  
 
In addition, perhaps more importantly, the hukou system creates hiring and wage 
discrimination against migrants and thus reduces their labor market opportunities. 
Comparable workers with agricultural hukou have a smaller probability to be hired in the 
high wage sector in urban areas than those with non-agricultural hukou. Furthermore, 
among observationally-equivalent people, those with agricultural hukou get paid less than 
those with non-agricultural hukou in urban China. These kinds of labor market 
discrimination decrease the expected wages of rural migrants and hence deter further 
migration. Shao et al (2007) maintained that the available jobs for migrants are usually 
Three D (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) occupations at the low end of wage scale.  
 
These restrictions and interventions listed above make many rural workers reluctant 
to leave the village, especially when the wages for rural migrants in urban areas are not 
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high enough to attract these workers.  
 
2.2.5.2 Skill difference 
The co-existence of rural labor surplus and urban labor shortage can be partly 
attributed to structural reasons as well, such as skill-mismatch. Specifically speaking, 
remaining workers in rural areas may not be able to take some job vacancies in cities due 
to lack of necessary knowledge or skills.  
 
Knight, Deng, and Li (2010) argued that most of remaining labor surplus in rural 
sector are unskilled workers, whereas labor shortage of skilled workers is more serious 
than that of unskilled workers in urban China. For example, some surveys indicate that a 
large number of potential migrants fail to migrate to cities because they do not possess 
necessary skills or years of schooling required by urban jobs (DeBrauw et al, 2002; Du, 
Park, and Wang, 2005). It is common for enterprises in cities to require a middle school 
degree (nine-year education) before even considering migrant job applicants. 
Nevertheless, 85% of the labor force working in rural agricultural sector has less than 
nine years of schooling (Dang, 2010). Guangdong, for example, reported job vacancies of 
about 750,000 in mid-2009, most of which were mainly in the skilled technician 
categories such as computer engineering technicians and mechanics, for which most rural 
migrants were not qualified (Chan, 2010). Yao (2010) asserted that China is trying to 
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upgrade their exports and thus the demand for skilled workers is increasing. He argued 
that there is a real shortage of skilled labor in China. The bulk of rural migrants, 60% or 
more, have only nine years of education, and people with technical diplomas are rare. 
 
Another concrete example of the shortage of skilled workers comes from a recent 
survey in Yancheng City, Jiangsu Province in 2010. Among 17 companies covered by the 
survey, 15 of them faced a shortage of skilled workers. They found that most of job 
seekers did not possess such skills as firms demanded (Chen, Cui, and Xue, 2010). 
Moreover, Cai and Wang (2010) argued that many firms set an age limit in recruitment. 
Firms in urban areas prefer younger workers to older workers. Job-searchers over 40 
years old without high education or skills are considered to be hard to find a high-pay job. 
Therefore, we need to take into account the heterogeneity of workers in terms of skill 
level to understand the co-existence of labor surplus in rural areas and labor shortage in 
cities.  
 
2.2.6 Unemployment 
Open unemployment is low in China and is mainly concentrated in cities of central 
and western China. 
 
Most Chinese scholars claim that there is no rural open unemployment and thus open 
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unemployment is mainly in cities (Cai and Wang, 2010; Han and Zhang, 2010). In rural 
China, the Household Responsibility System (HRS) guarantees that everybody has his or 
her share of land, so it is a reasonable assumption that rural unemployment is as low as 
negligible since workers can easily work on a piece of land to have a job in agriculture 
sector. People may argue that there may be rural unemployment during slack seasons. 
However, Chen et al (2010) claimed that farming during busy seasons, part-time job 
during slack time becomes the best option for most peasants in China. Even for people 
staying in rural areas during the slack seasons, if they are not actively searching for jobs, 
they would not be counted as unemployed. The only effect of non-working in slack 
seasons is a reduction in labor participations rate, but not an increase in rural 
unemployment.  
 
As discussed in the last section, the state sector reform was speeded up after the 
Congress held in September 1997, which encouraged the restructuring of small SOEs, 
and allowed inefficient firms to reduce employment or go bankrupt (Lu and Jiang, 2008). 
Since the watershed of 1997, the urban labor market has been reshaped with massive 
layoffs in state-owned companies. As a direct consequence of the massive layoffs in the 
state sector, the emergence of urban open unemployment became a policy concern for the 
first time in 1998. The official indicator of unemployment in China is so-called registered 
unemployment rate defined by the ratio of registered unemployment to the sum of 
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registered unemployment and registered employment, but it is widely believed to 
underestimate actual unemployment and therefore is questioned by domestic and 
international scholars (Yang and Gu, 2010; Solinger, 2001). During the time of massive 
layoffs of the public sector in 1998, most of the laid-off workers initially expected to 
return to work for their original companies when the state-owned companies recovered 
from profits loss. Therefore, at that time, many laid-off workers did not register 
themselves as unemployed in local government agencies. For example, between 1998 and 
2000 when a large number of SOEs workers were laid off, the registered unemployment 
rate remained unchanged at 3.1 percent.  
 
Currently, the registered unemployment only covers unemployed people who hold a 
local non-agricultural hukou, that is, the unemployed among local residents (Yang and 
Gu, 2010). Because registered unemployment does not cover migrants who are not 
working and actively seeking for jobs, this indicator fails to reflect the actual severity of 
urban unemployment. For instance, the registered unemployment rate in urban China was 
4.2% in 2005, whereas the Census data in 2005 showed that the surveyed urban 
unemployment rate was 5.2%.  
 
From 1996, some scholars have tried to estimate the unemployment rate based on 
different household surveys according to the ILO definition of unemployment. By ILO 
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definition, unemployment rate is the ratio of urban unemployment over urban labor force. 
Giles, Park, and Zhang (2005) shows that the surveyed unemployment rate rose from 4.5 
percent in 1996 to 7.3 percent in 2002, indicating a rise in urban unemployment due to 
the policy changes.  
 
Cai and Wang (2010) utilizes survey data from China Population Statistical Yearbook 
to estimate the unemployment rate since the state sector reform, and shows that urban 
unemployment rate rose steadily from 4.0 to 7.6 between 1995 to 2000. After reaching 
the peak of 7.6 percent in 2000, it actually tends to decline with fluctuations. This 
suggests that China may have turned the corner in resolving the unemployment problems 
of the millions of workers laid off during the process of public sector restructuring.  
 
Table 2.6 provides the updated evidence for the evolution of urban unemployment 
rate in China. In the following table, registered unemployment rate is the official 
indicator for urban unemployment, equal to the number of unemployed people in cities 
who registered with the government agency divided by the sum of registered 
unemployment and urban registered employment. In contrast, surveyed unemployment 
rate is estimated based on nationwide household surveys and is defined as the ratio of 
urban unemployment over urban labor force. A more detailed discussion about the 
relationship between the registered unemployment and surveyed unemployment is 
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provided in the appendix.  
 
Table 2.6 Urban Unemployment Rate (percent) 
 
Year Surveyed unemployment rate Registered unemployment rate 
1997 4.5 3.1 
1998 6.3 3.1 
1999 5.9 3.1 
2000 7.6 3.1 
2001 5.6 3.6 
2002 6.1 4.0 
2003 6.0 4.3 
2004 5.8 4.2 
2005 5.2 4.2 
2006 N/A 4.1 
2007 N/A 4.0 
2008 N/A 4.2 
Source: surveyed unemployment rates in various years are from Cai and Wang (2010) 
based on nation-wide household surveys from China Population Statistical Yearbook. 
Registered unemployment rates are from Chinese Statistics Yearbook in various years.  
 
Since the registered unemployment rate published by Chinese Statistical Yearbook 
only takes into account those unemployed who are registered with local governments, the 
rates are lower than those suggested by household surveys on the unemployment rate 
(Dong et al., 2007; Giles et al., 2005; Hu and Sheng, 2007). Qin (2010) employed 2005 
Census data to estimate urban unemployment and claimed that urban unemployment rate 
was around 7.4%. In addition, Han and Zhang (2010) used another dataset from 
household survey and found that urban unemployment rate was about 8% in 2006.  
 
Ma and Wang (2011) found that the urban unemployment is mainly concentrated in 
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inland China. Using the Census data, they showed that the unemployment rate in coastal 
China is only around 3%, close to the frictional level of unemployment. In contrast, the 
unemployment rate is about 5-6% in central and western China. They argued that some 
institutional forces may be responsible for the existence of unemployment in inland 
China, such as minimum wage, whereas the private sector in coastal China pays almost 
the market-clearing wage leading to low unemployment. Furthermore, this study 
discovered that the unemployed in inland region are mostly local residents with urban 
hukou. The unemployment rate for rural migrants in inland areas is even lower than 3%.  
 
Qin (2010) and Li (2007) both asserted that the main type of urban unemployment is 
structural unemployment concentrated in central and western China, particularly due to 
skill mismatch. Qin (2010) demonstrated that most of urban unemployed people receive 
less than nine years of schooling and have very few technical skills. On the demand side, 
as mentioned in the previous section, China has a labor shortage in skilled workers, 
especially technicians in coastal region, such as carpenters. The vocational and technical 
schools have been developed too slowly to satisfy the demand. The skill mismatch is the 
most salient reason for urban unemployment in China (Li, 2007).  
 
The increasing college enrollment rate did not solve the problem of structural 
unemployment. After 1998, in order to improve high education, China has built many 
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new universities, and college enrolment rate has risen sharply. The figure below displays 
the increase in the number of college graduates since 2004. In 2010, there were 6.31 
million college graduates, more than twice as many as the number of college graduates in 
2004.  
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Figure 2.7 The Rising Number of College Graduates 
 
However, China has paid too much attention to the quantity of colleges, but relatively 
little attention to the quality (Li and Chen, 2010). Nearly 30% of college graduates cannot 
find a job within one year after graduation. One reason is that the design of majors and 
courses in colleges was not responsive to the market demand, so numerous college 
graduates do not possess necessary skills the employers need. In addition, relatively low 
quality of some universities is also responsible for the low skills of college graduates. 
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Many universities lack good teachers and professors in some subjects. Therefore, even 
though the number of high degree holders has increased dramatically, the structural 
unemployment still prevails in urban China partly because of relatively low quality of 
education.  
 
2.2.7 Labor Market Segmentation 
There exists labor market segmentation between rural and urban labor market as well 
as within urban labor market between different ownerships  
 
2.2.7.1 Segmentation between rural and urban labor market 
The institutional constraints such as hukou system are still in place and causing 
segmentation between rural and urban labor market (Yang et al, 2010). Again, a labor 
market is said to be segmented if two conditions hold. First, for workers of a given skill 
category, some jobs are demonstrably better than others, most importantly, in terms of 
rate of pay, but also including other elements such as benefits, job security, or social 
protections. And second, the better jobs are rationed, in that only a fraction of those who 
would like these jobs and are capable of performing them are hired into them. As 
mentioned earlier, although restrictions on rural-urban migration have been relaxed 
gradually in the past decade, they have not been totally abolished. The hukou-based labor 
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market discrimination prevents many qualified workers being hired into high-pay jobs. 
Gan (2010) argued that the institutional obstacles still prevents some rural people from 
migrating to cities, and access to high-wage urban jobs is still limited for rural people due 
to hukou status. 
 
Moreover, comparable workers earn more in urban area than in rural area. Shi (2002) 
discovered that urban labor earned 28% more than rural labor did after controlling for 
human capital variables. Dang (2010) employed a survey dataset and compared two 
groups with similar characteristics, and concluded that comparable workers earn more in 
urban sector than in rural sector. Yang (2010) also claimed that on average, workers with 
similar human capital earn around 80 percent more in cities than in rural areas.  
 
2.2.7.2 Segmentation between different ownerships of firms 
There is labor market segmentation between SOEs and private firms in urban China. 
In the urban labor market in China, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still provides higher 
wages and benefits as well as better job security compared to non-SOEs (Song and Li, 
2010; Knight and Song, 2005). Xue (2008) discovered that comparable workers earn 60% 
higher in state-owned companies than in non-state-owned companies after controlling for 
all of available observed characteristics. Zhang, Chen, and Wong (2011) found that the 
return on human capital is higher in SOEs since most of SOEs have some extent of 
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administrative power and provides more benefits for their own workers. Zhu (2010) 
claimed that SOEs pay the wages higher than market-clearing level, while the wages in 
non-SOEs are set at the market-clearing level. 
 
Furthermore, the jobs in SOEs are strictly rationed, in that many workers in private 
enterprises who are willing and able to work in SOEs cannot find a job in SOEs 
(Demurger et al, 2008). In recent years, a considerable number of people applied for very 
few jobs vacancies in SOEs. I take a concrete example to illustrate this claim. In 2008, 
the four largest state-owned commercial banks in China created 1,200 job openings for 
college graduates. On the other hand, more than 12,000 college graduates applied for 
these 1,200 jobs. Thus, less than one tenth of college graduates were able to get a job in 
the four attractive state-owned banks in 2008.  
 
2.2.8 Wage determination in the urban private sector 
Wages in urban private sector are largely market-determined, and institutional 
interventions play a small role in wage-setting mechanism.  
 
Several authors have identified labor market conditions in China as being largely 
market-determined, and claimed that labor market interventions play a small role in 
wage-setting mechanism in private sector (Dong and Xu, 2009; Ni, Wang, and Yao, 2011; 
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Zhang et al, 2011; Knight and Song, 2005). This conclusion is drawn based on apparent 
lack of institutional forces that push wages above market-clearing levels. The most 
common sources of labor policy interventions in terms wage-setting are minimum wage 
and labor unions. I examine these two kinds of interventions in more detail below to 
verify the largely market-determined wage setting mechanism in China.  
 
2.2.8.1 Minimum wage 
Minimum wage regulation was initially introduced in 1993, but new regulations were 
put in place in 2004 to cover part-time workers via a minimum hourly rate, and to 
increase the penalties for non-compliance (Baker & McKenzie, 2004). The minimum 
monthly wage is set on the assumption that the employee works a standard 40-hour week 
and the labor law specifies that extra hours should be paid at 150% of the normal hourly 
rate. Decisions to introduce a minimum wage and to determine its level are usually taken 
at prefecture level with reference to cost of living and other labor market conditions.  
 
The minimum wage regulation fails to play an important role in Chinese labor 
market mainly due to two reasons: low level of the required minimum wage and weak 
enforcement. First, the minimum wage data provided by the Wage Division of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security suggests that in some cities, the minimum wages 
are still very low (Ni, Wang, and Yao, 2011). Second, while the minimum wage exists on 
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paper, there is little evidence that it is effectively enforced on the ground. Therefore, even 
for cities with higher-than-market-clearing minimum wage, the weak enforcement 
downplays the role of minimum wage regulation in affecting wage-setting mechanisms.  
 
2.2.8.2 Labor unions 
Zhang et al (2011) shows that trade unions in China do not play a significant role in 
affecting industrial labor income. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
began to require the establishment of labor unions in private enterprises in 1995 (National 
Federation of Trade Unions, 1995). In order to explore a legitimate way to protect the 
rights and interests of workers, relevant policies were put into place in 1998. From 1998 
to 2008, labor unions and union membership increased rapidly in China, especially in the 
private sector. Although the number of organizations and their members increased, 
Chinese labor unions failed to help workers in the bargaining process with employers, 
especially in terms of bargaining for higher wages. The most crucial reason is that there is 
no freedom of association for workers and all labor unions are under the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions which is, indeed, a part of the government.  
 
2.2.9 Return to education 
Skilled workers have experienced a much larger wage increase than unskilled 
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workers. Kang and Peng (2010) employed a CHNS (China Health and Nutrition Survey) 
dataset from 1991 to 2006 and discovered that the average wage differentials between 
college graduates and high school graduates have risen substantially. Since the wage data 
for workers with different skill levels is not available, several previous studies employ a 
proxy variable for the skill level. For example, Liu (2009) ranked different industries 
according to the proportion of high-educated labor in the labor forces, and calculated the 
industry-wide average wage rates. Then, Liu used the average wage in the industry with 
the highest percentage of college graduates to represent the wage of skilled workers. That 
is, the wage in the industry that requires a large portion of skilled workers reflects 
average wage of skilled laborers, whereas the wage in the industry that requires a large 
portion of unskilled workers serve as the proxy for the wage of unskilled workers. 
Specifically, Liu used the wage rate in the Scientific Research sector to represent the 
wage of skilled labor, and wage rate in the Manufacturing sector to represent the wage of 
unskilled labor, and defined “skill premium” as the wage rate ratio of skilled labor to 
unskilled labor. Using this approach, this study showed that the skill premium as defined 
above increased from 1.2 to 1.9 since 1987.  
 
Yang, Chen, and Monarch (2010) followed the above approach to argue that rises in 
the wages of skilled labor, especially for those workers with high educational attainment 
employed in advanced service industries, have been the major force behind the dramatic 
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increases in the general wage level in China. They claimed that it is the sharp increase in 
the wages of skilled labor and the increasing share of the skilled labor in the total labor 
force that are the main thrust behind the overall wage rise pattern in China.  
 
Using the same approach, the figure below which plots the evolution of yearly wage 
for different industries illustrates that skilled workers have experienced wage rise to a 
much greater extent than unskilled workers do.  
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Figure 2.8 Evolution of Annual Earnings in Different Industries (yuan) 
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As can be seen, the upward movements in wages in sectors such as manufacturing, 
and construction which hire a substantial proportion of unskilled workers have been very 
limited, partly due to an increasing labor supply of unskilled workers induced by the 
rural-urban migration. In contrast, the average wages in the industries with a considerable 
number of high skilled workers such as finance and IT industry have rocketed in the past 
decade. This implies that the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers has been 
enlarging.  
 
These wage trends reflect the rise in rewards to skills (or education) during China’s 
economic transition. The private return to education has risen dramatically after the 
reform of China’s labor market. In pre-reform China there was very little return for 
education manifested in earnings. Cab drivers and college professors had similar incomes. 
Economic reform has created a labor market in which firms are free to make hiring 
decisions and workers are allowed to decide where they are willing to work. In the short 
period between 1988 and 2003, the Mincer wage returns for one additional year of 
schooling increased from 4% to 11% (Dollar, 2007). 
 
Kang and Peng (2010) investigated the private returns to schooling in urban China 
using pooled CHNS (China Health and Nutrition Survey) dataset. Based on the standard 
Mincer human capital earning function, they adopted the OLS and IV models and 
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concluded that one additional year of schooling leads to wage increase by about 9%. 
Heckman and Li (2004) used the data from the China Urban Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (CUHIES) to identify the returns to higher education for young 
people in the urban areas of the six provinces. The instruments employed are parental 
education and year of birth, and the IV estimator of average return to four-year college 
attendance was 43% (on average, 11% annually). 
 
Drawing on data from urban household surveys in six provinces, a recent study by 
Zhang et al. (2005) provided estimates of the returns to education in urban China for each 
year from 1988 to 2001. Based on OLS estimation of the Mincerian earnings function, a 
dramatic increase in returns was reported, from only 4.0% per year of schooling in 1988 
to 10.2% in 2001. Qian and Smyth (2008) estimated the private returns to education and 
discovered that, on average, an additional year of schooling would increase earnings by 
12% in 2005. 
 
Although the econometric results from OLS regression based on Mincer equation 
should be cautiously used due to possible omitted variable bias or endogeneity bias, the 
results from IV approach should be more convincing. According to the results from 
above studies, I conclude that the return to education has increasing sharply in the past 
two decades.  
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2.2.10 Self-employment and social insuance coverage 
About 10 percent of urban labor force in China is self-employed, and a substantial 
share of wage and salary employees in urban areas is not covered by social insurance 
programs.  
  
Self-employment is often referred to informal employment in previous literature. 
Using this definition, informal employment in urban China accounts for a very small 
portion of total urban employment. In 2005, nearly 10 percent of urban workers were 
reported as self-employed (Park and Cai, 2011). Zhu (2010) estimated that around 8% of 
urban workers are self-employed, and this proportion has been decreasing over the last 
several years. Giulietti et al. (2011) found that most of self-employed workers in the 
urban area are rural migrants. Among rural migrants in cities, around 20 percent are 
self-employed. They found that migrants choose self-employment not because they 
cannot find salaried jobs, but they are willing to pursue a business opportunity. The 
results of the analysis indicate that self-employed migrants earn on average 15% higher 
than those with salaried jobs with similar observed characteristics. The authors argue that 
the wage differential is mainly due to some unobserved characteristics, such as social 
networking, willingness to start a business, and so on.   
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Zhang and Zhao (2011) investigated in more detail about the determinants of 
self-employment and the wages of self-employed workers. They defined 
self-employment as the status of working for oneself instead of for an employer. A 
self-employed individual may work alone or own and run a business that also hires other 
people. These individuals can be scrap metal collectors, street vendors who sell fruits, 
snacks, cigarettes, clothing, souvenirs, etc, or provide services such as shining shoes and 
repairing bicycles and electronics. This study uses a unique survey database on 
Rural-Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI). The first wave of the survey 
was conducted in 2008 and the data became available in 2009. In China, three 
representative samples of households were surveyed, including a sample of 8,000 rural 
households, a sample of 5,000 rural-urban migrant households, and a sample of 5,000 
urban households. In response to a survey question asking about the migrant’s reason to 
choose self-employment, the top three answers are: (1) it brings a higher income 
(answered by 38 percent of the self-employed migrants); (2) it gives more flexibility and 
freedom (29 percent); and (3) it allows one to be one’s own boss (19 percent). Only a 
small fraction (12 percent) ended up being self-employed because they cannot find wage 
work. 
 
The paper introduced above used an IV approach and finds that a rural-urban migrant 
with a larger social-family network is more likely to be self-employed in the city. This 
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finding is robust to alternative model specifications and various restrictions on the sample 
used in estimation. After controlling for human capital variables and numbers of friends 
and relatives, the income differential between self-employed people and wage workers is 
close to zero.  
 
The term “informality” has various meanings in different literature. Many previous 
studies have discussed informal employment in China, but they use the word differently. 
In addition to self-employment, there are at least two other possible definitions that have 
been used in academic studies.  
 
Some scholars define a worker working informally if he or she does not have a 
formal labor contract. Labor contract is a binding agreement between employers and 
employees governing wages and benefits as well as working conditions. In China’s 
context, labor contract plays a crucial role in employment relations, in that it is basically 
the only binding document employees can use in the face of labor disputes. Without the 
written labor contract, employers can easily violate the agreement, such as withdrawing 
benefits employees should receive, deferring wage payments, or requiring overtime work 
without any additional compensation. The labor contract is intended to help employees to 
verify their argument in the case of arbitration or lawsuit. Due to the special importance 
of labor contract in China, most scholars have defined informal employment as lack of 
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written labor contract (Park and Cai, 2011; Gagnon et al., 2011).  
 
According to this definition, informal employment has become less popular in urban 
China and nearly 90% urban workers now have a written labor contract, partly due to the 
implementation of the new Labor Contract Law. The new Labor Contract Law was 
implemented on Jan 1st, 2008, and re-affirmed the requirement that all employers sign 
formal contracts with their employees and both employers and employees participate in 
social insurance programs, strengthens rights to collective bargaining, and required extra 
payment for overtime work. The new law also laid down a revised, sharpened and much 
more detailed version of the employment protection rules, with strict procedural 
requirements to consult employees in the event of changes to work conditions and 
prescribes relatively high severance pay. According to the new law, employers who do 
not sign labor contracts with employees would pay very high fines. Therefore, the 
proportion of workers without a labor contract has decreased dramatically. Specifically 
speaking, by the end of 2007, only half of workers in urban areas held a written labor 
contract, whereas the percentage has increased to 88% by the end of 2009. 
 
Additionally, some previous studies have considered social insurance coverage as the 
criterion for formal employment. Specifically speaking, a worker is working informally if 
he or she is not covered by any social insurance programs. In urban China, there are five 
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main types of social insurance programs, including pension, medical, unemployment, 
work-related injury and maternity insurance. According to this definition of informal 
employment, most rural migrants work informally, in that only one quarter of rural 
migrants in urban areas is covered by social insurance system (National bureau of 
Statistics, 2010). Li (2010a) found that indicate that in urban labor market, only 18 
percent of migrant workers were covered by a pension scheme, less than 11 percent by 
unemployment insurance, and 10 percent by medical insurance in 2007. 
 
Although the new labor contract law requires the adherence to social insurance 
system for both employers and employees, the enforcement to date has been very limited. 
The power of labor inspectors in government is constrained by the legal framework for 
administrative penalties. The possible punishments are very limited, and the amount of 
fines involved is too small to enforce the compliance (Herd and Reutersward, 2010). 
Thus, there is still a large proportion of urban workers not covered by social insurance 
system. Zhu (2010) showed that by the end of 2008, the coverage of social insurance 
system for urban workers is 68 percent for old-age pension, 79% for medical insurance, 
54% for unemployment insurance, 59% for work-related injury insurance, and 44% for 
maternity insurance, respectively. As it turns out, there is still a large portion of laborers 
working informally characterized by no social insurance coverage. The transition from 
informal to formal employment has yet a long way to go. However, the new labor 
  
 
89 
contract law at least signals the willingness of government to promote formal 
employment with written labor contract and social insurance coverage.  
 
To summarize this section, I conclude that no matter which definition we use for 
informal employment, either by self-employment, or by no labor contract or no social 
insurance coverage, informal employment in urban China has become less frequent.  
 
2.3. Conclusion  
Fifteen years ago, it was the government, rather than the market, that arranged the 
allocation of labor in China. The past fifteen years witnessed the rapid development of 
China’s labor market. Since the mid-1990s, job-seekers have become free to choose jobs, 
and employers have more flexibility to make decisions on hiring and firing. Since then, 
the Chinese labor market started to burgeon, in which employers make hiring decisions to 
maximize profit while workers make labor supply decisions to maximize utility.  
 
However, the current Chinese labor market has some unique features. It is unique not 
only because the current Chinese labor market is different from other countries’ labor 
market, but also different from what it used to be fifteen years ago. Based on the 
preceding review of nearly 200 academic articles and books, I conclude that the current 
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Chinese labor market can be summarized by 10 features as follows.  
 
1. Nearly half of total labor force in China is working in rural areas and the other half 
is working in urban China; Within rural areas, more than one half of the rural labor force 
is still working in agriculture sector, and the rest is working in rural non-agriculture 
sector concentrated in eastern China; Within urban labor force, more than three quarters 
are working in private sector. 
 
2. Urban and rural wages have both been increasing in real terms, but urban wages 
have grown much faster than rural wages, and now the average urban wage is 
approximately four times as high as the average rural wage. 
 
3. Urban and rural hukou holders face different costs of living in cities and have 
different access to government-provided public service and welfare programs in the urban 
area.  
 
4. Workers with rural hukou earn lower wages and are less likely to be hired in the 
high-wage sector in urban areas compared to workers with local urban hukou due to both 
differences in human capital and labor market discrimination. 
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5. The phenomena of urban labor shortage and rural labor surplus are co-existent in 
the current Chinese labor market.  
 
6. Open unemployment is low in China and is mainly concentrated in cities of central 
and western China. 
 
7. There exists labor market segmentation between rural and urban labor market as 
well as within urban labor market between different ownerships  
 
8. Wages in urban private sector are largely market-determined, and institutional 
interventions play a small role in wage-setting mechanism in urban private sector. 
 
9. Skilled workers have experienced a much larger wage increase than unskilled 
workers.  
 
10. About 10 percent of urban labor force in China is self-employed, and a 
substantial share of wage and salary employees in urban areas is not covered by social 
insurance programs.   
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Appendix:  
Measures of Unemployment in China 
I use the table below to demonstrate how the official unemployment rate (called 
registered unemployment rate) is measured in current China.  
 
B D 
C E 
A 
 
The whole rectangle represents the total urban population. The definition of each area 
is given as follows. 
 
A+B+C+D+E=Total urban population. 
A=Not in urban labor force.  
B+C+D+E=Urban labor force. 
B=Registered unemployment with local urban hukou. 
C=Unregistered unemployment.  
B+C=Urban unemployment 
D=Registered employment in registered establishments 
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E=Unregistered employment 
D+E=Urban employment 
 
According to the ILO definition, urban unemployment rate should be equal to urban 
unemployment divided by urban labor force, that is, B C
B C D E
+
+ + +
. 
 
However, the official unemployment rate published in China is so-called registered 
unemployment rate which is defined by the ratio of registered unemployment to the sum 
of registered unemployment and registered employment, i. e., B
B D+
.  
 
In the literature on the topic of China’s unemployment, scholars have tried to 
estimate the true unemployment rate using the ILO definition, and these estimates are 
called surveyed unemployment rate based on nation-wide household surveys, such as 
Census.  
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Chapter 3 Hukou-based Labor Market Discrimination 
and Ownership Structure in Urban China: Comparing 
OLS and Double-selectivity Estimates 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been reported that since 2003, Chinese factories in a few coastal cities have 
been facing a labor shortage in that firms have difficulty hiring enough workers as they 
want. As time goes by, the phenomenon of labor shortage has not disappeared but has 
spread to more cities. In July 2010, the media reported that factories in Guangdong have 
even hired many illegal workers from Vietnam and elsewhere (Chan, 2010). In contrast, 
we still observe hundreds of millions of people staying in the rural area and earning very 
low wage. Some scholars called the low-wage workers in the rural area as rural labor 
surplus (Knight et al., 2011). Why do these rural workers choose to work in the 
agriculture sector and earn very little rather than migrating to cities for better-paying 
jobs?   
 
Previous studies have provided several reasons for the co-existence of urban labor 
shortage and rural labor surplus, such as credit market imperfection with costly migration, 
and the large amount of cost of living for rural-to-urban migrants in cities due to the 
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household registration system (hukou) (Chau et al., 2012; Knight et al., 2011). 
Nonetheless, there is another possible reason for this puzzle that most of previous studies 
have ignored: rural-to-urban migrants face labor market discrimination in cities due to 
their hukou status. In January 1958, the central government issued the Regulations of 
household Registration which required that each person born in China should be 
classified either rural hukou or urban hukou in a given location. This paper attempts to 
provide empirical evidence on the labor market discrimination against rural hukou 
holders in Chinese cities, so as to offer another explanation for the simultaneous urban 
labor shortage and rural labor surplus.  
 
Specifically, this paper examines the extent of labor market discrimination against 
rural hukou holders in state-owned enterprises and private firms, respectively. Based on 
previous literature, the urban labor market in China is segmented involving state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and private sector (Song and Li, 2010). As is known, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) still provide higher wages and benefits as well as better job security 
compared to private firms for political reasons, while the wages in private firms are 
largely determined by the market forces (Dong and Xu, 2009; Knight and Song, 2005). 
Therefore, the results of this study can help us better understand whether the hukou-based 
discrimination is driven by market behaviors or by institutional forces. To my knowledge, 
this paper is the first one to test the hukou-based discrimination in different ownership 
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sectors.  
 
Moreover, this paper will distinguish two types of labor market discrimination 
against rural hukou holders, namely wage discrimination and hiring discrimination (also 
called employment discrimination). Wage discrimination is defined as the situation in 
which two groups of workers who have the same characteristics receive different wages 
(Becker, 1971; Aigner and Cain, 1977). The hiring discrimination here refers to the 
situation in which comparable workers with rural hukou are less likely to be hired in the 
high wage SOE sector. I will test the degree of both types of discrimination against rural 
hukou holders in urban China.  
 
Another important methodological contribution of this study is to adopt a 
double-selectivity approach to account for selectivity both in sector and hukou status 
determination. The first selectivity comes from the possibility that stated-owned 
enterprises selectively hire people with certain characteristics. Another selection problem 
arises because local governments of Chinese cities can grant urban hukou to some rural 
hukou holders with certain characteristics who meet the criteria specified by each local 
government. In general, selectivity bias may arise when a model is applied to a 
non-random sub-sample of the underlying population. In our context, people who are 
working in the SOE sector and who have urban hukou are not drawn randomly from an 
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underlying population. As Beller and Blau (1988) argued, the adjustment for selectivity 
bias is important, particularly when one is interested in potential differences in employer 
treatment of two groups. In this case, the focus should be on wage offers rather than 
observed wages (Beller and Blau, 1988; Reimers, 1983). The selectivity issue of hukou 
status has never been dealt with or even considered in previous literature. This paper will 
be the first one to apply the double-selection framework to study labor market 
discrimination in China.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some institutional 
background of the current Chinese labor market with particular attention on the labor 
market segmentation and the hukou system. In section 3 and 4, I will review previous 
literature and elaborate the contributions of this paper. Section 5 describes the 
methodology of studying wage and hiring discrimination in two ownership sectors and 
provides various model specifications. In section 6, I present the data description and 
report the econometrical results. Section 7 develops a theoretical discussion of our results 
and section 8 concludes.  
 
3.2 Institutional background of the Chinese labor market 
3.2.1 Labor market segmentation  
  
 
113 
China has the usual dimension of labor market segmentation – some jobs being much 
better than others, with not enough employment in the better job segments for all who 
would like these jobs and are capable of performing them. As many scholars have pointed 
out, the main feature of the current labor market in urban China is a segmented labor 
market involving state-owned enterprises and private enterprises (Song and Li, 2010; 
Knight and Song, 2005).  
 
Specifically, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still provide higher wages and benefits 
as well as better job security than private firms. Zhu (2010) argued that SOEs pay the 
wages higher than market-clearing level, while the wages in non-SOEs are set at the 
market-clearing level. 
 
Furthermore, the jobs in SOEs are strictly rationed, in that many workers in private 
enterprises who are willing and able to work in SOEs cannot find a job in SOEs 
(Demurger et al., 2012). In recent years, a considerable number of people applied for very 
limited jobs vacancies in SOEs. Accordingly, even though many applicants possess the 
job qualifications, they could not obtain jobs in SOEs due to relatively fewer vacancies 
and intense competition.  
 
3.2.2 Unique hukou system 
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In addition to the labor market segmentation, the current Chinese labor market has a 
unique household registration system (hukou).  
 
Every Chinese citizen holds either an urban or rural hukou in a particular location. 
One’s hukou status would remain unchanged no matter where the individual physically 
moved, unless he or she goes through a formal procedure of hukou conversion. The 
criteria to convert the hukou status from rural to urban vary from one place to another, 
since local governments have now received full power and discretion to make their own 
hukou policies within their administrative jurisdictions. Some local governments admit 
local urban hukou to people who have salaried jobs or own a house in their administrative 
areas, or possess some types of occupational skills fitting the requirements stipulated by 
local governments (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). In Guangdong, the government 
converts various criteria, such as schooling, working skills, contributions to social 
insurance, volunteering and blood donation, into credit points, which accumulate to help 
obtaining local urban hukou (Cai, 2011). 
 
3.3 Past research on labor market discrimination against rural 
hukou 
Most of previous studies have used the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique to 
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conclude there is some degree of labor market discrimination against rural hukou in urban 
China. The basic idea of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is that differences in average 
wages can be decomposed to differences in characteristics (sometimes called endowment) 
and differences in returns to these characteristics (also called coefficients). The latter is 
conventionally used as an estimate of discrimination (Oaxaca, 2007). Deng (2007) used 
the China Household Income Project (CHIP) data in 2002 which basically covers the 
whole country, found that 60 per cent of the wage differential between rural and urban 
hukou holders in cities originates from unexplained factors. Gravemeyer, Gries and Xue 
(2010) employed a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis to estimate the wage 
differential between workers with urban and rural hukou in Shenzhen city, and found that 
on average and all else being equal, 52.9 per cent of the higher wage of urban hukou 
holders is due to higher returns to the different characteristics and attributes, while 47 per 
cent is due to the higher endowments in characteristics such as education. This would 
imply that 52.9 percent of the average wage difference between the two groups cannot be 
explained by observed characteristics.  
 
Nonetheless, very few studies have analyzed the discrimination in state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and private firms separately. Chen and Hoy (2011) conducted a 
qualitative research on discriminatory behaviors in state-owned and private 
manufacturing companies in Shanghai, and argued that the wage discrimination is larger 
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in state-owned enterprises than in private sectors. However, they failed to provide 
quantitative evidence on the exact extent of labor market discrimination in two ownership 
sectors.   
 
To my knowledge, only one previous study explored quantitatively the differential 
effects of hukou status on wages between different economic sectors. Gagnon et al (2011) 
utilized the Census data in 2005 and analyzed the wage differential between urban and 
rural hukou holder in three sectors, including formal sector, self-employment, and “no 
contract” sector. “No contract” sector is defined as jobs without a written labor contract, 
and formal sector is defined as wage and salary jobs with a written labor contract. Using 
this division, they found that the wage differential between urban and rural hukou holders 
is much larger in the formal sector than in the other two sectors. More specifically, the 
wage differential is negligible for self-employment and “no contract” workers. 
Furthermore, even for the very small wage differential, more than 90% of it could be 
explained by the human capital variables. That is, the hukou-based wage discrimination 
in self-employment and “no contract” sector is almost non-existent. In contrast, urban 
hukou holders earn 60% more than rural hukou holders in the formal sector, and nearly 
35% of this wage differential cannot be explained by observed characteristics.  
 
As can be seen, although the study above compared the wage discrimination in 
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different sectors, it did not consider the division between SOEs and private firms. A 
considerable share of private firms has labor contracts with their employees and thus 
belongs to the formal sector defined as in Gagnon et al (2011). Therefore, we could 
conclude that no previous study has provided quantitative evidence on labor market 
discrimination against rural hukou holders in different urban sectors.   
 
3.4 My contributions 
To my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to explore the extent of labor market 
discrimination against rural hukou in SOEs and private firms, respectively. As is known, the 
wages in SOEs are mainly set by the government for political reasons, while the wages in 
private firms are largely determined by the market forces. Therefore, the results of this 
study can help us better understand whether the hukou-based discrimination is driven by 
market behaviors or by institutional forces.  
 
Second, this paper contributes to the literature by distinguishing two types of labor 
market discrimination including wage and hiring discrimination. In addition to analyzing 
the wage discrimination in SOEs and private firms, this paper will examine whether 
workers with rural hukou are less likely to be hired in the high wage SOE sector than 
those with urban hukou. If the hiring differential does exist, I will test how much of the 
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hiring differential is due to discrimination. To the author’s knowledge, this paper is the 
first one to empirically study the two types of labor market discrimination in China.  
 
Third, this paper makes a methodological contribution to the empirical literature on 
labor market discrimination in China by adopting a double-selectivity approach to 
account for selectivity both in sector and hukou status determination. The first selectivity 
comes from the possibility that stated-owned enterprises selectively hire people with 
certain characteristics. Another selection problem arises because local governments of 
Chinese cities can grant urban hukou to some rural hukou holders with certain 
characteristics who meet the criteria specified by each local government.  
 
Fourth, this paper will provide more convincing empirical evidence on labor market 
discrimination by various robustness checks. In previous literature, the portion of the 
wage differential that is not explained by observed characteristics is commonly used as an 
estimate of the extent of wage discrimination. However, it should be noted that the 
observationally-equivalent workers may not be truly equivalent, while there may be some 
unobserved productivity differentials between the two types of workers responsible for 
the wage gap. These unobserved characteristics are known to the employers, but not 
known to the econometricians who run the wage regressions. In this case, the literature 
tends to over-estimate the degree of labor market discrimination. To reduce this bias, I 
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will include more control variables in the wage regressions. The comprehensive 
information on personal characteristics provided by available micro dataset 
(RUMIC-2008) enables us to investigate wage compensation by controlling for 
individuals' most important characteristics such as school performance, an indicator for 
job training, occupation and industry. Blau and Kahn (2000) suggested including the 
industry and occupation as control variables in the wage regressions. Admittedly, if some 
of the factors controlled for in such regressions such as occupation itself reflect the 
impact of discrimination, then discrimination will be underestimated. Nonetheless, results 
of such robustness checks may be instructive in that to include occupation and industry in 
controls makes for a more conservative estimate (an estimate that is less likely to be an 
overestimate, although it still could be) (Blau and Kahn, 2000). If workers with different 
hukou earn differently for very similar jobs, it is more likely that the hukou-based wage 
discrimination exists.  
 
Another robustness check is that besides using the original Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), I will employ two alternative 
decomposition techniques developed by Cotton (1988) and by Oaxaca and Ransom 
(1988；1994), respectively. The original version of wage decomposition methodology 
only considered two extreme cases, in which the wage structure for one group represents 
what the competitive wage structure would be in the absence of discrimination. In the 
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current empirical literature on the Chinese labor market, almost all of the studies still use 
the original Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique to identify the explained and 
unexplained wage gaps between two groups of workers.2 Cotton (1988) argued that 
population-weighted coefficients are more accurate than traditional ones as the 
non-discriminatory wage structure. Another way to decompose the wage differential is to 
obtain the competitive wage structure from a regression with the pooled sample (Oaxaca 
and Ransom, 1988; 1994). There is no consensus in the literature about which weighting 
scheme is unambiguously better than another (Powers et al., 2011). Thus, this paper will 
report the decomposition results using four alternative non-discriminatory wage 
structures, namely, urban-weighted, rural-weighted, population-weighted, and pooled 
sample weighted wage structures.  
 
3.5 Methodology and model specification 
3.5.1 Estimating wage discrimination 
The most direct way to obtain estimates of the differential effects of hukou status on 
wages between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and private firms is to include two dummy 
variables denoting the firm ownership and hukou status as well as an interaction of these 
                                                        
2 To the author’s knowledge, there is only one exception. Demurger et al. (2012) uses a pooled wage 
structure in decomposing the wage gaps between different ownerships of firms.  
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two dummy variables in a Mincer (1974) type wage regression. However, this 
specification ignores the fact that the wage structures for urban and rural hukou holders in 
SOEs and private firms may differ from one other. Allowance for different wage 
structures for two types of workers in two economic sectors requires estimation of four 
separate wage regressions. 
 
In addition, since workers with each hukou status and in each ownership sector are 
not randomly drawn from the population, two selection issues need to be considered in 
order to consistently estimate four wage equations. In summary, we have a system of six 
equations in total, with two selection equations and four wage equations as follows. Let 
*
iS  and 
*
iU  be two latent unobserved continuous variables to determine sector 
allocation and hukou status, respectively, for person i. ijW  (i=U or R, j= S or P) denote 
the wages for urban and rural hukou holders in the SOE sector and private firms, 
respectively. 
 
             * 1 1 1'i i i iS X ud= + , SOE sector determination.           (1) 
*
2 2 2'i i i iU X ud= + , Urban hukou determination.            (2) 
ln U U U US S S SW X vg= + .                           (3) 
ln R R R RS S S SW X vg= + .                           (4) 
ln U U U UP P P PW X vg= + .                           (5) 
ln R R R RP P P PW X vg= + .                           (6) 
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The error terms in the six equations above are assumed to have the following 
variance-covariance matrix.  
 
å =
1 11 12 13 14
2 21 22 23 24
11 21
12 22
13 23
14 24
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
u
u
U
S
R
S
U
P
R
P
a a a a
a a a a
a a
a a
a a
a a
s r
r s
s
s
s
s
é ù
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê úë û
.                    (7) 
 
Different specifications on the matrix above lead to different estimation methods. 
This section provides three alternative ways to estimate the system with three different 
specifications on the variance-covariance matrix, and then decompose the wage 
differentials between urban and rural hukou holders in the two ownership sectors, 
respectively.  
 
3.5.1.1 No selectivity correction 
In the absence of selection issues, we can employ OLS estimation to consistently 
estimate the four wage regressions from equation (3)-(6). This simple specification 
indeed assumes that all of the off-diagonal terms in (7) are zero. In order to examine the 
extent of the wage discrimination against rural hukou in each sector, I first adopt the 
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Blinder-Oaxaca (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) decomposition method to decompose the 
average log wage differential into the endowment effect which can be explained by 
productivity-related characteristics, and the unexplained coefficient effect which is 
commonly used as the estimation for wage discrimination. Specifically, the 
decomposition of the wage differential between urban and rural hukou holders in a given 
sector j (SOE or private) can be written as follows. 
 
ln lnU Rj jW W-                                    
= ˆ ˆ' 'U U R Rj j j jX Xg g-                                  
= * * *ˆ ˆ( ) ' [ '( ) '( )U R U U R Rj j j j j j j j jX X X Xg g g g g- + - + - ].      (8) 
 
In the equations above, ln UjW  and ln
R
jW are the predicted mean (log) wages for 
urban and rural hukou holders in sector j (S or P), 'X  is the mean vector of wage 
determining variables, gˆ is a vector of estimated coefficients (wage structure), and *g  
is the non-discriminatory wage structure. The first term above ( ) ' *U RX X g- is 
attributed to different endowments (productivity-related characteristics) in two groups of 
workers and is usually called the endowment effect. The second term in the square 
bracket ˆ ˆ[ '( *) '( * )]U U R RX Xg g g g- + -  is typically interpreted as the part of the wage 
gap that is associated with differences in returns (coefficients) to the characteristics 
between the two groups, which often serves as the estimate for discrimination (Liu et al., 
2000; Oaxaca, 2007). 
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A practical concern associated with the adoption of the Blinder-Oaxaca approach is 
called the index number problem. This refers to the fact that the decomposition of the 
wage gap is not unique, depending on the choice of the non-discriminatory wage 
structure, that is, the choice of *g . The original version of the Blinder-Oaxaca approach 
assumes that *g  takes extreme values equal to the wage structure of one reference 
group in the study. For example, if *g = ˆUg , then we assume that the wage structure for 
urban hukou holders would be adopted in the absence of discrimination (Liu et al., 2000). 
This is a very common assumption in that the wage structure of the dominant group is 
usually considered as the hypothetical wage structure in the absence of discrimination. 
However, if one believes that the current wage structure for rural hukou holders 
represents what the competitive wage structure would be in the absence of discrimination, 
then *g = ˆRg . As mentioned earlier, most of studies on the Chinese labor market use this 
original version of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method (Gagnon et al., 2011; Qu 
and Zhao, 2011; Gravemeyer et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2000), and employ the two extreme 
wage structures to approximate the wage structure in the absence of discrimination.  
 
Cotton (1988) argued that derived weights using averages of coefficients for two 
groups will be more accurate than coefficients for one reference group. According to this 
approach, the non-discriminatory wage structure in sector j is *jg =
U
jf ˆ
U
jg +
R
jf ˆ
R
jg , where 
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U
jf and  
R
jf are the proportions of urban and rural hukou holders in sector j, respectively. 
Thus, Cotton’s weights are sometimes referred as population-weighted 
non-discriminatory wage structure (Liu et al., 2000). 
 
An alternative way to decompose the wage differential is to obtain the competitive 
wage structure ( *g ) from a regression with the pooled sample (Oaxaca and Ransom, 
1988; 1994). As they argued, if by the absence of discrimination one means the complete 
cessation of existing discrimination activity, then it might be reasonable to suppose that 
the resulting competitive wage structure would be a blend of the currently observed wage 
structures for the two groups of workers. A natural weighting scheme for approximating 
the competitive wage structure can be derived from the parameter vector estimated with 
the pooled sample of two groups of workers.  
 
However, there is no consensus in international literature about which weighting 
scheme is unambiguously better than another (Powers et al., 2011). Thus, this paper will 
report the decomposition results using four alternative non-discriminatory wage 
structures, respectively, including the wage structure of urban hukou holders, rural hukou 
holders, population-weighted wage structure, and the wage structure from the pooled 
sample.  
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In summary, I will run four wage regressions for urban and rural hukou holders in 
two ownership sectors respectively. Then, for each sector j (SOE or private), the wage 
decomposition will be conducted using equation (8) by four alternative 
non-discriminatory wage structures ( *jg ) specified above. Using this method, I can 
examine the degree of labor market discrimination against rural hukou holders in 
state-owned and private enterprises.  
 
3.5.1.2 Independent selection process 
This section takes into account the two selection issues but assumes that the two 
selection processes are independent ( r =0). That is, we assume the matrix of the error 
terms in (7) takes the following form. 
 
å ’=
1 11 12 13 14
2 21 22 23 24
11 21
12 22
13 23
14 24
0
0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
u
u
U
S
R
S
U
P
R
P
a a a a
a a a a
a a
a a
a a
a a
s
s
s
s
s
s
é ù
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê ú
ê úë û
.                  (9) 
 
Behrman et al. (1981) show that if the two selection rules are independent (i.e. the 
unobservable variables in the selection rule for the SOE sector are not correlated with the 
unobserved variables in the selection rule for hukou status, i.e., r =0), then the standard 
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Heckman two-step approach can be applied (Heckman, 1979). As a result, they show that 
the selectivity bias can be corrected by adding two regressors to the wage function, 
whereby each regressor indicates the probability that an individual will be employed in 
the SOE sector and has an urban hukou.  
 
Let “S” be a dummy variable equal to 1 if *iS ³ 0 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we 
define “U” as a dummy variable equal to 1 if *iU ³ 0 and 0 if 
*
iU <0. S and U indicate 
whether an individual is working in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and has an urban 
hukou, respectively.  
 
In the first step, two univariate probit models are estimated for both sector and hukou 
status determination as in the single selection case, from which the inverse Mills ratios 
are calculated (Henneberger and Sousa-Poza, 1998). In the second step, these ratios are 
used as regressors in the wage function. More specifically, by estimating the probit model 
prob(S=1)= F ( 1 1X d ), we can obtain the inverse Mills ratios for selection into the SOE 
and private sector, respectively: 1 1
1 1
( )ˆ
( )S
X
X
f d
l
d
=
F
 for state-owned enterprises (S=1), and 
1 1
1 1
( )ˆ
1 ( )P
X
X
f d
l
d
-
=
- F
 for private firms (S=0).       f  is the standard normal density 
function and F  is the corresponding standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
The correction terms for selection into urban and rural hukou status are derived 
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analogously by estimating the univariate probit model: prob(U=1)= F ( 2 2X d ). As a 
result, we obtain 2 2
2 2
( )ˆ
( )U
X
X
f d
l
d
=
F
 for urban hukou holders (U=1) and 2 2
2 2
( )ˆ
1 ( )R
X
X
f d
l
d
-
=
- F
 
for rural hukou holders (U=0).                           
 
By estimating the two univariate probit models for sector and hukou status 
determination, selectivity correction terms are constructed as above and used to augment 
the wage equations for two types of workers in the two economic sectors. The four 
augmented wage equations to be estimated are specified as follows. 
 
11 12
ˆ ˆln U U U US S S S U SW X wg a l a l= + + + ,                  (10) 
21 22
ˆ ˆln R R R RS S S S R SW X wg a l a l= + + + ,                   (11) 
31 32
ˆ ˆln U U U UP P P P U PW X wg a l a l= + + + ,                  (12) 
41 42
ˆ ˆln R R R RP P P P R PW X wg a l a l= + + + .                   (13) 
 
Again, the left-hand side variables denote the wages for urban and rural hukou 
holders in the SOE sector and private firms, respectively. The superscript denotes the 
hukou status (urban versus rural hukou) and subscript denotes the economic sector. ijw  
(i=U or R, j= S or P) are random disturbance terms with mean zero, a is a vector of 
coefficients.  
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In order to identify the wage equations above, each selection equation should include 
at least one exogenous variable assumed to be relevant only for this equation which is 
excluded from the other selection and the wage equations (Rabe, 2011). Fortunately, the 
comprehensive information on personal characteristics provided by available micro 
dataset (RUMIC-2008) contains some variables that can be used to identify these 
equations. The excluded instrument that identifies SOE sector determination equation is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the individual is recommended by the government for 
this job. For the SOE selection equation, since the SOE sector has very close relationship 
with the government in China, the government sometimes introduces some people to the 
state-owned enterprises, but this kind of government reference is very rare in private 
firms. Thus, whether or not to have government reference for a job is a good indicator for 
the sector determination. Moreover, since state-owned enterprises usually have 
established wage schemes for workers with different characteristics such as education and 
experience, it is unlikely that the government reference would directly affect workers’ 
wages in the SOE sector.  
 
In addition, the variable included in the hukou determination equation but excluded 
from the wage equation is a continuous variable representing the total amount of money 
the individual received from his or her parents in the last twelve months. As introduced 
previously, the criteria to grant urban hukou differs from one place to another. However, 
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many cities grant urban hukou to people who make an investment in the city, or purchase 
some property such as a house, etc. Therefore, if people receive more money from their 
parents in the past year, they are more likely to meet the criteria specified by local 
government to be granted an urban hukou. This variable is excluded from the wage 
equation because employers can seldom know that how much money a worker received 
from his or her parents in the past year, and thus cannot pay workers differently based on 
this unknown information.  
 
Given the estimates from augmented wage regressions (10)-(13), I can decompose 
the average wage differentials between urban and rural hukou holders in state-owned 
enterprises and private firms, respectively. However, the decomposition becomes more 
complicated when there are selectivity correction terms. The complexity arises from the 
way to treat the selection term when we decompose the average (log) wage differential. 
Previous literature has provided two major ways to deal with the selectivity term in 
decomposition. Dolton and Makepeace (1986) treat the selectivity-correction terms in the 
same way as the other regressors in the wage functions, while Reimers (1983) proposes 
that the selectivity-correction terms can be used to modify the wage differentials, and 
then the modified wage differential is decomposed to endowment effect and coefficient 
effect. As Beller and Blau (1988) argued, the adjustment for selectivity bias is important, 
particularly when one is interested in potential differences in employer treatment of two 
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groups. In this case, the focus should be on wage offers rather than observed wages 
(Beller and Blau, 1988; Reimers, 1983). Therefore, I adopt Reimers’s strategy to modify 
the wage differential, and then decompose the adjusted wage differential into the 
endowment effect and coefficient effect. 
 
Given the estimates of wage regressions above, I decompose the adjusted wage 
differential in the two ownership sectors. By equation (10) and (11), the wage 
decomposition in the SOE sector is as follows (for example: *g = ˆUg ):  
 
11 12 21 22(ln ) (ln )
U R
S S U S S RW Wa l a l a l a l- - - - - = ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ' '( )
U R U R U R
S S S S S SX X Xg g g- + - , (14) 
 
The first term on the right hand side ˆ( ) 'U R US S SX X g-  reflects the proportion of 
adjusted wage differential that can be explained by characteristics, and the last term 
ˆ ˆ'( )R U RS S SX g g- serves as an estimate of wage discrimination in the SOE sector. Similarly, 
by equation (12) and (13), the wage decomposition in the private sector is: 
 
31 32 41 42(ln ) (ln )
U R
P P U P P RW Wa l a l a l a l- - - - - = ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ' '( )
U R U R U R
P P P P P PX X Xg g g- + - . (15) 
 
Again, the wage decomposition above with selectivity-correction terms will be done 
with four alternative weighting wage structure in the absence of discrimination, 
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respectively, and all of the results will be reported in the next section.  
 
3.5.1.3 Double selectivity approach 
In the case of r 0¹ , we adopt the double-selectivity approach to estimate the 
system of equations (1)-(6) with the stochastic specification in (7). Tunali (1986) shows 
that if the error terms have a joint normal distribution, then a two-step estimation 
procedure can be applied to correct for the double-selectivity issue, which is very similar 
to Heckman’s two step method. Specifically, the two selection equations are estimated 
using a bivariate probit model, and augmented selectivity correction terms are derived as 
additional regressors in four wage equations.  
 
In our context, there are four groups of workers defined by two dummy variables 
including “S” denoting the sector of employment and “U” denoting the hukou status, 
respectively. After estimating the bivariate probit model for the two selection equations, 
we can obtain the following selectivity terms. Set C1= 1 1'i iX d , C2= 2 2'i iX d , 
1M = 1 221
C Cr
r
-
-
, and 2M = 2 121
C Cr
r
-
-
. 2F  is the bivariate standard normal distribution 
function, f  is the univariate standard normal density function, and F  is the 
cumulative standard normal distribution. The selectivity terms generated by the bivariate 
estimation are ˆUSl = 1 2
2 1 2
( ) ( )
( , ; )
C M
C C
f
r
F
F
; ˆSUl = 2 1
2 1 2
( ) ( )
( , ; )
C M
C C
f
r
F
F
; ˆRSl = 1 2
2 1 2
( ) ( )
( , ; )
C M
C C
f
r
F -
F - -
; 
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ˆS
Rl = 2 1
2 1 2
( ) ( )
( , ; )
C M
C C
f
r
F
-
F - -
; ˆUPl = 1 2
2 1 2
( ) ( )
( , ; )
C M
C C
f
r
F -
-
F - -
; ˆPUl = 2 1
2 1 2
( ) ( )
( , ; )
C M
C C
f
r
F -
-
F - -
; 
ˆR
Pl = 1 2
2 1 2
( ) ( )
( , ; )
C M
C C
f
r
F -
-
F - -
; ˆPRl = 2 1
2 1 2
( ) ( )
( , ; )
C M
C C
f
r
F -
-
F - -
. 
 
In the second step, I estimate four augmented wage equations for urban and rural 
hukou holders in two ownership sectors as specified below.  
 
11 12
ˆ ˆln U U U U S US S S S U SW X wg a l a l= + + + ,                  (16) 
21 22
ˆ ˆln R R R R S RS S S S R SW X wg a l a l= + + + ,                  (17) 
31 32
ˆ ˆln U U U U P UP P P P U PW X wg a l a l= + + + ,                  (18) 
41 42
ˆ ˆln R R R R P RP P P P R PW X wg a l a l= + + + .                   (19) 
 
Similar to the previous case, I adopt Reimers’s strategy to modify the wage 
differential with the selectivity terms, and then decompose the adjusted wage differential 
into the endowment effect and coefficient effect. Equation (20) and (21) provide the 
formulae for the wage decomposition in the SOE sector and private sector, respectively 
( *g = ˆUg ).  
 
11 12 21 22(ln ) (ln )
U R
S S U S S RW Wa l a l a l a l- - - - - = ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ' '( )
U R U R U R
S S S S S SX X Xg g g- + - , (20) 
 
31 32 41 42(ln ) (ln )
U R
P P U P P RW Wa l a l a l a l- - - - - = ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ' '( )
U R U R U R
P P P P P PX X Xg g g- + - . (21) 
  
 
134 
 
In summary, the wage decomposition in a double-selectivity framework works as 
follows. I first estimate a bivariate probit model for sector determination and hukou status 
determination, and obtain eight selectivity terms as above (the lambdas). In the second 
step, I estimate four augmented wage equations (equation 16-19) and decompose the 
adjusted wage differential into a proportion due to characteristics and an estimate of wage 
discrimination in each sector (by equation 20 and 21).  
 
3.5.2 Estimating hiring discrimination 
3.5.2.1 No selectivity correction 
It is documented in the previous literature that on average, workers with rural hukou 
are less likely hired by the state-owned enterprises than those with urban hukou (Gagnon 
et al., 2011). However, it is not known in the literature about how much of the average 
hiring differential is due to hiring discrimination against rural hukou in the SOE sector. 
To fill in this gap, this section adopts the similar decomposition technique to decompose 
the overall hiring differential into the endowment effect and the proportion due to hiring 
discrimination.  
 
Specifically, if the hiring probability in the SOE sector is modeled with a linear 
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probability model, then the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique can be directly 
applied here.3 For hukou status i (urban or rural), I estimate a linear probability model as 
follows. 
 
1 1 1Pr( 1)
i i i iS X ud= = + , i=U or R.                   (22) 
 
In the equation above, Pr( 1)iS = is the probability that a worker with hukou i (urban 
or rural) is hired in the SOE sector, 1
iX  is a vector of individual and job-related 
characteristics, and 1
id  is a vector of coefficients on these characteristics, and 1
iu  is the 
random error term. According to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method, the linear 
probability model is estimated for urban and rural hukou holders, respectively, and the 
average hiring differential is decomposed as follows. 
  
Pr( 1) Pr( 1)U RS S= - =  
= 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ' '
U U R RX Xd d-  
= * * *1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ' [ '( ) '( )]
U R U U R RX X X Xd d d d d- + - + - .           (23) 
 
In the equations above, Pr( 1)US =  and Pr( 1)RS = are the predicted mean 
probabilities for urban and rural hukou holders to work in the SOE sector, 1
UX  and 
                                                        
3 I also tried probit models and did the probit decomposition of the overall hiring differential using non-linear 
decomposition technique developed by Yun (2004; 2005) and Bauer and Sinning (2008). The command in STATA is 
nldecompose. The results are very similar to those obtained from the linear probability model. Non-linear 
decompositoin results are available upon request.  
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1
RX are the mean vectors of hiring determining variables in the SOE sector for urban and 
rural hukou holders respectivley, 1ˆ
Ud  and 1ˆ
Rd are the vectors of estimated coefficients, 
and *1ˆd  is the non-discriminatory coefficient structure. Again, the first term above 
*
1 1 1ˆ( ) '
U RX X d-  is attributed to different endowments (productivity-related characteristics) 
in two groups of workers and is usually called the endowment effect. The second term in 
the square bracket * *1 1 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ '( ) '( )]
U U R RX Xd d d d- + -  is is associated with differences in 
returns (coefficients) to the characteristics between the two groups, which is the estimate 
for hiring discrimination. 
 
3.5.2.2 Hukou selectivity correction 
When we model hiring determination for urban and rural hukou holders, there is a 
single selection issue left which is the selection of hukou status. I will adopt the standard 
Heckman two-step procedure to deal with this single selection issue in estimating hiring 
discrimination.  
 
Specifically, we can obtain the hukou selectivity correction terms by estimating the 
probit model with hukou status as the dependent variable. If sector determination is 
modeled with a linear probability model, then I estimate the two equations or urban and 
rural hukou holders with selectivity correction terms as follows: 
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1 1 1
ˆPr( 1)U U U UU US X ud q l= = + + ,                        (24) 
1 1 1
ˆPr( 1)R R R RR RS X ud q l= = + + .                         (25) 
 
After obtaining the estimates from this linear probability model, the adjusted hiring 
differential will be decomposed into the usual endowment effect and coefficient effect, as 
in equation (26) (Again, take the example of *1ˆd = 1ˆ
Ud ).4 
 
(Pr( 1) ) (Pr( 1) )U RU U R RS Sq l q l= - - = - = 1 1 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ' '( )]
U R U R U RX X Xd d d- + - .  (26) 
 
In summary, this section has explained different models to analyze wage and hiring 
discrimination against rural hukou holders in state-owned enterprises and private firms, 
including those with and without selectivity correction. All of the results will be reported 
in the next section. 
 
3.6 Data description and econometric results 
I will utilize 2008 wave of the Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) survey to 
analyze the proposed question. The Longitudinal Survey on Rural Urban Migration in 
                                                        
4 In the presence of selectivity terms, it would be very difficult to apply non-linear decomposition technique. The 
difficulty arises from the fact that the selectivity terms cannot be separated from other regressors to adjust the overall 
differential. Yun (1999) proposed to use Taylor expansion to linearize the probit equation and then do the 
decomposition as in the linear case. However, this method involves approximation, and very few previous studies have 
used it. Currently, the non-linear decomposition commands in STATA including fairlie and nldecompose neither allow 
for adjustment for selection.   
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China (RUMiC) consists of three parts: the Urban Household Survey, the Rural 
Household Survey and the Migrant Household Survey. It was initiated by a group of 
researchers at the Australian National University, the University of Queensland and the 
Beijing Normal University and was supported by the Institute for the Study of Labor 
(IZA), which provides the Scientific Use Files. The financial support for RUMiC was 
obtained from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID), the Ford Foundation, IZA and the Chinese Foundation of Social 
Sciences. 
 
The survey covers three groups of Chinese households: 5000 migrant households 
who worked in 15 designated cities (migrant survey) in nine provinces or metropolitan 
areas; 5000 urban local incumbent households in the same cities (urban household 
survey), and 8000 rural households (rural household survey). Most of the migrants have 
rural hukou while the urban sample largely takes urban hukou. This feature gives us 
enough observations for both urban and rural hukou holders. For the research purpose of 
this paper, I will only use the urban sample and migrant sample in 2008 wave of the 
survey. The nine provinces or metropolitan areas covered in the survey are Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Sichuan, Chongqing and Henan. The first 
four of these are the largest migrant destinations, and the remaining five are the largest 
migration sending areas. The RUMiC survey of migrant workers in urban cities, to the 
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best of our knowledge, is the only random sample of migrant workers for China so far. 
The survey records detailed individual information, such as monthly earnings, hours of 
work, demographic characteristics, and work and employment information. A detailed 
definition of each variable used in this study is provided in the data appendix. 
 
For the purpose of this study, I restrict the sample to employees aged from 18 to 60 
in urban areas. Furthermore, people working at foreign-owned companies and 
self-employed people are excluded from our sample. The remaining sample consists of 
5,012 urban hukou holders and 3,795 rural hukou holders. The total sample size is 8807. 
The summary statistics of the key variables in the data set are presented in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Mean Values of Key Variables 
 SOE  Private 
 Urban hukou Rural hukou  Urban hukou Rural hukou 
Age 40.18 32.08  38.01 30.73 
Years of schooling 12.53 9.65  11.88 9.36 
Experience 21.67 16.25  20.12 15.12 
Monthly earnings 2294.63 1529.76  2018.49 1500.99 
Hourly wage 15.08 7.40  12.76 6.72 
Male 0.58 0.65  0.55 0.61 
Parent money 683.23 361.57  668.40 214.02 
Gov. reference 0.45 0.03  0.16 0.003 
Firm size 1261.06 61.62  254.48 15.03 
Social capital 35.58 28.72  33.19 31.93 
N 3,198 658  1,814 3,137 
Note: A detailed definition of each variable is provided in the data appendix.  
  
 
140 
 
As can be seen from the table, among 5,012 urban hukou holders, more than half of 
them (3,198) are working in state-owned enterprises, whereas only a very small 
proportion of rural hukou holders are working in this high wage sector. In addition, the 
average monthly earnings are 2294.6 (yuan) and 1529.8 in the SOE sector for urban and 
rural hukou holders, respectively, so the average earning differential is about 50%. On the 
other hand, the average differential in terms of monthly earnings is about 30% in the 
private firms. 5  Given this evidence so far, we cannot conclude that the wage 
discrimination is more severe in SOEs than private firms because the wage differentials 
could be driven by differences in productivity-related characteristics. That is, the raw 
wage differential presented here is only the average one but does not control for workers’ 
characteristics.   
 
Table 3.1 shows that on average, urban hukou holders are older than rural hukou 
holders indicating that most of rural migrants in cities are young people aged around 30. 
Furthermore, more than 60% of rural hukou holders are males, while the gender 
composition is more balanced for urban hukou holders. In terms of human capital 
variables, urban hukou holders have more education than rural hukou holders, and the 
                                                        
5 In the data set, some firms’ ownership are identified as collective-owned. This is a special firm ownership in China 
due to the planned economy in which some firms were owned by a community, a city, etc. Since the transformation 
from planned economy to market economy in 1978, most of the collective-owned firms have become more 
market-oriented and privatized especially after 1990s (Sun, 2008). Therefore, although some of the origional 
collective-owned firms are still officially called collective, they are very similar to private enterprises in practice. So I 
put the collective-owned firms in the dataset to the category of private enterpries.   
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average education is slightly higher in state-owned enterprises than in the private sector. 
The data set also contains a variable to reflect people’s social capital measured by the 
number of greetings sent in the past Chinese new year festival. As seen in Table 3.1, 
urban hukou holders in the SOE sector have the highest social capital, and urban hukou 
holders have more social capital than rural hukou holders in each sector. For a job-related 
characteristic, workers with urban hukou tend to work in larger firms than those with 
rural hukou. In addition, the SOE firms are typically larger than private firms.  
 
The excluded variable to identify the sector selection equation is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the individual is recommended by the government for this job. Table 
3.1 indicates that nearly half of the urban hukou holders in the SOE sector are 
recommended by the government for this job, while this ratio is much smaller in private 
sector. This is because the SOE sector has very close relationship with the government in 
China, and the government sometimes introduces some people to the state-owned 
enterprises, but this kind of government reference is very rare in the private firms. 
Moreover, the excluded variable to identify the hukou determination equation is the total 
amount of money the individual received from his or her parents in the last twelve 
months. As is seen, urban hukou holders received more money from their parents than 
rural hukou holders in either sector, which can partly verify our identification variable.  
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As Giulietti et al. (2012) claimed, in the RUMiC dataset, hourly wages are more 
prone to measurement error (being calculated by combining monthly wages and weekly 
hours worked), so I choose to use monthly wages as the major dependent variable. As a 
robustness check, the wage equations have also been estimated using hourly wages, and 
the results are presented in the appendix.  
 
3.6.1 Evidence on wage discrimination and ownership structure 
3.6.1.1 No selectivity correction 
In the first step, the wage equation is estimated for urban and rural hukou holders 
separately within each sector without dealing with the selectivity issue and the results are 
reported in Table 3.2. For the purpose of estimating the extent of discrimination more 
accurately, I control for individuals’ productivity-related characteristics as well as 
job-related information as many as the data set allows. The dependent variables in all of 
wage equations are the natural logarithm of monthly earnings measured in nominal 
Chinese currency (yuan) in 2007. The independent variables include potential labor 
market experience and its square, completed years of schooling, social capital, seniority, 
number of children, health status, weight, height, school performance, gender, marriage 
status, a dummy variable indicating job training, firm size, and a set of dummies 
including occupation, industry, and province dummies to control for the difference in cost 
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of living in different regions.  
 
Table 3.2 Log Wage Regressions without Selectivity Correction 
 SOE Private 
 Urban hukou Rural hukou Urban hukou Rural hukou 
Years of schooling 0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
0.036*** 
(0.004) 
Experience -0.003 
(0.005) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
Exp. Sq -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
Male 0.247*** 
(0.038) 
0.091* 
(0.047) 
0.343*** 
(0.052) 
0.092*** 
(0.023) 
Social capital 0.0016*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
Firm tenure 0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
Constant 8.425*** 
(0.532) 
5.582*** 
(0.581) 
6.748** 
(0.716) 
5.704*** 
(0.271) 
N 2,679 639 1,455 3,040 
Adjusted R-sq 0.2155 0.2536 0.2241 0.1725 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors. The dependent variables in all of wage equations are the natural logarithm of monthly 
earnings in 2007. All regressions also control for number of children, health status, weight, height, 
school performance, gender, marriage status, a dummy variable indicating job training, firm size, and 
a set of dummies including occupation, industry, and province dummies. 
 
Table 3.2 presents the coefficients of the major human capital variables, and the 
coefficients of other variables are not reported. As the table shows, the return to schooling 
is around 3 percent in China and is very similar between urban and rural hukou holders in 
each sector, which is consistent with recent studies (Song, 2012; Demurger et al., 2012). 
In addition, it turns out that the coefficients on human capital variables are all statistically 
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significant for rural hukou holders and mostly larger than the coefficients for urban hukou 
holders in both sectors, whereas the coefficients on social capital display the opposite 
pattern. This may imply that the wage structure is more market-oriented for rural hukou 
holders, while social networking is very important for the wages of urban hukou workers. 
Comparing the state-owned enterprises (SOE) and private firms, we can find that the 
wage structure is very similar for rural hukou holders in these two sectors. For urban 
hukou holders, the return to major human capital variables is higher in private firms than 
in SOEs, including years of schooling and work experience. However, it is noteworthy 
that the return to social capital and firm tenure is higher in SOEs than private firms for 
urban hukou holders.  
 
Another finding from Table 3.2 is that for urban hukou holders, males with the same 
observed characteristics earn about 30% more than females, which suggests an evidence 
of gender discrimination. For rural hukou holders, the gender wage premium is about 
10%. We can conclude that the gender discrimination is more severe among urban hukou 
holders than among those with rural hukou.  
 
Table 3.3 reports the decomposition of the overall wage differential into the 
explained and unexplained components in terms of log differentials using equation (8). 
The four alternative non-discriminatory wage structures are used as weights for the wage 
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decomposition, including wage structures for urban and rural hukou holders, respectively, 
population-weighted and pooled-sample wage structures. The raw log wage differential is 
higher in SOE sector than in private sector between urban and rural hukou holders. 
Furthermore, the entire wage differential in the private sector between urban and rural 
hukou holders is due to people’s productivity-related characteristics, meaning that there is 
no any discrimination in the private sector. In contrast, there is some proportion of wage 
differential in the SOE sector that can not be explained by observed characteristics, 
although it is very small. In summary, if we don’t take into account the double selection 
issues, we find that the wage discrimination is non-existent in the private sector, and very 
small in magnitude in the SOE sector.  
 
Table 3.3 Wage Decomposition without Selectivity Correction 
  Urban- 
weighted 
Rural- 
weighted 
Pooled sample 
weighted 
Population- 
weighted 
      
SOE Total diff 
  
0.294 
(0.022) 
0.294 
(0.022) 
0.294 
(0.022) 
0.294 
(0.022) 
 Explained 
  
0.287 
(0.063) 
0.289 
(0.101) 
0.292 
(0.021) 
0.287 
(0.055) 
 Unexplained 
  
0.008 
(0.065) 
0.005 
(0.103) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.058) 
      
Private Total diff 
  
0.162 
(0.020) 
0.162 
(0.020) 
0.162 
(0.020) 
0.162 
(0.020) 
 Explained 
  
0.289 
(0.031) 
0.226 
(0.090) 
0.170 
(0.016) 
0.250 
(0.058) 
 Unexplained 
  
-0.126 
(0.035) 
-0.064 
(0.092) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.087 
(0.060) 
Note: The main entries represent the decomposition of log wage differential, in which wage is 
measured by monthly earnings. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
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The next section will take into account the double-selectivity issue and provide more 
convincing results about the extent of wage discrimination in firms with different 
ownerships.  
 
3.6.1.2 Double-selectivity correction 
Table 3.4 presents the results of two selection equations using two single probit 
models and a bivariate probit model, respectively. The former model assumes that the 
hukou selection rule and sectoral choice are independent (ρ=0), while the model 
presented in the last column assumes that the two selection rules are correlated with each 
other (ρ≠0). For the sector determination equation, the estimated coefficients are standard 
ones in that people who have more education and work experience are more likely to 
work in the SOE sector. In addition, the coefficients on the excluded variable (Gov. 
reference) are both positively significant in two specifications, partly verifying my 
hypothesis that people with government reference are more likely to be hired in SOEs 
because the SOE sector has very close relationship with the government in China. For the 
hukou determination equation, we can see that the excluded variable (log of parent 
money) also has expected effect on the probability of obtaining an urban hukou. People 
who receive more money from their parents tend to be wealthier and thus more likely to 
convert their hukou from rural to urban.  
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Table 3.4 Probit Estimates for Selection Equations 
 Univariate Probit Bivariate Probit 
Equation 1 Sector determination 
Years of schooling 0.074 *** 0.088 *** 
 (0.007)  (0.009)  
Experience 0.038 *** 0.048 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  
Exp. Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0002)  
Male -0.112 ** -0.113 * 
 (0.050)  (0.063)  
Firm tenure 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  
Gov. reference 0.712 *** 0.727 *** 
 (0.049)  (0.063)  
Constant -2.875 *** -2.947 *** 
 (0.591)  (0.743)  
N 7828  5359  
P-value 0.000  0.000  
     
Equation 2 Hukou determination 
Years of schooling 0.243 *** 0.241 *** 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  
Experience 0.140 *** 0.140 *** 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  
Exp. Sq -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003)  
Male -0.431 *** -0.436 *** 
 (0.115)  (0.114)  
Firm tenure 0.045 *** 0.044 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  
ln(parentmoney) 0.067 *** 0.066 *** 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  
Constant -7.434 *** -7.408 *** 
 (1.389)  (1.384)  
N 5359  5359  
P-value 0.000  0.000  
ρ 0.000  0.177 *** 
   (0.050)  
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Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors. All regressions also control for variables that are included in the wage regressions.  
 
The main purpose of this study is not to explain why certain individuals work in the 
SOE sector or have an urban hukou, but instead to investigate the possible selectivity bias 
which may result from non-random selection. Therefore, the estimated coefficients for 
the two equations above will not be elaborated on here. As the table shows, ρ is 
significantly positive implying that the inclination to obtain urban hukou and the 
inclination to work in the SOE sector are positively related to each other.  
 
After estimating the selection equations, I run four augmented wage equations with 
Heckman selectivity terms for the case of ρ=0, and another four augmented wage 
equations with Tunali double-selectivity terms for the case of ρ≠0, respectively. The 
results of wage regressions are provided in the appendix, Table A1 and A2, respectively. 
As can be seen from Table A1, the two selection issues are indeed very important. For 
example, the coefficient on Sl  is 0.559 and statistically significant, implying that rural 
hukou holders are positively selected into the SOE sector. That is, the average wage of 
rural hukou holders working in the SOE sector is greater than what a random person from 
the population would earn in the SOE sector. In addition, the coefficients on the urban 
hukou selectivity terms are negative in each sector, implying that there is a negative 
correlation between the inclination to obtain an urban hukou and the wage rate.  
  
 
149 
 
Given the regression results with double-selectivity correction, I decompose the 
selectivity-adjusted wage differential to the proportion due to characteristics and the 
remaining part due to discrimination as described in the previous section. Accordingly, I 
obtain the wage decomposition results with double-selectivity correction in Table 3.5 for 
cases of ρ=0 and ρ≠0, respectively.   
  
Table 3.5 Wage Decomposition with Double Selectivity Correction 
  
Urban- 
weighted 
Rural- 
weighted 
Pooled sample 
weighted 
Population- 
weighted 
      
Panel A Double selectivity (ρ=0 ) 
SOE Total diff (adjusted) 1.193 1.193 1.193 1.193 
  (0.415) (0.415) (0.415) (0.415) 
 Explained -0.061 0.717 0.952 0.071 
  (0.201) (0.306) (0.333) (0.175) 
 Unexplained 1.254 0.476 0.241 1.122 
  (0.465) (0.213) (0.087) (0.410) 
      
Private Total diff (adjusted) 0.603 0.603 0.603 0.603 
  (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) 
 Explained 0.339 0.326 0.512 0.331 
  (0.259) (0.118) (0.095) (0.121) 
 Unexplained 0.264 0.277 0.092 0.272 
  (0.294) (0.244) (0.062) (0.226) 
      
Panel B Double selectivity (ρ≠0 ) 
SOE Total diff (adjusted) 1.096 1.096 1.096 1.096 
  (0.393) (0.393) (0.393) (0.393) 
 Explained 0.712 -0.071 0.877 0.579 
  (0.311) (0.205) (0.316) (0.260) 
 Unexplained 0.384 1.167 0.218 0.517 
  (0.200) (0.449) (0.082) (0.219) 
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Private Total diff (adjusted) 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.322 
  (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
 Explained 0.273 -0.038 0.263 0.077 
  (0.118) (0.252) (0.057) (0.165) 
 Unexplained 0.049 0.361 0.060 0.246 
  (0.222) (0.301) (0.059) (0.239) 
Note: The top panel (ρ=0) assumes that the hukou selection rule and sector choice are independent 
with each other, while the bottom panel (ρ≠0) assumes that the two selection rules are correlated. 
 
The decomposition results show that the wage discrimination is unambiguously more 
severe in the SOE sector than in private firms, regardless of the weight used for 
non-discriminatory wage structure. For example, if we focus on the results for 
pooled-sample weighted decomposition, the unexplained log wage differential is 0.241 in 
state-owned enterprises, but only 0.092 in private firms in the case of  ρ=0. Similarly, 
for the case of ρ≠0, the unexplained log wage differential is 0.218 in SOEs and 0.06 in 
private firms. If we translate the log differential into percentage points, the results from 
Tunali double-selectivity approach (ρ≠0) suggest that for observationally-equivalent 
workers, urban hukou holders earn about 30% more than rural hukou holders do in the 
SOE sector, but only 5% more in the private sector. If we take urban hukou holders’ 
wage structure as the non-discriminatory wage structure (which is the most frequently 
used weight in previous literature), then column 1 in Table 3.5 informs us that 
comparable workers with urban hukou earn 50% more than rural hukou holders in 
state-owned enterprises and again 5% more in private firms (ρ≠0).   
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Compared with the results in Table 3.3, the magnitude of wage discrimination is 
increased by the selectivity adjustment, especially in the SOE sector. This is because rural 
hukou holders are positively selected into the SOE sector, while there is a negative 
correlation between the inclination to obtain an urban hukou and the wage rate in the 
SOE sector. In other words, mean wage offers are above mean observed wages among 
urban hukou holders and below mean observed wages among rural hukou holders. 
Therefore, the OLS results without adjusting for selectivity under-estimate the extent of 
wage discrimination in the SOE sector.  
 
3.6.1.3 Robustness check for wage discrimination 
In addition to conducting robustness checks by using different non-discriminatory 
wage structures, this section will provide another robustness check by using hourly wage 
as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table A3 and A4 in the appendix. 
As can be seen, we still observe the general picture that SOEs are more discriminatory 
than private firms in terms of wages. The unexplained wage differentials between urban 
and rural hukou holders are mostly larger in SOEs than in private firms. In some cases, 
the unexplained part is similar between the two sectors, but there is no case in which the 
discrimination is significantly larger in private firms than in the SOE sector. In summary, 
the difference in terms of the extent of wage discrimination between the SOE and private 
sectors is smaller if we use hourly wage compared to monthly earnings. Since hourly 
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wages are more prone to measurement error in the RUMiC dataset (Giulietti et al., 2012) 
I choose to use monthly earnings as the major measure for our discussion purposes.  
 
3.6.2 Evidence on hiring discrimination and ownership structure 
In addition to analyzing the hukou-based wage discrimination in firms with different 
ownerships, this section examines another type of labor market discrimination, namely 
hiring discrimination in the high-pay SOE sector. As Table 3.1 shows, among 5,012 
urban hukou holders, about 64% of them (3,198) are working in the state-owned 
enterprises, whereas only 17% of rural hukou holders are working in this high wage 
sector. The raw hiring differential in the SOE sector between two types of workers is 
about 47 percent. How much is this hiring differential due to the difference in 
productivity-related characteristics and how much due to discrimination? Table 3.6 
reports the results of decomposing the raw hiring differential into the endowment effect 
and the discrimination.  
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Table 3.6 Hiring Discrimination in the SOE sector 
 Urban-weighted Rural-weighted 
Pooled sample 
weighted 
Population- 
weighted 
     No selectivity correction     
Total diff 0.474 0.474 0.474 0.474 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 0.010 
Explained 0.338 0.307 0.428 0.323 
 (0.044) (0.048) (0.009) 0.033 
Unexplained 0.135 0.167 0.045 0.150 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.005) 0.034 
 Selectivity correction for hukou status 
Total diff (adjusted) 0.547 0.547 0.547 0.547 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 0.015 
Explained 0.201 -0.178 0.448 0.000 
 (0.061) (0.113) (0.011) 0.066 
Unexplained 0.346 0.724 0.099 0.546 
 (0.066) (0.120) (0.010) 0.074 
Note: The main entries represent the decomposition of the probability of being hired in the high wage 
SOE sector. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
All specifications show that there exists obvious hiring discrimination against rural 
hukou holders in the SOE sector. According to the selectivity-adjustment decomposition, 
the unexplained differential in terms of the probability of being hired in the SOE sector is 
about 35% between urban and rural hukou holders (for urban-weighted decomposition). 
That is, rural hukou holders with identical observed characteristics have reduced 
probability of being hired in the high-wage sector than those with urban hukou.  
 
Similar to the results of wage discrimination, the proportion of discrimination in total 
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hiring differential is larger with hukou-selectivity correction than without selectivity 
correction. Specifically, urban-weigthed decomposition result shows that comparable 
workers with urban hukou are 13.5 percentage points more likely to be hired in the SOE 
sector than those with rural hukou without adjusting the selection issue, but the hiring 
differential becomes 35 percentage points if we take hukou selection issue into 
consideration.  
 
To recapitulate, the econometric results presented in this section suggest that rural 
hukou holders not only face more wage discrimination in the SOE sector, but also suffer 
hiring discrimination in the high wage SOE sector in urban China. 
 
3.7 Theoretical discussion  
I have shown that there exists wage discrimination and hiring discrimination against 
rural hukou holders in urban China especially in state-owned enterprises. Although I 
cannot fully rule out the possibility that differences in unobserved characteristics between 
urban and rural hukou holders play a role in the unexplained part of decomposition, I 
have included many control variables and employed several robustness checks to support 
the conclusion. 
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However, how can we explain the reason for the discrimination? There are two main 
theories established to explain the existence of the discrimination against some group of 
workers, tasted-based discrimination and statistical discrimination. The taste-based 
discrimination theory was developed by Nobel Laureate Gary Becker (1971). In Becker’s 
framework, agents have tastes for discrimination with respect to groups of workers 
identified according to observed traits such as race, ethnicity, and gender. These tastes are 
purely based on preferences. The tastes for discrimination may come from employers, 
co-workers, or consumers. In our context, assuming there is employer discrimination 
against rural hukou holders in the SOE sector, and employers have a distaste for hiring 
workers with rural hukou, then employers do not maximize profits but rather maximize 
utility function which assigns disutility on hiring rural hukou holders.  
 
Another possible explanation for our results is the statistical discrimination which 
maintains that employers use certain broad characteristics, such as gender, race or origin, 
when making decisions about individual recruitment where sufficient information does 
not exist or is costly to obtain. The pioneering work on this topic was done by Arrow 
(1973) and Aigner and Cain (1977). The wage discrimination found in this paper may 
arise from statistical discrimination, in that employers in the SOE sector think that 
migrants, as a group, are low skilled and less reliable. Employers’ negative perceptions 
are likely to be used as stereotypes to discriminate against migrants (Chen and Hoy, 2011). 
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However, the theory of statistical discrimination cannot explain why the wage 
discrimination is more severe in the SOE sector than in the private sector.  
 
Instead, in the taste-based model, the discrimination can sustain only if the market is 
not perfectly competitive. The competitive forces will drive out prejudiced firms. This is 
quite consistent with our finding in that SOEs can discriminate more because they are 
shielded from market forces. Since the SOE sector is commonly thought as part of 
government, the political power helps the SOE sector afford the discrimination against 
workers with rural hukou.  
 
In summary, the findings in this paper are mostly consistent with the taste-based 
discrimination theory. The SOEs discriminate rural hukou holders more than the private 
firms do because they are protected by the government and shielded from competitive 
market forces.  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
In current China, we observe a simultaneous urban labor shortage and surplus labor 
in rural areas earning very low wage. Although previous studies have provided some 
explanations for this phenomenon, none of them have investigated the reason from labor 
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market perspective. This paper fills this gap and examines the hukou-based labor market 
discrimination in two segmented urban sectors including state-owned enterprises and 
private sector.  
 
The results of this paper demonstrate that rural-to-urban migrants with rural hukou 
face both wage discrimination and hiring discrimination in urban China, especially in 
state-owned enterprises, which reduces their expected payoffs associated with migrating 
to the city. The paper offers an important reason for the co-existence of urban labor 
shortage and rural labor surplus.  
 
Another significant contribution of this paper is that it employs a double-selectivity 
approach to investigate the extent of discrimination in urban China, which is the first 
attempt in discrimination literature in China. The first selectivity comes from the 
possibility that people with certain characteristics such as more government networking 
may be favored by stated-owned enterprises (SOE) and thus more likely to work there. 
Another selection problem arises because the hukou status can also be endogenous in that 
some Chinese people are now allowed to convert their hukou from rural to urban upon 
meeting some criteria specified by each local government. The endogenity of hukou 
status has never been dealt with or even considered in previous literature.  
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In summary, the econometric results using the preferred double-selectivity approach 
show that for observationally-equivalent workers, urban hukou holders earn about 50% 
more than rural hukou holders do in the SOE sector, but only 5% more in the private 
sector (ρ≠0, urban-weighted decomposition). In addition, all specifications show that 
there exists obvious hiring discrimination against rural hukou holders in the SOE sector. 
According to the selectivity-adjustment decomposition, the unexplained differential in 
terms of the probability of being hired in the SOE sector is about 35 percentage points 
between urban and rural hukou holders (for urban-weighted decomposition). That is, rural 
hukou holders with identical observed characteristics have reduced probability of being 
hired in the high-wage sector than those with urban hukou. Had a less sophisticated OLS 
specification been used instead, the estimated discrimination would have been much 
lower. This suggests that the adjustment for double selection issues is necessary.  
 
I have to acknowledge that the regression-based decomposition technique has 
limitations on estimating the extent of discrimination since it is not possible to include all 
relevant individual characteristics and job-related features in regressions. However, this 
paper has tried to minimize the possibility that unobserved characteristics play a large 
role in explaining the wage differential by including as many control variables as the data 
set allows, such as school performance, health status, job training, firm size, and a set of 
dummies including occupation, industry, and province dummies.  
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To make the results more convincing, I have conducted various robustness checks 
including imposing different assumptions on the selection rules (ρ=0 or ρ≠0), trying 
alternative non-discriminatory wage structure, and using hourly wage as the dependent 
variable. All of my robustness checks lend the support to our major finding that rural 
hukou holders face more wage discrimination in the SOE sector than in the private sector, 
and also suffer hiring discrimination in the high wage SOE sector in urban China. This 
phenomenon can be best explained by the tasted-based discrimination theory. The SOEs 
discriminate rural hukou holders more than the private firms do because they are 
protected by the government and shielded from competitive market forces. 
 
Appendix 
Appendix 1: Data appendix  
This section explains the definition of each variable used in this paper.  
Hourly Wage. This is obtained from dividing the monthly earnings by the total number of hours 
worked in a moth. 
Years of schooling. Years of formal education. 
Experience. This is the potential work experience calculated by age minus years of schooling 
minus six. 
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Social capital. Measured by the number of greetings sent by the individual in the past Chinese 
new year festival. 
Seniority. Defined as the number of years an individual has worked in the current organization, 
also referred as firm tenure.  
Parent money. This means the total amount of money the individual received from his or her 
parents in the last twelve months. 
Government reference. A dummy variable indicating whether the individual is recommended by 
the government for this job. 
Number of Children. This information is obtained from the question “How many children have 
you ever had?” 
Health status. An ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5.  
Height. Measured by centimeters.  
Weight. Measured by kilograms. 
School performance. This information is obtained from the question “How was your performance 
in your class before you last left school?” It is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 (very good) to 5 
(very poor). 
Gender. A dummy variable equal to 1 for males and 0 for females. 
Marriage status. A dummy variable equal to 1 for the married and 0 for those not married. 
Job training. A dummy variable equal to 1 for those who have received job training and 0 for 
those who have not.  
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Firm size. This is obtained from the question “How many employees are there in your work unit 
(including yourself)?”.  
Occupation. This contains 25 occupation dummies. 
Industry. This contains 29 industry dummies. 
Province. This contains 9 province dummies since the survey was conducted in 9 provinces.  
. 
Appendix 2: Tables 
 
Table A1 Log Wage Regressions with Selectivity Correction (ρ=0) 
 SOE Private 
 Urban hukou Rural hukou Urban hukou Rural hukou 
Years of schooling 0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.060*** 
(0.020) 
0.043*** 
(0.012) 
0.040*** 
(0.011) 
Experience -0.007 
(0.007) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
Exp. Sq -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
Male 0.304*** 
(0.047) 
0.047 
(0.065) 
0.342*** 
(0.068) 
0.082*** 
(0.030) 
Social capital 0.0016*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.001** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
Firm tenure 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
Sl  
-0.084 
(0.076) 
0.559* 
(0.297) 
  
Ul  
-0.237** 
(0.119) 
 -0.101 
(0.113) 
 
Pl  
 
 
 0.447*** 
(0.109) 
0.096 
(0.347) 
Rl  
 
 
-0.110 
(0.072) 
 -0.076* 
(0.043) 
Constant 5.683*** 3.615*** 7.198** 5.682*** 
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(0.779) (1.115) (1.016) (0.341) 
N 1,646 464 869 2,355 
Adjusted R-sq 0.2129 0.2672 0.2809 0.1843 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors. The dependent variables in all of wage equations are the natural logarithm of monthly 
earnings in 2007. All regressions have control variables as previously.  
 
 
Table A2 Log Wage Regressions with Selectivity Correction (ρ≠0) 
 SOE Private 
 Urban hukou Rural hukou Urban hukou Rural hukou 
Years of schooling 0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.062*** 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
Experience -0.007 
(0.008) 
0.037*** 
(0.013) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
Exp. Sq -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
0.000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
Male 0.305*** 
(0.048) 
0.055 
(0.064) 
0.378*** 
(0.068) 
0.089*** 
(0.030) 
Social capital 0.0017*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.001** 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
Firm tenure 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
Constant 8.681*** 
(0.784) 
3.800*** 
(1.087) 
7.826** 
(1.019) 
5.768*** 
(0.337) 
N 1,646 464 869 2,355 
Adjusted R-sq 0.2206 0.2309 0.2809 0.1842 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors. The dependent variables in all of wage equations are the natural logarithm of monthly 
earnings in 2007. All regressions have control variables as previously. Each regression also has two 
Tunali double-selectivity terms as in equation (16)-(19).  
 
 
Table A3 Hourly Wage Decomposition without Selectivity Correction 
  Urban- 
weighted 
Rural- 
weighted 
Pooled sample 
weighted 
Population- 
weighted 
      
SOE Total diff 0.576 
(0.026) 
0.576 
(0.026) 
0.576 
(0.026) 
0.576 
(0.026) 
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 Explained 0.445 
(0.076) 
0.399 
(0.110) 
0.528 
(0.024) 
0.438 
(0.066) 
 Unexplained 0.131 
(0.079) 
0.177 
(0.113) 
0.048 
(0.015) 
0.139 
(0.069) 
      
Private Total diff 0.460 
(0.021) 
0.460 
(0.021) 
0.460 
(0.021) 
0.460 
(0.022) 
 Explained 0.420 
(0.036) 
0.368 
(0.101) 
0.416 
(0.018) 
0.387 
(0.065) 
 Unexplained 0.041 
(0.040) 
0.092 
(0.102) 
0.044 
(0.010) 
0.073 
(0.067) 
Note: The main entries represent the decomposition of log hourly wage differential. Figures in 
parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 
Table A4 Hourly Wage Decomposition with Selectivity Correction 
  
Urban- 
weighted 
Rural- 
weighted 
Pooled sample 
weighted 
Population- 
weighted 
      
Panel A Double selectivity (ρ=0 ) 
SOE Total diff (adjusted) 1.136 1.136 1.136 1.136 
  (0.509) (0.509) (0.509) (0.509) 
 Explained -0.058 0.508 0.896 0.038 
  (0.223) (0.375) (0.408) (0.196) 
 Unexplained 1.194 0.627 0.239 1.098 
  (0.560) (0.260) (0.106) (0.495) 
      
Private Total diff (adjusted) 1.050 1.050 1.050 1.050 
  (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) 
 Explained 0.074 0.263 0.797 0.192 
  (0.296) (0.134) (0.108) (0.139) 
 Unexplained 0.976 0.787 0.252 0.857 
  (0.337) (0.278) (0.071) (0.257) 
      
Panel B Double selectivity (ρ≠0 ) 
SOE Total diff (adjusted) 1.013 1.013 1.013 1.013 
  (0.483) (0.483) (0.483) (0.483) 
 Explained 0.469 -0.075 0.800 0.376 
  (0.382) (0.226) (0.388) (0.319) 
 Unexplained 0.545 1.088 0.213 0.637 
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  (0.245) (0.538) (0.100) (0.267) 
      
Private Total diff (adjusted) 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.809 
  (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) 
 Explained 0.201 -0.258 0.580 -0.088 
  (0.135) (0.288) (0.065) (0.188) 
 Unexplained 0.608 1.067 0.229 0.897 
  (0.253) (0.344) (0.067) (0.274) 
Note: The main entries represent the decomposition of log hourly wage differential. Figures in 
parentheses are standard errors. 
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Chapter 4 A Theoretical Model of the Chinese Labor 
Market6 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purposes of this paper are to formulate a theoretical model to incorporate the 
most central features of the current Chinese labor market and to demonstrate how this 
model might be utilized to analyze the labor allocation as well as the wages in different 
economic sectors. 
 
As Fields (2007) pointed out, good policy work requires sound theoretical 
foundations. Developing countries’ labor markets are marked by distinct labor market 
sectors that work in different ways from one another and by complicated 
interrelationships among the sectors. In China’s context, hitherto, very few studies have 
attempted to establish theoretical models for the Chinese labor market. 
 
This is the major motivation for this chapter. This chapter intends to build a 
theoretical model which can incorporate the central features of the current Chinese labor 
market analyzed in Chapter 2 and 3. These features below from Chapter 2 will serve as a 
starting point for my analysis.  
 
                                                        
6 This paper is co-authored with Professor Gary Fields. 
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1. Nearly half of total labor force in China is working in rural areas and the other half 
is working in urban China; Within rural areas, more than one half of the rural labor force 
is still working in agriculture sector, and the rest is working in rural non-agriculture 
sector concentrated in eastern China; Within urban labor force, more than three quarters 
are working in private sector. 
 
2. Urban and rural wages have been both increasing, but urban wages have grown 
much faster than rural wages, and now the average urban wage is approximately four 
times as high as the average rural wage. 
 
3. Workers with different hukou face different costs of living in cities and have 
different access to government-provided public service and welfare programs in the urban 
area.  
 
4. Workers with rural hukou earn lower wages and are less likely to be hired in the 
high-wage sector in urban areas compared to workers with local urban hukou due to both 
differences in human capital and labor market discrimination. 
 
5. The phenomena of urban labor shortage and rural labor surplus are co-existent in 
the current Chinese labor market.  
  
 
172 
 
6. Open unemployment is low in China and is mainly concentrated in cities of central 
and western China. 
 
7. There exists labor market segmentation between rural and urban labor market as 
well as within urban labor market between different ownerships  
 
8. Wages in urban private sector are largely market-determined, and institutional 
interventions play a small role in wage-setting mechanism. 
 
9. Skilled workers have experienced a much larger wage increase than unskilled 
workers.  
 
10. Only about 10 percent of urban labor force in China is self-employed, but a 
substantial share of urban workers is not covered by social insurance programs.   
 
This chapter formulates a theoretical model on China’s labor market incorporating 
most of the features above, but not all of them. Extensions of the model including more 
features are possible for future research. According to Fields’ criteria, good models 
should be those that contain enough sectors, provide realistic stylizations of the workings 
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of the labor markets in each sector, and contain reasonable specifications of the linkages 
between sectors in the country in question. 
 
Previous studies have tried to employ the existent models to explain the Chinese 
labor market, but none of these models could capture the essence of unique features of 
the current Chinese labor market, and these models were not originally built in China’s 
context. In addition, several scholars have attempted to build new models to fit the 
Chinese labor market. However, these models have various limitations and need to be 
further developed to fit the current reality.   
 
Section 2 will provide a literature review of how the existing classic labor market 
models were used to analyze the Chinese labor market. In section 3, we will introduce 
some models that previous scholars have built with an intention to particularly fit China’s 
labor market. Section 4 lists the features of our model, and the model will be formulated 
in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
4.2 Classic segmented labor market models  
The majority of previous research on analyzing the Chinese labor market was based 
on one of the most famous model on labor market dualism, namely, the Lewis model 
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(1954). The model contains two economic sectors including the high-wage modern sector 
and low-wage agriculture sector, and has no unemployment. There are two phases in the 
Lewis model. In Phase 1, the modern sector faces an unlimited supply of labor due to the 
wage gap between modern and agriculture sectors, so no employers in the modern sector 
need to raise wages to attract additional labor. Thus, the wage in modern sector remains 
constant in the first stage. Finally, a turning point is reached once the supply of labor to 
the modern sector is no longer unlimited and subsequent economic growth would 
increase wages in the two sectors at the same rate in Phase 2 of the model. In summary, 
the first phase of the model features a constant wage in the modern sector and rising wage 
in the agriculture sector, while the second phase is characterized by wage increase in the 
two sectors at the same rate.  
 
Although there are numerous studies on the debate about whether China has passed 
the Lewis turning point (Knight et al. 2011; Song and Zhang 2010; Lu and Jiang 2008), 
we claim that the Lewis model doesn’t fit China because the Chinese reality does not 
hold either in Phase 1 or in Phase 2 of the Lewis model. Specifically, China has neither 
experienced a period in which urban wage keeps constant while rural wage rises (Phase 1 
of the Lewis model), nor experienced a period in which rural and urban wages are the 
same and increase at the same rate (Phase 2 of the Lewis model). What we observe in 
China is that urban and rural wages have both been increasing, but urban wages have 
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grown much faster than rural wages. Accordingly, the whole discussion about whether 
China has passed or not passed the Lewis turning point is not well specified. 
 
Another seminal segmented labor market model is the Harris-Todaro model (Harris 
and Todaro 1970). The model again has two sectors but allows for open unemployment. 
The two sectors of the economy are an urban sector and an agricultural sector. In their 
model, urban sector wage is set institutionally above the market-clearing wage and is 
assumed to be above the agriculture wage, as well. The institutional intervention on urban 
wage prevents full employment. The migration in this model is driven by the difference 
in the expected wages between urban and rural sectors. Therefore, the equilibrium 
condition of the model is that the expected wages between rural and urban search 
strategies are equal to each other. This model can explain the phenomenon of open 
unemployment in the urban area, and has been employed to analyze the effects of various 
public policies, such as urban employment creation and rural development (Fields 2005).  
 
As it turns out, although all of the seminal models mentioned above have offered us 
insightful ideas on analyzing segmented labor market, they were all originally developed 
in other countries, rather than based on China’s context. There is a need to build a 
theoretical model to particularly describe the Chinese labor market by incorporating 
unique institutional features. 
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4.3 Past research on modeling China’s labor market 
To date, only a few researchers have attempted to construct models for the Chinese 
labor market. The earliest model targeting on Chinese labor market was developed by 
Professor Xin Meng in her book called “Labor Market Reform in China” published in 
2000. Based on Fields’ model, Meng (2000) developed a three-sector model to elaborate 
the relationship among rural-urban migration, employment, and wage levels in both rural 
and urban areas in China. The three sectors include rural sector, urban formal sector, and 
urban informal sector.  
 
The key assumptions of this three-sector labor market model are listed below: 
1. There exists institutional restriction on rural-urban migration; 
2. All urban residents work in the formal sector and migrants can be employed only 
in the informal sector; 
3. Firms pay higher wage in the formal sector than in the informal sector for the same 
work; 
4. The informal sector is a market sector and pays the market-clearing wage, whereas 
firms in the formal sector pays high-than-market-clearing wage; 
5. All jobs in the formal and informal sector are technically homogenous, both within 
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sectors and across sectors; 
6. Workers are homogenous in terms of skills, but differ in terms of residential status; 
7. The informal sector and rural sector both pay the market-clearing wage, but the 
wage in the urban informal sector is assumed to be higher than that in the rural sector.   
8. There is no open unemployment. 
 
Putting the three sectors into the same diagram, Figure 4.1 illustrates the interaction 
between rural-urban migration and the labor market condition in the whole economy. The 
two vertical axes represent rural and urban wages, and the horizontal axis measures labor 
input. DrDr denotes the labor demand curve for rural sector. DmDm is the real MPL curve 
for the urban formal and informal sectors. However, as the formal sector is paying 
employees higher wages than their MPL, the labor demand curve for the formal sector is 
DuDu. Therefore, the total labor demand curve for urban sectors is thus the kinked curve 
DuabDm, with the urban formal sector employing OuL2 amount of labor and the wage 
level for this sector being set at Wu. Because of differences in residential status, the labor 
supply curve for urban residents is Su, and the total urban labor supply is St.  
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Figure 4.1 Three-Sector Labor Market Model (Meng, 2000) 
 
As the real market demand curve in urban areas should be DmDm, rather than DuDu, 
the urban sector’s real demand for the urban residents at wage Wu is OuL1. Meng defines 
the hidden unemployment in urban formal sector as the actual quantity of labor working 
in the urban formal sector minus the quantity of labor demanded in this sector according 
to the real demand curve. Thus, Meng argued that the institutional intervention on the 
wage of urban formal sector generates a hidden unemployment of L1L2.  
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What is the labor allocation between the urban informal sector and rural sector? 
Recall that this model assumes that migrants could also take informal jobs in urban areas, 
so if there is no restriction on rural-urban migration, the urban informal sector will 
employ L2L4 migrants and the rural sector employ OrL4 amount of labor. However, this is 
not the case. Institutional barriers and transaction costs prevent rural labor from moving 
to the urban informal sector to the point L4. Instead, rural-urban migration stops at the 
point L3, the intersection of the total labor demand curve for urban sectors and the total 
urban labor supply curve. Therefore, the actual employment in the urban informal sector 
and rural sector are L2L3 and OrL3, respectively. Given the assumptions, there are three 
different wages levels in this economy, Wu, Wm, and Wr for urban formal sector, informal 
sector, and rural sector, respectively. 
 
Meng claimed that if the segregation between urban residents and rural migrants did 
not exist, other things constant, the urban wage would be equal to Wm, which is lower 
than the current average urban wage. Thus, the smaller the barrier to migration, and the 
less rigid the urban formal sector, the lower the urban labor costs. Indeed, if all of 
institutional constraints were removed, then the wage would be equalized across the three 
sectors, and the unique economy-wide wage would be equal to Wm. Furthermore, the 
problem of hidden unemployment would be eliminated if the urban formal sector pays the 
market-clearing wage.  
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Although Meng’s model incorporates some unique feature of the Chinese labor 
market, such as institutional restriction on rural-urban migration, it is not very rigorous 
and also has several limitations. For example, the definition of total labor demand curve 
for urban sectors DuabDm in this model actually violates the definition of demand curve, 
because a given wage is corresponding to multiple quantities of labor demanded. In 
addition, Meng’s model assumes that urban residents only take formal jobs, and informal 
jobs are merely filled in by migrants. Nonetheless, this assumption is too strict to fit the 
reality. On the one hand, Cai and Wu (2006) examines how common urban permanent 
residents are employed on an informal basis. They analyzed survey data collected by the 
Ministry of Labor in 66 cities nationwide at the end of 2002. The survey concentrated 
nearly exclusively on urban permanent residents. The authors applied multiple criteria to 
determine if an individual worker was employed informally. The most important 
categories are those who are self-employed workers, those who work on a temporary or 
hourly basis, and those who lack a labor contract and are not considered officially 
registered workers. The result is quite striking. They find that 45 percent of employment 
of urban residents is informal in nature. On the other hand, we do observe many migrants 
working in urban formal sector covered by social insurance system in Chapter 1. Finally, 
the fifth assumption that jobs across formal sector and informal sector are technically 
homogenous is not realistic. It is hard to imagine that an informal job such as selling 
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newspapers in the street has the same technical nature as a formal job such as computer 
engineer.  
 
Laing et al (2005) extended the basic H-T model to a search equilibrium setting that 
includes both legal and illegal migrants, and concluded that the stricter enforcement of 
hukou system may reduce urban unemployment. However, this model was built for the 
Chinese labor market in the 1990s, when the labor mobility was controlled by 
departments of public security and it was illegal for rural residents to move to cities 
without official approval. As mentioned in the first chapter, this strict restriction on labor 
mobility has been relaxed in China. Currently, Chinese workers are free to move and 
work in any place within China as long as they can find a job there. Accordingly, any 
internal migration is legal regardless of a worker’s hukou status. The hukou system has 
lost its significance on strictly prohibiting Chinese workers from migrating to places 
different from where they were born.  
 
Additionally, Seeborg, Jin and Zhu (2000) made another extension of the H-T model 
by incorporating the dual nature of state and non-state employment in Chinese urban 
cities. They break down urban formal labor into two sectors: the SOE (State-owned 
enterprises) sector and the non-SOE sector. Nevertheless, they only provided a conceptual 
model but failed to include details such as how the wages in each sector are determined.  
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Beyond Meng’s model and other segmented labor market models, the present paper 
establishes a rigorously theoretical model on current China’s labor market, and makes at 
least three contributions to the literature. First, the model contains three economic sectors, 
provides more realistic stylizations of the workings of the labor markets in each sector, 
and contains more reasonable specifications of the linkages between sectors. For instance, 
the model reflects the current feature that both urban and rural hukou holders are working 
in each of the two urban sectors, which was not allowed in Meng’s model.  
 
Second, the model constructed in this paper incorporates the role of the current 
hukou system in China’s labor market. Based on some very recent empirical papers on 
the Chinese hukou system, the model captures the stylized fact that workers with different 
hukou are treated differently in the urban labor market, face different costs of living in 
cities, and have different access to government-provided public service in the urban area. 
Almost all of the previous literature on modeling the Chinese labor market only claimed 
that hukou system is a major institutional restriction on labor mobility, but did not 
analyze how it actually works. The hukou system was similar to a black box which 
previous researchers had never explored for the purpose of modeling the Chinese labor 
market.  
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Last but not the least, this paper utilizes the model to analyze the welfare 
consequences of various labor market policies using two well-specified welfare 
evaluation criteria: first-order stochastic dominance approach and abbreviated social 
welfare function. Some researchers have tried to conduct policy analysis on the Chinese 
labor market (Hertal and Zhai 2006; Ito 2008). However, these studies either explicitly or 
implicitly use the magnitude of rural-to-urban migration as a policy evaluation criterion. 
They essentially hold the opinion that policies which would promote rural-to-urban 
migration are desirable and welfare-improving. We claim that this criterion is not 
appropriate because there is no economic or moral reason to simply judge whether the 
migration is good or not for people’s economic well-being in a country. In contrast, this 
present paper employs well-defined welfare criteria to analyze the effects of labor market 
policies. The unprecedented result of this paper will give Chinese policy makers a crucial 
guidance about how to design labor market policy in order to improve social welfare. 
 
To recapitulate, in comparison with the previous literature, we construct a theoretical 
labor market model for current China containing more fully-specified labor markets and 
inter-market linkages and incorporating the role of the current hukou system, obtain a 
closed form solution before modeling any policy interventions, and work out welfare 
consequences of the various possible policy interventions.  
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4.4 Features of our model 
4.4.1 Two locations: urban and rural area  
The model has two locations: a single urban area and a single rural area. The urban 
area is corresponding to a city in eastern China, such as Shanghai, or Beijing, and the 
rural area is in central or western China. As is known, the eastern part of China is richer 
than the central or western China. In fact, the majority of rural-to-urban migrants are 
located in eastern cities to pursue higher income compared to central and western China. 
Thus, the model reflects the most typical migration pattern in current China, from central 
or western rural area to eastern urban area. There is no differentiation within urban and 
rural areas.  
 
4.4.2 Three segmented employment sectors  
There are three sectors in total in the whole economy, including state-owned 
enterprises (SOE), private firms, and agriculture sector. The SOE and private sectors are 
located in the urban area, and the agriculture sector is in the rural area. 
 
The various sectors differ from one another in two major respects: wages and job 
search opportunities. It is documented in empirical literature that for comparable workers, 
the SOE sector pays the highest wages, with private sector in middle and agriculture at 
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bottom (Song and Li 2010; Yang 2010). The detailed definitions and explanations of each 
sector are as follows.  
 
4.4.2.1 SOE sector labor market 
The wages paid to workers with each hukou in the SOE sector are set exogenously 
by the government for political reasons and higher than the market-clearing levels as well 
as wages in any other sectors. As a result, all workers want to have a job in the SOE 
sector, because it pays higher wages than any place else. However, since the SOE sector 
labor market does not clear, it does not hire all of the people who want to work there.  
 
The SOE sector employers discriminate against rural hukou holders, taking the form 
of both wage and hiring discrimination. According to the results in Chapter 3, for 
observationally-equivalent workers, urban hukou holders earn about 50% more than rural 
hukou holders do in the SOE sector. In addition, urban hukou holders are found nearly 
50% more likely to work in the SOE sector than rural hukou holders, and a large portion 
of this hiring differential can be attributed to hiring discrimination in the SOE sector. That 
is, rural hukou holders with identical observed characteristics have reduced probability of 
being hired in the high-wage sector than those with urban hukou. The state-owned 
enterprises can afford discrimination because they are shielded from market forces. Since 
the SOE sector is commonly thought as part of government, the political power helps the 
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SOE sector afford the discrimination against workers with rural hukou 
 
Foreign-invested enterprises are excluded from the model. It has been shown that the 
wage level in foreign-invested enterprises is similar to that in the state-owned enterprises 
and also higher than the market-clearing wage (Chen et al. 2005). Therefore, our model 
can be simply extended to include foreign-invested enterprises as part of the SOE sector.  
 
4.4.2.2 Private sector labor market 
The private sector labor market clears for both rural and urban hukou holders, and 
therefore all the labor supplied to that sector is employed. Given the empirical features 
obtained in previous chapters, the private sector wage in China is largely 
market-determined, and institutional interventions such as minimum wage or labor unions 
play a small role in wage-setting mechanism. 
 
All workers located in the urban area who do not get employed in the SOE sector 
supply their labor to the private sector. Because the private sector pays the 
market-clearing wage, anybody who does not get a SOE job is able to obtain a job in the 
private sector and work there, regardless of this person’s hukou status. Thus, there is no 
open unemployment in the urban area.  
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Private sector employers are not discriminatory. We know from Chapter 3 that the 
average wage differential between urban and rural hukou holders is very small in private 
firms, and furthermore, a large proportion of the wage differential can be explained by 
different human capital between the two groups of workers.  
 
The model does not have an urban self-employment sector for the two following 
reasons. One is that self-employment in urban China has become less popular. Second, 
we don’t consider self-employment in the urban area as a separate sector because the 
wage differential between workers in private firms and the self-employed is very small 
after controlling for characteristics (Giulietti et al. 2012). Therefore, self-employment can 
be thought as part of the private sector in the model.  
 
4.4.2.3 Agricultural sector labor market  
This labor market is characterized by self-employment. In central and western China, 
a person located in the rural area is automatically allocated a piece of land. Farmers 
cultivate crops on their own land and sell the products. Feng (2008) said that the land 
rental market is still in its infancy. Thus, self-employment is still popular in poor rural 
areas. Furthermore, we assume that all agricultural sector workers earn the same 
self-employment wage as each other.  
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In addition, following the assumption by Fields (1975) and Stiglitz (1982), our 
model assumes that the wage in rural agriculture sector is invariant with respect to 
agriculture labor force. This assumption makes some sense because in the context of 
self-employment, an agriculture worker can almost produce the same amount of product 
with the available land allocated to each person.  
 
We exclude the rural non-agricultural sector from this model, since the rural 
non-agricultural enterprises are mainly concentrated in rural areas of eastern China (Ash 
2010). Again, the model only consists of a single rural area in central or western region, 
and a single urban area in eastern region of China.  
 
4.4.2.4 Inter-market linkages 
Any worker in this economy has two possible search strategies, either going to the 
urban area and searching jobs there or going to the rural area and accepting the 
agricultural wage. Workers with urban hukou have one pair of payoffs for urban versus 
rural search, and workers with rural hukou have a different pair of payoffs for urban 
versus rural search. 
 
This model does not allow for on-the-job search. That is, any person who wants to 
work in the city has to be physically located in the urban area and search for urban jobs. 
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People who adopt the rural search strategy can only accept the agriculture wage and have 
no chance of being hired for an urban job.  
 
Workers allocate themselves among two search strategies in order to maximize 
expected discretionary income by choice of search strategy. The assumption of expected 
wage equalization in the equilibrium was made by most of previous seminal models 
(Harris and Todaro 1970; Fields 1975). The terminology of the expected discretionary 
income differs from expected wage in that it takes into account other benefits and costs 
associated with each search strategy. The benefit may include various 
government-provided welfare benefits, and the cost refers to the cost of living in the 
destination. In the equilibrium, workers have equal expected discretionary income among 
different search strategies. 
 
4.4.3 The role of hukou system in the labor market 
Everybody in this model has urban or rural hukou, with which they are endowed and 
cannot change. Currently, the most important determinant of a person’s hukou type when 
the person was born is parental hukou types (Chan, 2010). One’s hukou status would 
remain unchanged no matter where the individual physically moved, unless he or she 
goes through a formal procedure of hukou conversion. However, many large cities in 
eastern China which are the main destinations of rural-to-urban migrants put up the most 
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stringent entry conditions to grant local urban hukou. The present hukou conversion 
policy in big cities is almost totally geared towards the super rich and the highly educated 
and is irrelevant to most of rural-to-urban migrants. The strict requirements of hukou 
conversion are clearly beyond their reach. Therefore, in this paper, we assume that people 
cannot change their hukou status.  
 
Although people are free to move between urban and rural areas within China, rural 
hukou holders have very little access to public services and welfare benefits provided by 
city governments, and have to pay a higher cost of living in the city than urban hukou 
holders do. The current hukou system is related to the access to a variety of public service 
and welfare programs, such as children education, medicare, housing subsidies, social 
security coverage, and so on. In current China, most of public service and welfare 
benefits are attached to a person’s hukou status, rather than the physical location. One can 
physically move to a new place but can be permanently barred access to local services 
and welfare programs. 
 
Moreover, there is a big difference in cost of living in the city between workers with 
rural and urban hukou. Rural migrants either have been denied some basic urban services, 
or can obtain only low-quality services at high cost. For instance, the children of rural 
migrants have to pay a very high fee to attend public schools in the destination city (Chen 
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and Yang 2010).  
 
Additionally, our model assumes that workers with urban hukou are inherently more 
productive than rural hukou holders for urban jobs, because rural hukou holders on 
average have less human capital than urban hukou holders. The rationale of this feature is 
that people in rural China receive less and relatively poorer-quality education than urban 
areas (Song 2012).  
 
Finally, as discussed previously, rural hukou holders face wage and hiring 
discrimination in the urban SOE sector. The wage discrimination implies that rural hukou 
holders’ efficiency units of labor are rewarded less than equally productive efficiency 
units of labor for urban hukou holders. Besides, rural hukou holders also face hiring 
discrimination in the urban SOE sector meaning that they get hired with reduced 
probability compared to urban hukou holders. 
 
4.4.4 No unemployment  
There is no unemployment in the whole economy of the model. In rural China, the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS) guarantees that everybody has his or her share of 
land, so it is a reasonable assumption that rural unemployment is as low as negligible 
since workers can easily work on a piece of land to have a job in agriculture sector. In 
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slack seasons, many workers choose part-time job in urban areas (Chen et al. 2010). Even 
for people staying in rural areas during the slack seasons, if they are not actively 
searching for jobs, they would not be counted as the unemployed. The only effect of 
non-working in slack seasons is a reduction in labor participations rate, but not an 
increase in rural unemployment. Thus, it makes sense to claim that rural unemployment 
does not exist.  
 
On the other hand, as observed in empirical literature, urban areas in eastern China 
are facing a labor shortage, rather than a labor surplus (Chan 2010). Therefore, in our 
model with only a single urban in eastern China, there is no urban unemployment as well.  
 
This section has summarized four features that will be included in the model. The 
next section will provide mathematical specifications of each feature and obtain 
closed-form solutions to the entire model.  
 
4.5 Model specification 
The previous section summarized the main features of our model. In this section, we 
provide the specific mathematical equations incorporating these features and obtain 
closed form solutions for each of the employment and wage levels.  
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The economy in this model consists of a large number of risk-neutral individuals and 
three economic sectors. There are two sectors in the urban area, the SOE and private 
sector, and only one sector in the rural area, which is the agricultural sector. Firms within 
each sector are identical and have the same production functions.  
 
Any person in this economy has one of the two hukou statuses, either rural or urban 
hukou. Let L be the total number of workers in this economy. Among these workers, 
there are UL  workers with urban hukou, and RL  workers with rural hukou. These two 
numbers are set exogenously by the government and will keep unchanged in the 
following model. The labor endowment equation is specified in equation (1): 
 
(1)                              UL + RL =L. 
 
As discussed above, workers with urban hukou have more human capital and thus are 
inherently more productive than rural hukou holders for urban jobs. Following the 
convention from previous literature, we use efficiency units of labor to reflect this 
productivity differential (Saint-Paul, 1994; Razin and Sadka, 1995). Assume that a 
worker with urban hukou is endowed with one efficiency unit of labor, regardless of 
whether this person works in the city or in the rural area. In contrast, a rural hukou holder 
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can provide only b <1 efficiency units of labor if he works in the city, and one efficiency 
unit of labor if he works in the rural area for agricultural work. That is, workers with 
different hukou are inherently equally productive for agriculture work in the rural area, 
but have different productivity for urban jobs.7 Efficiency units of labor are the only 
factor of production in each sector. 
 
4.5.1 SOE sector labor market  
The wages paid to workers with each hukou in the SOE sector are set exogenously 
by the government for political reasons and higher than the market-clearing wages. Let 
U
SW  and 
R
SW stand for the wages for urban and rural hukou holders in the SOE sector, 
respectively. The superscript denotes the hukou type, and the subscript refers to the 
economic sector. Accordingly, the wages per worker with each hukou type in the SOE 
sector are exogenously determined as follows. 
 
(2)                              USW =
U
SW .  
(3)                              RSW =
R
SW .  
 
Taking wages of each type of workers as given, firms in the SOE sector decide how 
many workers with each hukou status to hire. Firms in the SOE sector discriminate 
                                                        
7 A more reasonable assumption would be that rural hukou holders are more productive than urban hukou holders for 
rural agriculture jobs. However, this assumption would not affect the results of this paper.  
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against rural hukou holders, practicing both wage and hiring discrimination. Specifically, 
wage discrimination refers to the fact that the SOE sector pays higher wages to each 
efficiency unit of labor with urban hukou than each efficiency unit of labor with rural 
hukou. Since each urban hukou holder has one efficiency unit of labor for the job in the 
SOE sector, and a rural hukou holder has only b <1 efficiency units of labor, wage 
discrimination against rural hukou holders implies: 
 
(4)                               
R
U S
S
WW
b
> .  
 
The left hand side of the equation above denotes the wage for one efficiency unit of 
labor with urban hukou, while the right hand side is equal to the wage for one efficiency 
unit of labor with rural hukou. Equation (4) implies that the wage differential between 
workers with urban and rural hukou in the SOE sector is not only caused by the 
productivity differential, but also by the different treatment to the equally productive 
efficiency units of urban and rural labor in the SOE sector.  
 
Moreover, rural hukou holders also face hiring discrimination in state-owned 
enterprises in that SOE sector employers maximize utility, which is a function of profits 
and also disutility of hiring rural hukou holders. This specification is similar to the 
framework proposed by Becker’s (1971) model of employer discrimination. In Becker’s 
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original model, the disutility is linear in the number of discriminated workers. However, 
several papers have argued that this linear specification can either lead to full segregation 
or indeterminacy of the demand functions (Prieto-Rodriguez et al., 2008; Hellerstein et al., 
2002; Neumark, 1988). They claimed that a more reasonable assumption is that the total 
disutility is a convex function in the number of discriminated workers. 
 
We follow the convention in the literature and assume that the marginal disutility is 
increasing as more and more rural hukou holders enter the SOE sector. For analytical 
convenience, we employ a simple quadratic form for the disutility of hiring rural hukou 
holders. Let USE  and 
R
SE  denote the total number of workers with urban and rural 
hukou demanded by firms in the SOE sector, respectively. Firms in the SOE sector have 
the same discrimination coefficients denoted by d, and maximize the utility function as 
follows by choosing how many workers of each hukou type to hire. 
 
(5)              Max U= 2( ) ( )U R U U R R RS S S S S S S Sf E E W E W E d Eb+ - - - . 
 
The price of the output in the SOE sector is normalized to 1. (.)f  is a typical 
production function, with f’>0, and f’’<0. In order to obtain closed form solutions to the 
maximization problem above, we need to specify the production function in the SOE 
sector. For mathematical tractability, we choose a left half parabola as the functional form 
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for the production function. For our purposes, the quadratic specification on the 
production function has at least two advantages. First, it is a strictly increasing and 
concave function, which satisfies the conditions for a typical neo-classical production 
function. Second, it is sufficiently simple to allow for the derivation of closed form 
solutions. Thus, we have   
 
(6)                             SE =
U
SE + b
R
SE . 
(7)                        2( )S Sf E a b= - - + , a> 
MAX
SE >0. 
 
SE  denotes the number of efficiency units of labor demanded by the SOE sector, 
and consists of two terms as shown above. Given this production function, with a and b 
being positive parameters, we can solve for the utility maximization problem specified in 
equation (5). The following two equations stand for the solutions to the number of rural 
and urban hukou holders demanded in the SOE sector, respectively.  
 
(8)                            *RSE  = 2
U R
S SW W
d
b - , 
(9)                         *USE  =
1
2
a - USW b- 2
U R
S SW W
d
b -
.  
 
4.5.2 Private sector labor market  
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Private sector employers are not discriminatory, so each efficiency unit of labor is 
rewarded the same in the private sector regardless of the holder’s hukou status. Let the 
wage per efficiency unit of labor in the private sector be equal to NSW . We use “NS” 
(non-SOE) to denote the private sector from now on, reserving “P” for probabilities in 
later sections. Since efficiency units of labor are the only factor of production in the 
model, private sector employers as wage takers will merely determine how many 
efficiency units of labor to employ. Let NSE  denote the number of efficiency units of 
labor demanded and therefore employed by the private sector. Accordingly, firms in this 
sector with production function (.)g maximize the following profit function: 
 
(10)                        NSP = ( )NSg E - NSW NSE . 
(11)                            NSE =
U
NSE + b
R
NSE . 
 
Again, the product price is normalized to 1. (.)g  is an increasing, concave 
production function, with g’>0, and g’’<0. UNSE  and 
R
NSE  denote the total number of 
workers with urban and rural hukou demanded by firms in the private sector, respectively. 
In order to obtain closed form solutions analytically, we assume that the production 
function in the private sector takes the natural log form with parameter A as follows.  
 
(12)                         ln( )NS NSg A E= , A>0. 
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Given this production function, we can get the demand function for labor in the 
private sector as follows by solving for the profit-maximizing level of employment:   
 
(13)                               *NSE =
NS
A
W
. 
 
By assumption, all workers located in the urban area who do not get employed in the 
SOE sector supply their labor to the private sector. The private sector labor market clears 
for both rural and urban hukou holders, and therefore all labor supplied to that sector is 
employed. The market-clearing conditions in the private sector for workers with each 
hukou status are specified as follows in equations (14) and (15). UL  denotes the total 
number of urban hukou holders in the economy, and RUL  stands for the number of job 
seekers in the urban area with rural hukou. The superscript refers to the hukou status, and 
the subscript is the job location.  
 
(14)                              UL - USE =
U
NSE . 
(15)                              RUL
R
SE- =
R
NSE . 
 
Since an urban hukou holder provides one efficiency unit of labor for any urban job, 
the wage for a worker with urban hukou in the private sector is equal to NSW . A rural 
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hukou holder is endowed with only b  efficiency units of labor, and so the wage for a 
worker with rural hukou in the private sector is equal to b  times the wage per efficiency 
unit of labor in the private sector. Hence, the wages for urban and rural hukou holders in 
the private sector are determined as follows such that the market-clearing conditions in 
equations (14) and (15) are satisfied, respectively.  
 
(16)                               UNSW =
*
NSW . 
(17)                               RNSW = b
*
NSW . 
 
4.5.3 Agricultural sector labor market  
As discussed previously, the wage in agricultural sector is invariant with respect to 
the size of the agricultural sector labor force, and anyone who wishes to enter the 
agricultural sector can take up self-employment and earn a wage AW  regardless of 
hukou status. Because any person has one efficiency unit of labor for agriculture work, 
people with different hukou earn the same wage equal to AW . 
 
4.5.4 Inter-market linkages  
4.5.4.1 Search strategies 
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Any worker in this economy has two possible search strategies, either going to the 
urban area and searching for jobs there or going to the rural area and accepting the 
agricultural wage. Denote UUL  as the number of job seekers in the urban area with urban 
hukou. The superscript refers to the hukou status, whereas the subscript stands for the 
geographical location where people are looking for jobs. Similarly, RUL , 
U
RL , and 
R
RL  
follow the same notation, and the two equations below reflect the labor endowment for 
urban and rural hukou holders, respectively.   
 
(18)                              UL = UUL +
U
RL . 
(19)                              RL = RUL +
R
RL . 
 
(1) Search strategies for workers with urban hukou 
For urban hukou holders, two search strategies are possible. The first strategy is to 
stay in cities and search for urban jobs, and the second one is go to rural areas and earn 
the agricultural wage. Denote the probability of a given urban hukou holder being 
employed in the SOE sector by USP . This probability is endogenous and will be 
discussed in more detail later. If a person fails to obtain a job in the SOE sector, he or she 
will immediately go to the private sector and work there. The market-clearing condition 
in the private sector guarantees that any person who wants to work in the private sector 
will be able to find a job in this sector. Therefore, the expected wage of the first search 
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strategy for a worker with urban hukou E( UUW ) satisfies the following equation (20):  
 
(20)                       E( UUW )=
U
SW
U
SP +
U
NSW (1
U
SP- ). 
 
Again, the superscript refers to the hukou status, and the subscript stands for the job 
location. The first term on the right hand side of (20) is the expected wage from the SOE 
sector, and the second term equals the expected wage from the private sector conditional 
on failing to get a job in the SOE sector.  
 
Since we assume there is no unemployment in rural areas either, any urban resident 
who chooses the second search strategy will earn AW .  
 
(2) Search strategies for workers with rural hukou 
Similarly, workers with rural hukou also have two search strategies. The first strategy 
is to migrate to cities and search for urban jobs, and the second is to stay in rural areas 
and earn the agricultural wage. Denote the probability of a rural migrant becoming 
employed in the SOE sector by RSP . Consequently, the expected wage of the first search 
strategy for a worker with rural hukou E( RuW ) consists of two terms, the first term equal 
to the wage in the SOE sector for a rural hukou holder multiplied by the probability of 
being hired in the SOE sector for a worker with rural hukou, and the second term 
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equaling the wage in the private sector times the probability of working in this sector. The 
expected wage associated with migrating to the urban area for a rural hukou holder can 
thus be described in the following equation. 
 
(21)                      E( RuW )=
R
SW
R
SP +
R
NSW (1
R
SP- ). 
 
On the other hand, any rural hukou holder who chooses the second search strategy 
will earn AW , so the expected wage of the second strategy is AW . 
 
(3) Probabilities of employment 
We turn our attention now to the probabilities of employment in the SOE sector for 
workers with different hukou statuses. The probability of a given worker being hired in 
the SOE sector is calculated as the ratio of jobs in the SOE sector available to this type of 
worker divided by the number of job seekers with that hukou type in the SOE sector. 
Specifically, the probability of a worker with urban hukou becoming employed in the 
SOE sector, USP , is equal to the total number of jobs available to urban hukou holders in 
the SOE sector divided by job seekers with urban hukou:  
 
(22)                                  USP =
U
S
U
U
E
L
. 
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The corresponding probability for workers with rural hukou is calculated in the same 
way: 
(23)                                  RSP =
R
S
R
U
E
L
. 
 
4.5.4.2 Expected discretionary income 
Workers allocate themselves among search strategies in order to maximize expected 
discretionary income by choice of search strategy. As said earlier, the terminology of the 
expected discretionary income differs from expected wage in that it takes account of 
other benefits and costs associated with each search strategy. Specifically, the costs of 
working in the city for rural hukou holders should include both the cost of moving to the 
city and the cost of living in the city. In fact, the transportation cost of moving to cities is 
very low in current China, and so we ignore it. Therefore, we refer here only to the cost 
of living in the city, which is a one dimensional variable measured by its value in 
monetary terms. In order to capture the big difference in cost of living in the city between 
workers with rural and urban hukou, without loss of generality, we assume that the cost 
of being in the city for urban hukou holders is equal to  zero while RC  denotes the 
extra cost of living  in the city for a rural hukou holder. This cost is exogenously 
determined and the same for all rural hukou holders in the city.8 
                                                        
8 In reality, this cost can vary among rural hukou holders. For example, workers with children have to bear the 
education cost, but workers without children need not pay this cost. Indeed, the difference of this cost may partly 
explain why more young people choose to migrate while older people tend to stay in the rural area. The model 
developed here can be easily extended to incorporate this feature.  
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On the other hand, the current hukou system is related to the access to a variety of 
public service and welfare programs. Let US  and RS  denote the values of 
government-provided benefits associated with urban and rural hukou, respectively, 
including housing subsidies, social security programs, and so forth. These benefits do not 
have subscripts because they are not linked to the physical location but are only based on 
hukou status. In China, the benefits associated with urban hukou are much larger than 
those associated with rural hukou. That is, US > RS . For analytical convenience, we 
normalize these benefits so that RS =0.9  
 
Now we can write down the expressions of expected discretionary income associated 
with each search strategy for workers with different hukou. For an urban hukou holder, 
the expected discretionary income associated with staying in the urban area is equal to the 
expected wage plus the government-provided benefits related to urban hukou. Since this 
benefit will remain the same even if the urban hukou holder migrates to the rural area, the 
expected discretionary income associated with migrating to the rural area is equal to this 
benefit plus the expected wage in the rural area. Equations (24) and (25) give us the 
expressions for these expected discretionary incomes for workers with urban hukou. 
U
UDI  and 
U
RDI  stand for the discretionary incomes for an urban hukou holder in the 
                                                        
9 For policy interventions in later sections, a reduction in RC is indeed equivalent to an increase in RS . So the 
reduced cost policy can also be thought as increased benefit policy.  
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urban and rural area, respectively.  
 
(24)                          E( UUDI )=E(
U
UW )+
US , 
(25)                          E( URDI )=E(
U
RW )+
US . 
 
Similarly, the expected discretionary incomes associated with each search strategy 
for workers with rural hukou are specified in the following.  
 
(26)                          E( RUDI )=E(
R
UW )-
RC , 
(27)                          E( RRDI )=E(
R
RW ). 
 
4.5.5 Model solutions in equilibrium  
We claim that in equilibrium, rural hukou holders have the same expected 
discretionary income associated with two search strategies. The reason for this claim is 
the empirical fact that large numbers of rural hukou holders are working in the city and 
large numbers stay in rural areas. In other words, some rural hukou holders choose the 
first search strategy and others choose the second one, so neither strategy is dominant. 
The equilibrium condition for rural hukou holders is thus characterized by equalization of 
expected discretionary incomes, as in the following equation:  
  
 
207 
 
(28)                          E( RUDI )=E(
R
RDI ). 
 
Given that the solution to the equilibrium for rural hukou holders is interior, we can 
prove that urban hukou holders have a corner solution in the equilibrium in that the 
expected discretionary income associated with staying in the city is unambiguously larger 
than that associated with migrating to the rural area. Specifically, we have the following 
result, the detailed proof of which can be found in Appendix 1:  
 
(29)                           E( UUDI )>E(
U
RDI ).  
 
That is, all urban hukou holders choose to stay in the city and take urban jobs. This is 
quite consistent with the empirical reality that very few urban hukou workers actually 
choose to move to rural areas due to the availability to better-paying urban jobs (Gagnon 
et al., 2012). Accordingly, we can derive the following equilibrium results for urban and 
rural hukou holders, respectively:  
 
(30)                              *URL =0.  
(31)                     AW =
R
SW
R
S
R
U
E
L
+ RNSW (1-
R
S
R
U
E
L
)- RC .  
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The model specified in equations (1) through (31) can be analytically solved. Given 
the exogenously determined wages in the SOE and rural sector ( USW , 
R
SW , AW ), labor 
endowment with each hukou status, and the cost of being in the city for rural migrants 
RC , we can solve the equilibrium employment and wages in different sectors for different 
hukou holders.  
 
We have solved for some of wages and employment levels. Let us show the solutions 
to the remaining wages and employment levels to close the model. The solved wages in 
the private sector for urban and rural hukou holders are presented in equations (32) and 
(33), and employment levels in the urban private sector and rural agriculture sector are 
demonstrated in equations (34) to (36), respectively. The values of *RNSE  and 
*R
UL in 
equations (32) through (36) are expressed in equations (37) and (38). The derivations of 
these solutions are available from the authors upon request.  
 
 
(32)                          *UNSW = * *U R
U S
A
L L Eb+ -
. 
(33)                          *RNSW = b * *U R
U S
A
L L Eb+ -
. 
(34)                     *UNSE =
UL - ( 1
2
a - USW b- 2
U R
S SW W
d
b - ). 
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(35)                          *RNSE =
*R
UL - 2
U R
S SW W
d
b - . 
(36)                              * *R RR RE L= =
RL - *RUL . 
(37)                              *SE =
1
2
a - USW . 
(38)      
*R
UL ＝ 
2* * * * *( )( ) ( )( ) 4 ( ) [( ) ]
2 ( )
R R R U R R R U R R U R
S S A S S S A S A S S S
R
A
E W A W C L E E W A W C L E W C E L E W A
W C
b b b b b b
b
é ù é ù+ - + - + + - + - + + - -ë û ë û
+
 
 
4.5.6 Conditions for interior solutions 
As mentioned earlier, for the solution to the equilibrium condition for rural hukou 
holder (i.e., equation (28)) to lie in the interior, the parameters of the model should be 
restricted to take on certain values. For example, if the rural wage is so high that the 
expected payoff associated with working in agriculture is unambiguously larger than the 
expected payoff associated with migrating to the city, then the strategy of staying in rural 
sector will be dominant. This case will result in a corner solution in which no people will 
migrate to the urban area. In contrast, if the rural wage is low enough, staying in the rural 
sector will be dominated by the search strategy of migrating to the city. In this case, all 
people will choose to migrate to the city. In reality, we observe that some people are 
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migrating to the urban area, while some people stay in the rural area. That is, the solution 
must be interior.  
 
This part will examine the conditions that guarantee the interior solutions. For rural 
hukou holders, if the strategy of staying in the rural area is dominant, no people will 
choose the strategy of migrating to the city. In this extreme case, the following conditions 
should be satisfied.  
 
(39a)                             E( RUDI )<E(
R
RDI ). 
(39b)                                RUL *=0. 
 
After substituting the expressions of the expected payoffs associated with two search 
strategies, we will get: 
 
(39c)                       AW >
R
SW
R
SP +
R
NSW (1
R
SP- ) -
RC . 
 
In this extreme case, since no workers with rural hukou migrate to the city, the 
probability of getting a job in the SOE sector for the marginal rural hukou holder would 
be equal to 1. That is, RSP =1. Thus, (39c) implies: 
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(39d)                              AW >
R
SW -
RC . 
 
As can be seen, if the rural wage AW  is high enough, all workers with rural hukou 
will stay in the rural sector. In order to make the solution interior, the inequality above 
should be reversed. That is, one condition for the interior solution is: 
 
(39e)                              AW <
R
SW -
RC . 
 
On the other hand, there should be a lower bound for AW . If the agriculture wage is 
low enough, all people will migrate to the city, and the strategy of staying in the rural area 
would be dominated. In this case, RUL =
RL , and RSP =
R
S
R
E
L
. By equation (32), the 
market-clearing wage per efficiency unit of labor in the non-SOE sector would be 
*
NSW = U R
S
A
L L Eb+ -
. Following the same procedure as above, we can obtain the lower 
bound below. 
 
(39f)                 AW >
R
SW
R
S
R
E
L
+ b U R
S
A
L L Eb+ -
(1 -
R
S
R
E
L
) - RC . 
 
Again, RSE and SE remain unchanged, such that SE *=
1
2
a - USW , and 
R
SE * = 
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2
U R
S SW W
d
b - . In summary, the conditions to assure that the solution to the equilibrium is 
interior should be such that AW  lies in an open interval specified as follows: 
 
(39g)           AW Î(
R
SW
R
S
R
E
L
+ b U R
S
A
L L Eb+ -
(1 -
R
S
R
E
L
) - RC , RSW -
RC ). 
 
4.5.7 Numerical illustration 
In order to gain more intuition on how this model fits the current Chinese labor 
market and how it can be utilized to analyze the Chinese labor market conditions, we will 
derive the equilibrium results in an illustrative example. This numerical example should 
be considered as suggestive of the approximate magnitude, and readers are invited to 
substitute their own parameter values.  
 
In this hypothetical Chinese economy, the total labor force is 1000, in which 400 
workers hold urban hukou and 600 hold rural hukou. This proportion accords quite well 
with the value observed in current China. The exogenously determined institutional 
wages in the SOE sector for workers with urban and rural hukou are 4,000 and 2,000, 
respectively. These wages are approximately equal to the true monthly respective wages 
in China. I further set the invariant agriculture wage is 900 and the cost of living in the 
city for rural migrants RC  is equal to 800. There are several other exogenous parameters 
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in the model, and they are assumed to take the values in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Hypothetical Values for Exogenous Parameters  
Parameters Values 
d 20 
a 2150 
b  0.8 
A 820000 
 
Plugging these numbers above into our model, we can get the labor allocation in the 
SOE sector. The result is: SE =150, 
R
SE =30, and 
U
SE =126. That is, 30 workers with 
rural hukou are working in the SOE sector, while 126 urban hukou holders are working in 
this sector. Given these values, we can solve for the whole equilibrium. By equation (38), 
we can solve for RUL =187. Substituting this value into equation (32), we get 
*
NSW =2053, 
which is the market-clearing wage per efficiency unit of labor in the private sector. Since 
a rural hukou holder only has 0.8 efficiency unit of labor for the urban job, the wage per 
worker with rural hukou is equal to 1643 in the private sector. In addition, by 
market-clearing conditions in the non-SOE sector, we can get the labor allocation in the 
non-SOE sector. Furthermore, the endogenous probabilities of getting a job in the SOE 
sector for different hukou workers can also be derived. Table 4.2 and 4.3 display these 
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probabilities and demonstrate the full equilibrium results for urban and rural hukou 
holders in this hypothetical economy, respectively.  
 
Table 4.2 Endogenous Probabilities in this Numerical Example 
Probabilities Values 
U
SP  0.315 
R
SP  0.160 
 
Table 4.3 Equilibrium Results in the Hypothetical Chinese Economy 
Urban Hukou Rural Hukou 
Sector Employment Wage Sector Employment Wage 
SOE 126 4000 SOE 30 2000 
Non-SOE 274 2053 Non-SOE 157 1643 
Unemployed 0  Unemployed 0  
Agriculture 0  Agriculture 413 900 
Total 400  Total 600  
 
As can be seen, among 600 rural hukou holders, 413 of them stay in the rural sector 
while only 187 workers migrate to the urban area. The magnitude of rural-to-urban 
migration is similar to what we observe empirically. Ren et al. (2008) said that nearly one 
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third of rural hukou holders are working in the urban areas. 
 
Five results are reflected from this example. First, the labor market is segmented not 
only between rural and the urban area, but also within the urban area. Remember that we 
assume workers with each identical hukou are homogenous. However, the same worker 
with rural hukou could earn different wages in different sectors. For rural hukou holders 
with identical productivity, the SOE sector pays the highest wage (2000), followed by the 
non-SOE sector (1643), and the agriculture sector pays the lowest wage (900). Even for 
the urban hukou holders, the SOE sector pays higher wages than the non-SOE sector 
(4000 versus 2053). In addition, the better jobs are rationed, in that only a fraction of 
those who would like the high pay jobs in the SOE sector and are capable of performing 
them are hired into them. Thus, this illustrative example indicates the existence of the 
labor market segmentation.  
 
Second, there exists observed wage differential for workers with different hukou, not 
only due to the differential in productivity measured by efficiency units of labor, but also 
because of the wage discrimination in the SOE sector. Without discrimination, if a worker 
with urban hukou earns 4000 in the SOE sector, a worker with rural hukou who has 0.8 
efficiency unit of labor should have earned 3200 in this sector. However, the actual wage 
for a rural hukou holder is only 2000 in the SOE sector. This wage differential after 
adjusting for productivity differential simply mirrors the wage discrimination in 
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state-owned enterprises. There is no wage discrimination in the non-SOE sector, since the 
wage differential between two types of workers in this sector is solely attributed to 
difference in efficiency units of labor.  
 
Third, there exists observed hiring differential in the SOE sector between workers 
with urban and rural hukou. The probability of being hired in the SOE sector is 0.315 for 
workers with urban hukou, which is larger than that probability for rural hukou holders, 
0.160. Assume that each efficiency unit of labor is treated the same in the SOE sector, 
regardless of the person’s hukou status. If the probability of being hired in the SOE sector 
for an urban hukou holder with 1 efficiency unit of labor is 0.315, then the probability for 
a rural hukou holder with 0.8 efficiency unit of labor should be equal to 0.8*0.315=0.252. 
However, the actual probability is 0.160, which is much lower than 0.252. Therefore, we 
can conclude that the hiring differential results not only from the inherent productivity 
differential, but also from the hiring discrimination in the SOE sector against rural hukou 
holders.  
 
Fourth, the market-clearing wages in the non-SOE sector for workers with each 
hukou avoid unemployment in the urban labor market. All workers physically in the 
urban area who want a job in the non-SOE sector are able to find such a job. Thus, unlike 
the H-T model, open urban unemployment does not exist in this model.  
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Finally, the wage distribution of this hypothetical economy can be visualized by the 
wage density function and cumulative distribution function in the following two figures. 
There are five spikes in Figure 4.2, with the mode 900. Nearly a half of workers in this 
economy still earn lower than 1000. The average wage in this economy is only 1771.  
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Figure 4.2 Wage Density Function 
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Figure 4.3 Cumulative Distribution Function of Wage (cdf) 
 
Can wages truly reflect workers’ standard of living in this context? The answer is no 
in this context, because workers with rural hukou earn higher wages in the city compared 
to those staying in the rural area, but also have to bear higher costs of living in the city. 
Then we examine the distribution of discretionary income which takes into account the 
cost of living in a given location. Table 4.4 displays the results using the illustrative 
example introduced above. Since RC  is assumed to be 800, compared to Table 4.3, the 
discretionary income of rural hukou holders should be the wage minus 800.  
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Table 4.4 Discretionary Income (DI) and Employment 
Urban Hukou Rural Hukou 
Sector Employment DI Sector Employment DI 
SOE 126 4000 SOE 30 1200 
Non-SOE 274 2053 Non-SOE 157 843 
Unemployed 0  Unemployed 0  
Agriculture 0  Agriculture 413 900 
Total 400  Total 600  
 
As can be seen, the lowest discretionary income is not in rural area, but in the 
non-SOE sector for rural hukou holders. Furthermore, the discretionary income of rural 
hukou holders is unambiguously lower than that of urban hukou holders, no matter which 
sector or area they are working in. Figure 4.4 presents the distribution of discretionary 
income in this economy.  
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of Discretionary Income  
 
The graph above indicates that there is a big gap in terms of discretionary income 
between urban and rural hukou holders. All workers with rural hukou are at the left end of 
the distribution, whereas all urban hukou holders are located at the right end of the 
distribution. The average discretionary income for rural and urban hukou holders are 900 
and 2666, respectively. The ratio of discretionary income is around 3:1 for the two groups 
of workers. The analysis in terms of distribution of discretionary income above is a 
starting point, from which we will analyze in great detail the effects of a variety of labor 
market policies on the income distribution in the next chapter of the dissertation.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
As Fields (2007) pointed out, good policy work requires sound theoretical 
foundations. In China’s context, hitherto, very few studies have attempted to establish 
theoretical models for Chinese labor market. Many unique features of Chinese labor 
market have not been taken into adequate consideration. 
  
Based on the central features of the current Chinese labor market, the present paper 
constructed a three-sector segmented labor market model including an urban SOE 
(state-owned enterprises) sector, an urban private sector, and a rural agricultural sector. 
These sectors’ labor markets differ from one another in terms of the way each one 
operates, the way employment and wages are determined within each, how the several 
labor markets connect with one another, and how conditions in the various sector differ as 
between workers with urban and rural residential permits.  
 
The system of residential permits, unique to China, has been called by its Chinese 
name hukou. The model presented in this paper shows that the hukou system affects the 
current Chinese labor market through two major channels. One is that the urban 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) practice both hiring discrimination and wage 
discrimination against rural hukou holders. Another feature of the hukou system is that 
rural hukou holders have to bear a large cost when they live in the city, but they do not 
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have the same access to various government programs and public services as urban hukou 
holders. These two mechanisms together help explain a puzzle observed in current China: 
a considerable number of rural hukou holders still choose to stay in the poor rural area 
and earn very little, instead of migrating to urban areas where labor shortages are 
endemic and wages are many times higher.   
 
Finally, the model developed in this chapter could serve as a solid foundation for 
helping us analyze income distribution of an economy from labor market perspective.  
According to the most recent Chinese official document, the most significant part of 
China's 12th Five-Year Plan is the focus shift from allowing some people to get rich to 
creating a more even distribution of income. How can we achieve the goal to improve 
Chinese people’s economic well-being? As Fields (2008) claimed, labor market condition 
is very much important for income distribution because most people, especially the poor, 
derive all or the great bulk of their income from the work they do. Labor income 
inequality accounts for more of total income inequality than do all other income sources 
combined (Fields, 2005). Therefore, it would be extremely useful and necessary to 
analyze the income distribution from labor market perspective. Without developing a 
theoretical model on the current Chinese labor market, we may not be able to evaluate 
how a proposed policy would affect the income distribution of the whole economy, since 
a policy implemented in one sector may generate unexpected outcome on another 
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economic sector. This paper exactly filled in this gap. The multi-sector model constructed 
in this chapter with the central features of the current Chinese labor market will enable us 
to analyze the effects of labor market policies on the whole income distribution. The 
model will help China make more sound labor market policies especially in terms of 
achieving distributive objectives.  
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Appendix: 
Appendix 1: Proof of equation (29).   
We claim that the discretionary income for urban hukou holders in the city is larger 
than in the rural area. That is, we need to prove: 
 
(A1)  USW
U
SP +
U
NSW (1
U
SP- )> AW . 
 
By assumption, USW > AW  and 
U
NSW > AW , so the weighted average of 
U
SW  and 
U
NSW  
must be larger than AW  as well.  
 
Appendix 2: Derivations of equation (32)-(38). 
By the market-clearing condition in the private sector, we have the following 
equation reflecting that the number of efficiency units demanded in the private sector is 
equal to the number of efficiency units supplied in this sector.  
 
(A2)  NSE =
U
UL + b
R
UL - SE . 
 
By substituting (A2) into equation (13), we get: 
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(A3)   *NSW = U R
U S
A
L L Eb+ -
. 
 
If we further substitute (A3) into equations (16) and (17), we prove equations (32) 
and (33). Then we derive the solution to RUL  in the equilibrium. Substituting equations 
(23) and (33) into (31) and re-arranging, we obtain: 
 
(A4)    AW +
RC =( RSW b- * *U R
U S
A
L L Eb+ -
)
*
*
R
S
R
U
E
L
+ b * *U R
U S
A
L L Eb+ -
.  
 
By multiplying *RUL (
* *U R
U SL L Eb+ - ) on both sides and re-arranging, we have the 
following quadratic equation of one unknown variable *RUL .  
 
(A5)    
* 2 * * * *( )( ) [( )( ) ]( ) [( ) ] 0R R R U R R R R U RA U A S S S U S S SW C L W C L E E W A L E L E W Ab b b b+ + + - - - - - - =
 
Thus, we can solve for *RUL  and obtain the expression in equation (38).
10 The 
positive solution to RUL  is given as follows.  
 
Substituting equation (9) into (14) and re-arranging, we can get equation (34). 
                                                        
10 We found that another root is not a feasible solution. Specifically, it would make the number of rural hukou holders 
in the SOE sector become negative. Therefore, we have a unique as expressed in equation (38).  
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Similarly, we can obtain equation (35) by substituting equation (8) into (15) and 
re-arranging terms. In addition, we get equation (37) by substituting equations (8) and (9) 
into equation (6). Finally, because all workers in the agricultural sector are employed, we 
obtain equation (36) by substituting *RUL  into equation (19) re-arranging terms. This 
completes the proof.  
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Chapter 5 Effects of Labor Market Policies on Social 
Welfare: Application of a Theoretical Model for China11 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This paper will conduct several policy experiments to examine how the changes in 
labor market policies could affect income distribution in China by utilizing a rigorously 
developed multi-sector model on the current Chinese labor market. Two alternative 
policy evaluation criteria will be adopted to investigate the distributive consequences of 
various labor market policies, including first-order welfare dominance approach and 
abbreviated social welfare function.  
 
Very few previous studies have touched on this area. Ito (2008) employed a 
household-disaggregated, recursively dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model and simulation techniques to uncover the effect of removing hukou system on 
Chinese income distribution. Ito’s assumption is that Chinese labor market should be 
consistent with the original H-T model if the hukou system were removed. Accordingly, 
his study calculates the counter-factual labor allocation based on H-T model and 
compares this allocation with the actual observed situation, so as to simulate the effect of 
the removal of hukou system. The simulation results show that the removal of the hukou 
                                                        
11 This chapter is co-authored with Professor Gary Fields.  
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system would be accompanied by a massive migration to cities. However, Ito’s results are 
not convincing to me because I believe that even in the absence of the hukou system, the 
Chinese economy would not be in H-T equilibrium. As illustrated in Chapter 4, the 
original H-T model is not consistent with the observed labor shortage in coastal cities and 
the labor market segmentation between SOEs and non-SOEs. That is why we built a new 
theoretical model in Chapter 4 trying to better describe the current Chinese labor market.  
 
Another study on the effect of the removal of hukou system showed that in the 
absence of hukou system, average per-capita income in urban and rural areas China 
would decrease and increase, respectively, further promoting rural-to-urban migration to a 
large extent (Whalley and Zhang, 2007). Both studies above employ a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) framework and simulation analysis to model the 
counterfactual situation.  
 
However, the modeling on the Chinese labor market in both papers is too rough to 
represent the complexity of segmented labor market in China. For instance, neither of the 
studies above takes into account of the labor market segmentation between state-owned 
enterprises and private firms. Furthermore, the policy evaluation criteria are not well 
defined. Most of previous studies either explicitly or implicitly use the magnitude of 
rural-to-urban migration as a policy evaluation criterion (Hertal and Zhai, 2006; Ito, 2008; 
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Bao et al., 2009). These studies essentially hold the opinion that policies which will 
promote rural-to-urban migration are desirable and welfare-improving. We claim that this 
criterion is not appropriate because there is no economic or moral reason to simply judge 
whether the migration is good or not for people’s economic welfare in a country. In 
contrast, this present paper will employ a rigorously developed theoretical model and 
well-defined welfare criteria to analyze the effects of labor market policies on income 
distribution. The unprecedented result of this chapter will give Chinese policy makers a 
crucial guidance about how to design labor market policy in order to improve social 
welfare.  
 
In order to make sound and complete policy analysis, this paper will utilize the five 
step policy evaluation framework developed by Fields (2007a) to assess the effects of a 
variety of labor market policies. Specifically, the procedure is as follows. 
 
Policy instruments —— Model —— Outcomes ——Policy evaluation criteria 
—— Policy evaluation judgment 
 
First, we clarify what exact policy experiments to perform. Using the theoretical 
model developed in Chapter 4, we propose to conduct the following policy experiments.  
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1. Rural development (RD). Specifically, this policy refers to an increase in 
agriculture wage.  
2. Reduced Cost (RC). That is, the cost of living in cities for rural hukou 
holders will be reduced. (reduce 
RC ), while keep the cost of living for urban hukou 
holders constant.  
3. Hukou Conversion (HC). This one-shot policy means that the government 
entitles a proportion of rural hukou holders working in the city with urban hukou 
(increase UL ). 
 
The reason we select the policies above is that these three policies are the most 
discussed and relevant in China’s labor policy agenda. Many government officials, 
economists, and policy analysts have made the policy recommendations as above. 
However, the welfare consequences of these policies have yet to be determined. This 
paper will fill in this gap and utilize the theoretical model on the Chinese labor market to 
investigate this policy question.  
 
The second part of the framework is to specify the model. We will use the model 
developed in Chapter 4 as a solid foundation for the policy analysis. Once the policy 
instruments and the model have been specified, the third step is to use the model to 
predict the labor market outcomes. More specifically, we will re-solve the model for each 
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policy experiment and then compare the results in the new equilibrium with those in the 
original equilibrium.  
 
In the fourth step, we will specify the policy evaluation criteria. As mentioned 
earlier, the present study attempts to examine how labor market policies could affect 
income distribution in China. Accordingly, the policy evaluation criteria should focus on 
some indicators or measures of income distribution. As Fields (2005) concluded, in the 
labor market analysis, it is not enough just to be concerned about distribution. How 
distributional concerns are brought into the policy analysis can and does make an 
important difference. The first welfare criterion I will use is the first order welfare 
dominance approach. The appeal of the dominance approach is that it relies upon ordinal 
measures of entire distributions and levels of welfare, while avoiding the use of index 
numbers that rest upon a dubious assumption of cardinality. As Saposnik(1981) claimed, 
the first-order dominance is the most straightforward approach to rank the income 
distributions. The criterion compares absolute incomes in ranked (ordered) positions in 
the income distribution and is thus also referred to as “rank dominance”. One distribution 
X first-order-dominates (FOD) another distribution Y for the class of anonymous, 
increasing social welfare functions if and only if the income of the person in each rank in 
X is at least as great as the income of the person with the corresponding rank in Y and 
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strictly greater someplace.12 If the two distributions cross with each other, then these 
two income distributions cannot be ordered using the first-order dominance. We will use 
discretionary income (DI) as the measure of income for this approach, which is defined 
as the labor income minus the living cost in a given location. In other words, 
discretionary income is the realization of the expected payoff for a job searcher.  
 
In addition, following the approaches employed by Fields (2005), we will complete 
the welfare economic analysis by utilizing an alternative measure for social welfare, 
namely abbreviated social welfare function in which the goodness of income distribution 
depends positively on total income, and negatively on income inequality and poverty. 
Again, the income here refers to discretionary income defined as in last paragraph. 
Eventually, for each policy instrument, the overall judgment will be made in the fifth 
step based on the specified policy evaluation criteria. We will conduct policy experiment 
analytically, rather than use calibrations to simulate the results, because the accuracy of 
calibrations may depend on whether the assumed function forms are valid.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 compares the income 
distributions with and without each proposed policy using the first-order welfare 
dominance as the policy evaluation criterion. We will examine whether the distribution of 
                                                        
12 “Anonymous” means that all workers are treated identically regardless of which particular ones earn how much 
income. “Increasing” means that social welfare increases whenever one worker’s earnings increase, holding other 
workers’ earnings the same. 
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discretionary income under each policy first-order dominates the original distribution. 
Section 3 presents an alternative labor market analysis using an abbreviated social 
welfare function in which an increase in total income is regarded as welfare-improving, 
while an increase in income inequality or poverty is regarded as welfare-decreasing. The 
policy analyses in Section 2 and 3 will only focus on the benefits of each policy. That is, 
for now, the costs of different policies are ignored. As we know, from policy point of view, 
if the government is to choose between different policies, it needs to consider not only the 
consequences of implementing the policies, but also the costs of putting the policies into 
effect. Therefore, Section 4 will complete this social cost-benefit analysis by using the 
public finance framework, in which the government has a fixed budget, say B dollars, and 
then determines which policy to implement using this fixed budget. Section 5 concludes 
the paper and provides policy recommendations. 
 
5.2 First-order dominance (FOD) approach 
The first-order dominance method will be used to make welfare comparisons 
between the initial equilibrium and the new equilibrium that would result from each 
policy change. We will use the quantile function to conduct the 
first-order-welfare-dominance comparison, in which the discretionary income is a 
function of quantile of labor in the economy. According to the quantile functions, the 
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first-order-welfare-dominance criterion should be described as follows: One distribution 
X first-order-welfare-dominates another distribution Y if and only if the quantile function 
for X is above or equal to the quantile function for Y for all quantiles and strictly above 
someplace. For analytical convenience, from now on, we normalize the total labor force 
equal to 1. Our task is to figure out how many people earn each amount of discretionary 
income, and compare the two sets of numbers to see whether one set of income 
distribution lies above the other one. This method of showing income distributions is 
essentially equivalent to comparing the cumulative distribution functions (cdf), because 
the quantile function is the inverse function of the cdf. In the initial equilibrium, there are 
five possible values of discretionary income, which are listed in Table 5.1. In this table, 
the group is ordered by the amount of discretionary income from the lowest to the highest. 
Column 2 explains what type of workers each group refers to, and column 3 shows the 
five possible values of discretionary income. The last column of Table 5.1 stands for the 
number of workers earning the corresponding amount of the discretionary income in 
column 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
242 
Table 5.1 The Initial Distribution of Discretionary Income (DI) 
Group  Group Description DI (lowest to highest) 
Number of people 
earning each DI 
1 
Rural hukou holders working in 
the private sector 
R
NSW -
RC  RNSE  
2 Rural hukou holders working in 
agriculture sector A
W  RRE  
3 Rural hukou holders working in 
the SOE sector 
R
SW -
RC  RSE  
4 Urban hukou holders working 
in the private sector 
U
NSW  
U
NSE  
5 Urban hukou holders working 
in the SOE sector 
U
SW  
U
SE  
Note: “NS” sector denotes the private sector (non-state-owned enterprises), while “S” sector 
denotes the state-owned enterprises. The superscript denotes the hukou type, and the subscript 
refers to the economic sector. 
 
The ordering for the first three rows comes from the interior equilibrium condition 
for rural hukou holders. We know that the discretionary income (DI) for group 2 is a 
weighted average of the discretionary income for group 1 and 3, so this number must lie 
between the DI for group 1 and 3. Furthermore, since we know that the SOE sector pays a 
higher wage than the private sector, i.e., RSW >
R
NSW , it follows that DI for group 3 is larger 
than for group 1. Since the urban hukou holders don’t have to bear the living cost RC , 
their discretionary incomes are equal to the respective wages. By assumption in the 
model, workers with urban hukou in the SOE sector enjoy the highest DI, USW .  
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Hitherto, only one ranking of DI has not been determined, group 3 versus 4, that is, 
the discretionary income for rural hukou holders working in the SOE sector ( RSW -
RC ) 
versus the DI for urban hukou holders working in the NS sector UNSW . The model so far 
cannot determine which of the two values is larger than another. I need to rely on the 
empirical evidence to see which one is larger. From chapter 3, we know from the RUMIC 
(Rural-Urban Migration in China) data set that the average monthly wage in the non-SOE 
sector for urban hukou holders is 2,018, while the average wage for rural hukou holders 
in the SOE sector is 1,530. Thus, we can infer that UNSW  is larger than 
R
SW . As a result, 
the difference between RSW  and 
RC  should be definitely smaller than UNSW , given the 
fact that the cost of living for rural hukou holders in the city ( RC ) is also substantial. As 
Ren et al. (2008) said, on average, the school fees per child in the city nearly account for 
one third of a rural migrant’ annual income. Thus, it is safe to assume that RSW -
RC  is 
less than UNSW .   
 
The income distribution described above is visualized as the step function in Figure 
5.1. The horizontal axis denotes quantile of labor and the vertical axis denotes the 
discretionary income for each quantile. Again, the total labor force is normalized to be 1. 
The values in the graph below are exactly the same as presented in Table 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 Initial Quantile Distribution of Discretionary Income (DI)  
 
The balance of this section presents the results of the three policy interventions using 
the first-order dominance criterion described above. The proofs of the results are shown 
in the appendix. 
5.2.1 Rural development (RD): FOD comparison 
This section analyzes whether rural development strategy would improve the income 
distribution using the first-order dominance as the evaluation criterion. Since 2003, the 
Chinese government has implemented many public policies to promote rural 
development, including the abolition of agricultural taxes, the provision of subsidies for 
purchasing agricultural machines or equipment, the accelerated development of rural 
public services, increased investment in rural infrastructure and the provision of small 
O 
R
NSE
A 
R
NSE
B 
R
NSE
C 
R
NSE
D 
R
NSE
E 
R
NSE
R
NSW -
RC  
R
NSE
AW  
R
NSE
R
SW -
RC  
U
NSW  
U
SW  
Labor 
DI     
The width of 
each band is 
as follows: 
OA= RNSE  
AB= RRL  
BC= RSE  
CD= UNSE  
DE= USE  
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loans to rural households (Ash, 2010). Therefore, it is very important and necessary to 
determine whether rural development could improve the social welfare in China with a 
segmented labor market. 
 
For simplicity, we consider the rural development as an increase in the agriculture 
wage for the policy analysis below. There might be different channels to increase the 
agriculture wage, such as providing financial loans to rural households, or offering 
workers with subsidies for better technology. However, the question about which specific 
channel is better than another is beyond the scope of our study. According to the five-step 
policy evaluation framework (Fields, 2007a), the policy instrument analyzed in this 
section is an increase in the agriculture wage, AW . We assume that the increase in AW  is 
not large enough to alter the ranking of the discretionary income listed in Table 5.1. This 
assumption will also be maintained for the other policy analyses in the subsequent 
sections.  
 
The effects of the rural development policy on discretionary income and employment 
levels are summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 5.2 The Effect of Rural Development Policy 
Group  Group Description Employment Wages  DI 
1 
Rural hukou holders working 
in the private sector - + + 
2 Rural hukou holders working 
in agriculture sector 
+ + + 
3 Rural hukou holders working 
in the SOE sector 
0 0 0 
4 Urban hukou holders 
working in the private sector 
0 + + 
5 Urban hukou holders 
working in the SOE sector 
0 0 0 
Note: “+” denotes an increase in a particular variable, “-” denotes a decrease, and “0” stands for no 
change.  
 
Let us explain the economic intuition behind the results above. As the agricultural 
wage increases, more rural hukou holders would choose to work in the agricultural sector, 
and therefore fewer people would migrate to the urban area. Since the employment level 
in the SOE sector for rural hukou holders is independent of the agricultural wage, it 
remains unchanged. Accordingly, we see more agricultural employment but less 
employment for rural hukou holders in the private sector.  
 
In addition, the fall in rural-to-urban migration reduces the labor supply to the urban 
private sector, resulting in a higher market-clearing wage there. This is why the wages 
would increase in the private sector for both urban and rural hukou holders. Furthermore, 
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the discretionary income moves in the same direction as wages for all groups since there 
is no change on the cost of living for rural hukou holders in the city. Thus, in Table 5.2, 
we observe an increase in discretionary income for three groups: rural hukou holders 
working in agriculture, rural hukou holders working in the urban private sector, and urban 
hukou holders working in the private sector.  
 
Given the results in Table 5.2, we can draw the distribution of discretionary income 
under the rural development (RD) policy and compare it with the original distribution. 
Figure 5.2 depicts the effects of the rural development policy on employment levels and 
discretionary income for each of the five groups. The solid step function OABCDE stands 
for the original distribution of discretionary income without the policy. The new income 
distribution generated by the rural development policy is displayed by dashed lines 
OA’B’C’D’E’. Comparing the two distributions, they coincide in ranges BC and DE, and 
the new distribution lies above the original one in all other ranges. As a result, the new 
distribution under rural development first-order dominates the original one. Therefore, we 
conclude that rural development is welfare-improving by the first-order welfare 
dominance criterion. 
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Figure 5.2 Quantile Distribution under Rural Development 
5.2.2 Reduced cost (RC): FOD comparison 
As introduced in the previous chapter, there is a large difference in the costs and 
benefits associated with living in the city between rural and urban hukou holders. Migrant 
workers with rural hukou have to pay extra fees for their children education in the city. 
Compared to urban residents, some rural hukou holders do not have access to medical 
insurance or assistance programs and thus need to spend much money on medical 
treatment once they develop some disease. In addition, most of workers with rural hukou 
do not have access to need-based welfare programs in the city, such as housing allowance, 
minimum living guarantee, etc.  
 
This section will examine what would happen to the income distribution if the cost of 
O 
Original:         A        B     C      D      E 
R
NSW ’-
RC  
AW ’ 
U
NSW ’ 
Labor 
DI 
Post-policy:    A’             B’     C’      D’      E’ 
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living for rural hukou holders in urban areas were reduced, while keep the cost of living 
for urban hukou holders constant. That is, the policy instrument analyzed in this section is 
a decrease in 
RC . In practice, this could be done by lowering the schools fees for 
migrants’ children education, or providing housing allowance for the rural migrants 
working in urban areas. Almost all of the previous studies claim that reducing the living 
cost for rural hukou holders is a desirable policy because it will promote migration. As 
mentioned previously, in my view, this criterion is not appropriate. It has yet to be 
determined whether reducing 
RC  would improve social welfare. In similar fashion, we 
will gauge the welfare effects of this policy experiment by the first-order dominance 
approach. Table 5.3 presents the results of such a reduced cost policy.  
 
Table 5.3 The Effect of Reduced Cost Policy 
Group  Group Description Employment Wages  DI 
1 
Rural hukou holders working 
in the private sector + - + 
2 Rural hukou holders working 
in agriculture sector 
- 0 0 
3 Rural hukou holders working 
in the SOE sector 
0 0 + 
4 Urban hukou holders 
working in the private sector 
0 - - 
5 Urban hukou holders 
working in the SOE sector 
0 0 0 
Note: “+” denotes an increase in a particular variable, “-” denotes a decrease, and “0” stands for no 
change.  
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As the cost-of-living for rural hukou holders in the city decreases, more rural hukou 
holders would migrate to the city, while fewer people would remain in the rural area and 
work in the agriculture sector. Since the employment level in the SOE sector for rural 
hukou holders remains unchanged, the increased labor force in the urban area with rural 
hukou would enter the private sector. Hence, we see less agricultural employment but 
more employment for rural hukou holders in the urban private sector.  
 
The reduced cost policy would increase the discretionary income for rural hukou 
holders in urban areas, whether they are working in the SOE sector or the private sector. 
However, because of the increased labor supply to the urban private sector, the wages for 
urban hukou holders in the urban private sector would decrease, so their discretionary 
income would fall. These effects are summarized in Table 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the distributions of discretionary income before and after the 
reduced cost policy. Again, the solid step function corresponds to the original income 
distribution, and the dashed lines represent the new distribution which would result from 
the policy of reducing 
RC . As can be seen: (1) Workers in segments OA and BC are 
better off under the policy, (2) Workers in segments A’B’ and DE experience no change in 
discretionary income; and (3) Workers in segments  AA’ and CD become worse off after 
the policy experiment. In this way, we can conclude that a policy of reduced cost for 
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urban hukou holders in urban areas neither welfare-dominates the original distribution 
nor is welfare-dominated by it. That is, we cannot make an unambiguous policy 
evaluation judgment solely based on the first-order dominance criterion. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Quantile Distribution under Reduced Cost 
 
5.2.3 Hukou conversion: FOD comparison 
This policy experiment refers to changing a proportion of rural hukou holders’ hukou 
status from rural to urban hukou. Specifically, the policy instrument analyzed in this 
section is an incremental increase in UL . We conceive of the timing of the policy 
experiment as follows. At the original equilibrium, the government randomly selects a 
small percentage of rural hukou holders who are working in the city and immediately 
O 
Labor 
R
NSW ’-
RC ’  
R
SW -
RC ’ 
U
NSW ’ 
DI 
Original:     A       B      C     D       E 
Post-policy:        A’   B’      C’     D’       E’ 
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grants them urban hukou. After the hukou conversion, workers and firms will re-optimize 
and reach a new equilibrium. The effects of such a hukou conversion policy are shown in 
Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4 The Effect of Hukou Conversion Policy 
Group  Group Description Employment Wages  DI 
1 
Rural hukou holders working 
in the private sector - - - 
2 Rural hukou holders working 
in agriculture sector 
- 0 0 
3 Rural hukou holders working 
in the SOE sector 
0 0 0 
4 Urban hukou holders 
working in the private sector 
+ - - 
5 Urban hukou holders 
working in the SOE sector 
0 0 0 
Note: “+” denotes an increase in a particular variable, “-” denotes a decrease, and “0” stands for no 
change.  
 
Due to the hukou conversion policy, people whose hukou types get converted would 
be better off and earn higher discretionary income. However, the hukou conversion policy 
would increase the supply of labor to the urban private sector, causing the wage there to 
fall. This results in a decrease in the discretionary income for people in the private sector 
with either hukou type.  
 
Given the results above, we draw the distribution of discretionary income under the 
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hukou conversion policy, which is shown in Figure 5.4.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Quantile Distribution under Hukou Conversion  
 
Compared to the original income distribution, workers in segments AA’, B’B, and 
C’C become better off. However, workers in segments OA’ and CD become worse off. 
Other segments remain unchanged. As a consequence, the post-policy distribution neither 
first-order welfare dominates the original one nor is dominated by it.  
 
In summary, only the rural development policy yields an unambiguously 
welfare-improving income distribution using the first-order welfare dominance criterion. 
O 
R
NSW ’-
RC  
 
U
NSW ’ 
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DI 
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In contrast, the reduced cost and hukou conversion policies have ambiguous effects on 
social welfare using the first-order dominance criterion. Finally, no proposed policy 
among the three alternatives is unambiguously welfare-decreasing using this welfare 
criterion.  
 
5.3 Abbreviated social welfare function 
As an alternative way to evaluate social welfare, abbreviated social welfare function 
approach was initially created by Lambert (1993) and employed by Fields (2005) in the 
context of the simplified Harris-Todaro model. In the analysis below, we work with a 
class of abbreviated social welfare functions of the form: 
 
(1)    SW= f (Total income, poverty, income inequality), 1 0f > , 2 0f < , 3 0f < .  
 
Again, “income” in this context refers to the discretionary income defined as 
previously. In this abbreviated social welfare function, economic well-being depends 
positively on the total income earned by all workers, negatively on poverty, and 
negatively on income inequality. Since there are five values of income throughout this 
economy, the total income of all workers is the sum of discretionary income earned by 
each group. The income of each group is the product of income per worker times the 
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number of workers in each group.  
 
The second component in the specified welfare function is poverty. Specifically, 
poverty is measured here by the poverty headcount or poverty headcount ratio. Because 
the total population is constant, the results of the analysis based on the two measures are 
the same. Hence, we measure poverty by the poverty headcount defined as the number of 
workers whose discretionary incomes are below or equal to a given poverty line. As we 
know, most agriculture workers in China still earn very little and have low standard of 
living. Hence, a reasonable place to set the poverty line in the model is the agricultural 
wage in the original equilibrium, that is, AW . We set the poverty line z= AW .
13 
Accordingly, there are two groups of workers in poverty, including agricultural workers 
in rural China and workers with rural hukou working in the urban private sector. 
 
In terms of measuring income inequality, we use the difference in average 
discretionary income between workers living in the urban and rural area as the measure 
of inequality. One of the biggest policy concerns on inequality in current China is 
urban-rural inequality, that is, the income gap between urban and rural dwellers.14 The 
average income for rural dwellers is equal to AW , since all workers in the rural area earn 
                                                        
13 If the poverty line is set at the new agriculture wage after the rural development policy, then the rural development 
policy would not reduce poverty using the poverty headcount measure, but would reduce the depth of poverty. This 
would require us to use more complicated poverty measures such as P2. For reasons of mathematical tractability and to 
be able to use the poverty headcount measure, we set the poverty line equal to the original agriculture wage before any 
policy change.  
14 To ease the calculations, we found it easier to use the difference in discretionary income of urban workers compared 
to rural workers rather than the ratio.  
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this amount. The average income for people living in the urban area is a weighted average 
of four groups of workers in the city.  
 
For each policy among the three alternatives, we derived each of the arguments of the 
abbreviated social welfare function. The results are summarized in Table 5.5, and the 
proofs are provided in Appendix 5.  
 
Table 5.5 Summary of Welfare Analysis of Three Policies Using 
Abbreviated Social Welfare Function 
Labor market 
policy 
Change in total 
income 
Change in 
poverty 
headcount 
Change in 
income 
inequality 
Change in 
welfare 
Rural 
Development 
+ - - + 
Reduced Cost - 0 - ambiguous 
Hukou 
Conversion 
ambiguous - ambiguous ambiguous 
Note: “+” denotes an increase in a particular variable, “-” denotes a decrease, and “0” stands for no 
change.  
 
As can be seen, only RD policy is unambiguously welfare-improving, in that it 
increases total income, reduces income inequality, and also reduces poverty. The RC 
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policy does reduce inequality, but it would also make the total income fall, rendering the 
welfare-ambiguous consequence. The HC policy also generates a welfare-ambiguous 
result in that it has ambiguous effects on total income and income inequality, and depends 
on parameters values. 
  
The welfare economic results from Sections 2 and 3 for the first-order-dominance 
approach and the abbreviated social welfare function are summarized in columns 2 and 3, 
respectively, of Table 5.6.  
 
Table 5.6 Summary of Welfare Economic Analysis of Three Policies  
Labor market policy 
Change in social welfare 
using first-order 
dominance 
Change in social welfare 
using abbreviated social 
welfare function 
Rural Development + + 
Reduced Cost ambiguous ambiguous 
Hukou Conversion ambiguous ambiguous 
 
According to the results presented above, rural development policy would generate a 
better income distribution no matter which of the two welfare evaluation criteria we use. 
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However, it is worth pointing out that we can not say from the preceding analysis that the 
RD policy is Pareto-improving. The reason is that the Pareto criterion requires that we 
look at welfare changes for each identified person in the economy and the analysis here 
has no way of identifying which people are which.  
 
Another conclusion drawn from Table 5.6 is that none of the proposed policy is 
welfare-decreasing. The income distributions generated by RC and HC policies neither 
first-order dominate the original one nor dominated by it, implying that for each policy, 
some groups become better off while some others become worse off. Furthermore, the 
effects of RC and HC on social welfare are also ambiguous when we use the abbreviated 
social welfare function, which depends positively on total income, and negatively on 
income inequality and poverty. This partly explains the policy debate in current China 
that some people favor the RC and HC policy while some do not.  
 
5.4 Social cost-benefit analysis of labor market policies 
As mentioned previously, the policy analyses in Section 2 and 3 only focused on the 
benefit side of each policy but ignored the costs of implementing different policies. From 
the policy point of view, if the government is to choose between different policies, it 
needs to consider not only the consequences of implementing the policies, but also the 
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costs of putting the policies into effect. In order to assess the returns from public 
expenditures, economists have long relied on social cost-benefit analysis (Fields, 2007a). 
Section 5.4 will complete the social cost-benefit analysis by using a public finance 
framework, in which the government has a fixed budget, say B dollars, and then 
determines which policy to implement using this fixed budget. Keeping the cost side 
constant for each policy, we will again examine the benefit side by the first-order 
dominance approach.  
 
5.4.1 Social cost-benefit analysis 
As Fields (2007a) claimed, the social cost-benefit criterion may be stated as follows: 
a project is socially profitable if the total social benefits exceed the total social costs. The 
larger the difference between total social benefits and total social costs, the more 
worthwhile the project. We begin the social cost-benefit analysis by imagining that the 
government has a fixed budget, say B dollars. How should it be spent? The answer 
depends on the precise objective. Since the aim of this paper is to examine the effects of 
labor market policies on income distribution in China, I will adopt the first-order welfare 
dominance criterion to measure the benefit of each policy, which takes into account the 
distributional aspects. Specifically, I will compare three hypothetical income distributions 
which results from the three respective policies using the fixed amount of budget. In 
order to make the discussion clearer, I will employ the first-order dominance approach for 
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each pair comparison. More concretely, we denote the income distribution resulted from 
RD policy using B dollars as Y1. Similarly, let Y2 and Y3 stand for the income 
distributions generated by RC and HC policies, respectively, each of which use the same 
amount of budget, i.e., B dollars. Then our task is to compare Y1 versus Y2, Y1 versus Y3, 
and Y2 versus Y3 by the first order dominance criterion. Given the fixed cost of each 
policy, the budget should be spent on the policy whichever generates the income 
distribution that first-order dominates the other two income distributions according to the 
social cost-benefit criterion.  
 
5.4.2 Cost of each policy 
For the purpose of conducting sound social cost-benefit analysis, I need to explain 
very carefully how the cost of each policy occurred, that is, who is undertaking which 
action. In previous sections of this paper, when stating that the government implements 
different labor market policies, we have not specified which particular government we 
referred to. Since the purpose of labor market policies analyzed in this paper is to create a 
better income distribution in China, it is the central government that should play a role in 
improving nation-wide income distribution. Thus, in the subsequent sections, we assume 
that the central government has a budget of B dollars and makes a decision about which 
labor market policy to implement among the three alternative policies, namely, RD, RC, 
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and HC.15 The three sub-sections below describe how the cost is occurred and paid for 
each of the three policies above.  
 
5.4.2.1 Cost of rural development policy 
The rural development policy involves an increase in the agriculture wage. In the 
past few years, the central government of China has been implementing a variety of 
public policies to promote rural development, including the abolition of agricultural taxes, 
the provision of subsidies for purchasing agricultural machines or equipment and 
subsidies for planting certain kinds of agriculture products, the accelerated development 
of rural public services, increased investment in rural infrastructure and the provision of 
small loans to rural households (Ash, 2010). There might be different channels to 
increase the agricultural wage, such as providing financial loans to rural households, or 
offering workers subsidies for better technology. Given the fixed fiscal transfers to 
agricultural workers, these channels may produce different multiplier effects in terms of 
increasing rural income. However, as mentioned previously, the question about which 
specific channel is better than another is beyond the scope of our study. What we know is 
that one dollar budget allocated to an agriculture worker could generate at least one dollar 
of income increase. Denote this multiplier as M, meaning that one dollar budget allocated 
                                                        
15 For analytical convenience, we do not consider how this budget is collected or financed. For example, the budget 
can come from an endowment from a development bank.  
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to an agriculture worker could generate M dollar income increase (M ³ 1)16. 
 
Given this assumption, let us denote ,
R
R RDL  as the number of rural hukou holders 
working in the rural sector after the rural development policy. Accordingly, each person 
in ,
R
R RDL  would enjoy a wage increase from AW  to AW ’. Given the fixed budget of B 
dollars from central government, we have the following governmental budget constraint 
for the rural development (RD) policy.  
 
(2a)    
,
AR
R RD
B M W
L
= D , where AWD = 'AW - AW . 
 
Equivalently, by manipulating the formula above, we have: 
 
(2b)    'AW = AW +
,
R R
U RD
MB
L L-
.  
 
5.4.2.2 Cost of the reduced cost policy 
The reduced cost policy refers to a reduction in 
RC . As is known, the local 
government in cities charges rural hukou holders substantial sums for housing, health care, 
and education and deny them unemployment benefits and other need-based welfare 
                                                        
16 In fact, it may be possible that M<1 because of the cost of funds such as administrative cost of allocating funds or 
corruption. However, the results shown below are still valid even though M is less than 1. That is, the only necessary 
assumption we make here is that M>0.  
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benefits. Recalling the model setup in chapter 4, the economy has a single rural area in 
inland (central and western) region and a single urban area in coastal (eastern) region of 
China. Accordingly, the local government in the urban area originally charged 
RC  
through public schools, public hospitals, and so on. Let us specify the cost of RC policy 
as follows. The central government pays the cost of living for rural migrants to local 
government in the destination urban area. Denote ,
U
R RCL  as the new number of urban 
hukou holders migrating to the city after the RC policy. Due to the policy change, each 
person in ,
U
R RCL  would face a new cost of living 
RC ’. That is, each rural hukou holder in 
the city after the reduced cost policy would enjoy the lower cost, and there are ,
U
R RCL  of 
them. The central government uses the fixed budget to pay for these reduced cost, which 
is equal to ,
U
R RCL  times the amount of reduced cost for each worker with rural hukou. 
Given the fixed budget of B dollars from central government, we have the following 
governmental budget constraint for RC policy.  
 
(3a)    B= ,| |
R R
U RCC LD , where | |
RCD = ' '| |R R R RC C C C- = - . 
 
Since RC  is reduced in the RC policy, the absolute value of the change in RC  is 
equal to RC  minus 'RC . An equivalent expression of the condition above is as follows: 
 
(3b)    'RC = RC -
,
R
U RC
B
L
. 
 
5.4.2.3 Cost of hukou conversion policy 
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This policy experiment refers to changing a proportion of rural hukou holders’ hukou 
status to urban hukou, that is, an increase in UL . Recall the timing of this policy 
illustrated previously. At the original equilibrium, the government randomly selects a 
percentage of rural hukou holders who are working in the city and immediately entitles 
them with urban hukou. Before the policy change, these selected people need to pay the 
cost of living (
RC ) to the local government. However, after the policy change, they no 
longer need to pay this cost. The central government uses the fixed budget to pay the cost 
of living for those who convert their hukou status from rural to urban to local government 
in the destination urban area. Therefore, the budget constraint of central government is 
indicated below for the HC policy.  
 
(4a)    B= ( )U RL CD , where ( ) 'U U UL L LD = - . Equivalently,  
(4b)    'UL = U R
BL
C
+  
 
Then we could compare the income distributions generated by the three respective 
policies using the same amount of budget, that is, B dollars. Let Y1 , Y2 and Y3 denote the 
income distributions resulted from rural development (RD), reduced cost (RC) and hukou 
conversion (HC) policies, respectively, each of which use the same amount of budget, i.e., 
B dollars. Given the fixed cost of each policy, the budget should be spent on the policy 
whichever generates the income distribution that first-order dominates the other two 
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income distributions according to the social cost-benefit criterion. Moreover, for 
simplicity, we maintain a previous assumption that B is not large enough to alter the order 
of the discretionary income listed in Table 5.1 for any of the three policies.  
 
5.4.3 Pairwise policy comparison with a fixed budget using FOD  
This section will analyze three income distributions generated by the three policies 
with a fixed budget by the first order dominance (FOD) criterion. To make the 
discussions and graphs clearer, we divide the whole discussion into three pair 
comparisons, including Y1 versus Y2, Y1 versus Y3, and Y2 versus Y3, respectively. 
Furthermore, from now on, Y1 and Y2 will be displayed using the long and short dashed 
lines, respectively, and Y3 will be represented by dotted lines throughout the remainder of 
this paper.  
 
5.4.3.1 Comparison of rural development and reduced cost  
Owing to the assumption that B is not large enough to alter the order of the 
discretionary income listed in Table 5.1 for any of the three policies, we can make use of 
the results from Section 2 to draw the graph of quantile distributions generated by RD 
and RC policies, respectively. These graphs give us considerable information about the 
relative position of each of five segments in the quantile distributions resulted from RD 
  
 
266 
and RC policies. From now on, we denote the five segments in all of the previous figures 
as Segment 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 (from the left to the right). Accordingly, based on the results 
shown in Figure 5.2 and 5.3, Segment 5 is the same for both Y1 and Y2, including the 
length (horizontal) and position (vertical). In Segment 4, Y1 lies above the original 
distribution, whereas Y2  lies below the original distribution. Thus, Y1 should lie above 
Y2  in Segment 4. Using the same logic, we conclude that Y2  lies above Y1 in Segment 3, 
but below Y1 in Segment 2. Furthermore, Y1 is longer in Segment 2 but shorter in 
Segment 1 than Y2. However, it is not easy to see which distribution is higher in Segment 
1, because both the RD and RC policies increase the discretionary income of rural hukou 
holders working in the private sector in the urban area, and we do not know yet which 
policy would generate a relatively larger increase. In fact, the answer would depend on 
the extent of income increase resulted from one dollar budget allocated an agriculture 
worker under the rural development policy.  
 
Case 1: Multiplier effect (M) of rural development policy is sufficiently small. That 
is, one dollar budget allocated to an agriculture worker could generate a small income 
increase. 
  
We know that M ³ 1. Thus, we can examine the extreme case in which M=1. In 
Appendix 5a, I show that if M=1, Y2 would be indeed higher than Y1 in Segment 1 using 
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the budget constraints specified in equations (2a) and (3a) and approximation technique. 
That is, the discretionary income of rural hukou holders working in the non-SOE sector 
would be larger under reduced cost policy than rural development policy with the same 
amount of budget. In this case, we obtain the following graph showing the two quantile 
distributions resulted from RD and RC policies, respectively.  
 
Figure 5.5a Comparison of Income Distributions under   
Rural Development (RD) and Reduced Cost (RC) (M is small) 
 
In Figure 5.5a, the long-dashed step function OA’B’C’D’E’ stands for the distribution 
of discretionary income generated from the rural development policy using B dollars. In 
contrast, the income distribution for the reduced cost policy using the same budget is 
displayed by short-dashed lines and labeled by OA’’B’’C’’D’’E’’. As can be seen, Y2 is 
O 
RD:       A’               B’        C’       D’        E’ Labor 
DI 
RC:           A’’        B’’        C’’       D’’       E’’ 
RD 
RC 
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higher than Y1 in segments OA’ and B’C’, but lower than Y1  in A’B’ and C’D’. The other 
segments are the same for both distributions. Therefore, according to the first-order 
welfare dominance criterion, we may conclude that the income distribution resulted from 
RD policy neither welfare-dominates the distribution resulted from RC policy nor is 
welfare-dominated by it. That is, we cannot make unambiguous policy evaluation 
judgment about which of the two policies is better to improve the income distribution 
solely based on the first-order dominance criterion. 
 
Case 2: Multiplier effect (M) of rural development policy is sufficiently large. That 
is, one dollar budget allocated to an agriculture worker could generate a large income 
increase. 
 
In this case, the discretionary income of rural hukou holders working in the private 
sector would be larger under rural development policy than reduced cost policy with the 
same amount of budget. Accordingly, Y2 would be indeed lower than Y1 in Segment 1. 
The specific reason is stated in Appendix 5b. What is the cutoff value of M to distinguish 
the two cases discussed above? M is equal to the cutoff value when the discretionary 
income of rural hukou holders working in the non-SOE is the same under rural 
development policy and the reduced cost policy. Appendix 5c gives us the expression of 
M*. Case 1 is corresponding to the situation where 1 £ M<M*, while case 2 is 
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corresponding to M>M*. The graph of the two quantile distributions generated by the 
two policies in Case 2 is shown below.  
 
Figure 5.5b Comparison of Income Distributions under   
Rural Development (RD) and Reduced Cost (RC) (M is large) 
 
As can be seen, although Y1 generated by the rural development policy is higher than 
Y2 in most segments, it is still lower than Y2 (generated by reduced cost policy) in B’C’. 
Hence, in both cases, the income distribution resulted from rural development policy 
neither welfare-dominates the distribution resulted from reduced cost policy nor is 
welfare-dominated by it. That is, we cannot make unambiguous policy evaluation 
judgment about which of the two policies is better to improve the income distribution 
solely based on the first-order dominance criterion. 
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5.4.3.2 Comparison of rural development and hukou conversion  
Following the same procedure as above, we compare the income distributions 
generated by rural development and hukou conversion policies, respectively. According 
to the results displayed in Figure 5.2 and 5.4, Segment 3 and 5 are the same for both Y1 
and Y3, including the length (horizontal) and position (vertical). In Segment 4, Y1 lies 
above the original distribution, whereas Y3  lies below the original distribution. Thus, Y1 
should lie above Y3  in Segment 4. Moreover, Y1 is shorter in Segment 4 than Y3. For 
Segment 2, Y1 lies above the original distribution, whereas Y3  coincides with the original 
in terms of vertical position. Hence, Y1 should lie above Y3  in Segment 2. Using the 
same logic, we conclude that Y1  lies above Y3 in Segment 1. However, it is not obvious 
to see which distribution is shorter in Segment 1, because both the RD and HC policies 
decrease the number of rural hukou holders working in the private sector in the urban 
area ( RNSE ), and we do not know yet which policy would generate a relatively larger 
decrease.  
 
Case 1: Multiplier effect (M) of rural development policy is sufficiently small. That 
is, one dollar budget allocated to an agriculture worker could generate a small income 
increase. 
  
  
 
271 
Again, we examine the extreme case M=1. In Appendix 6a, I show that if M=1, the 
hukou conversion policy indeed reduces RNSE  by a larger amount than the rural 
development policy does. Thus, more people with rural hukou would work in the private 
sector under the rural development policy than under the hukou conversion policy. In 
summary, we obtain the following graph showing the two quantile distributions resulted 
from rural development and hukou conversion policies, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5.6a Comparison of Income Distributions under   
Rural Development (RD) and Hukou Conversion (HC) (M is small) 
 
As can be seen, Y3 (generated by HC policy) is higher than Y1 (generated by RD 
policy) in segments A’’’A’, B’’’B’ and C’’’C’, but lower than Y1 in OA’’’, A’B’’’ and C’D’. 
0 
RD:          A’          B’       C’        D’       E’ Labor 
DI 
HC:       A’’’      B’’’       C’’’             D’’’      E’’’ 
RD 
HC 
  
 
272 
The other segments are the same for both distributions. This implies that the income 
distribution resulted from RD policy neither first-order welfare-dominates the distribution 
resulted from HC policy nor is first-order welfare-dominated by it.  
 
Case 2: Multiplier effect (M) of rural development policy is sufficiently large. That 
is, one dollar budget allocated to an agriculture worker could generate a large income 
increase. 
 
In this case, more people with rural hukou would work in the private sector under the 
hukou conversion policy than under the rural development policy. The specific reason is 
explained in Appendix 6b. The cutoff value of M to distinguish the two cases above is 
equal to M** when the number of rural hukou holders working in the non-SOE sector is 
the same under rural development policy and hukou conversion policy. The mathematical 
expression of M** is given in Appendix 6c. Accordingly, Case 1 is corresponding to the 
situation where 1 £ M<M**, while case 2 is corresponding to M>M**. The graph of the 
two quantile distributions generated by the two policies in case 2 is shown below.  
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Figure 5.6b Comparison of Income Distributions under   
Rural Development (RD) and Hukou Conversion (HC) (M is large) 
 
In this case, Y3 (generated by HC policy) is higher than Y1 (generated by RD policy) 
in segments B’’’B’ and C’’’C’, but lower in OB’’’ and C’D’. The other segments are the 
same for both distributions. To summarize, in both cases, the income distribution resulted 
from rural development policy neither welfare-dominates the distribution resulted from 
the hukou conversion policy nor is welfare-dominated by it. That is, we cannot make 
unambiguous policy evaluation judgment about which of the two policies is better to 
improve the income distribution solely based on the first-order dominance criterion. 
 
5.4.3.3 Comparison of reduced cost and hukou conversion 
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According to the results displayed in Figure 5.3 and 5.4, Segment 5 is the same for 
both Y2 (generated by RC) and Y3 (generated by HC), including the horizontal length and 
vertical position. In Segment 3, Y2 lies above the original distribution, whereas Y3 
coincides with the original in terms of vertical position. Therefore, Y2 lies above Y3 in 
Segment 3 with the same length. Because the agriculture wage is constant for both 
policies, Segment 2 has the same vertical location for Y2 and Y3. In Segment 1, Y2 lies 
above the original distribution, whereas Y3  lies below the original distribution. Thus, Y2 
should lie above Y3  in Segment 1. Moreover, Y2 is shorter in Segment 1 than Y2. So far, 
we have not discussed Segment 4. The obvious result is that Y3 is longer than Y2 in this 
segment, but it is not obvious which one lies above the other. This is because both 
policies reduce the discretionary income of urban hukou holders employed in the 
non-SOE sector. For now, I assume that Y2 lies above Y3 in Segment 4. However, I will 
demonstrate later that the result of our welfare analysis is independent of this assumption. 
That is, no matter which distribution lies above the other in Segment 4, we will obtain the 
same result using the first-order dominance approach. Given the discussion above, we are 
able to draw the income distributions generated by RC and HC policies in Figure 5.7.   
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Figure 5.7 Comparison of Income Distributions under  
Reduced Cost and Hukou Conversion 
 
Figure 7 shows that Y3 (generated by HC) is higher than Y2 (generated by reduced 
cost) in segments A’’’A’’, B’’’B’’ and C’’’C’’, but lower than Y1 in OA’’’, B’’C’’’ and C’’D’’. 
The other segments are the same for both distributions. This implies that the income 
distribution resulted from RC policy neither first-order welfare-dominates the distribution 
resulted from HC policy nor is first-order welfare-dominated by it. Let us verify a 
previous claim that the result of our welfare analysis is independent of the assumption 
that Y2 lies above Y3 in Segment 4. It is obvious that even though Y2 lies below Y3 in 
Segment 4, other things being the same, we can still conclude that Y2 neither first-order 
dominates Y3 nor dominated by it. This is because even in the smaller range OC’’’, Y2 lies 
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above Y3 in some parts but below it in other parts. If the two distributions cross with each 
other, then these two income distributions cannot be ordered using the first-order 
dominance.  
 
In summary, according to the results in Section 5.4.3, no single distribution among 
Y1, Y2 and Y3 dominates either of the other two distributions. That is, none of the three 
policies (RD, RC and HC) with the same budget would result in an income distribution 
that first-order welfare-dominates either of the other two distributions generated by the 
other two policies. Thus, based on the first-order dominance criterion alone, we conclude 
that it is ambiguous which policy among the three alternatives the central government 
should choose with the fixed budget. 
 
5.4.4 Pairwise policy comparison with a fixed budget using poverty 
dominance approach  
What would happen if we relax our welfare criterion and only examine the effects of 
labor market policies on poverty? Atkinson (1987) and Foster and Shorrocks (1988) 
provided an important methodology called poverty dominance linking the 
first-order-dominance approach to the poverty measure. The 
first-order-poverty-dominance criterion should be described as follows: One distribution 
X first-order-poverty-dominates another distribution Y if and only if the quantile function 
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for X is below or equal to the quantile function for Y and strictly below someplace for all 
quantiles whose income are below or equal to the pre-specified highest possible poverty 
line (Zmax). Thus, if X poverty-dominates Y, X has more poverty than Y and thus is not 
desired. Compared to the first-order-welfare-dominance approach, the poverty dominance 
only looks at a smaller income range. The smaller the Zmax is, the more likely we will get 
the poverty dominance result. Furthermore, Atkinson (1987) and Foster and Shorrocks 
(1988) proved that X first-order poverty dominates Y if and only if povX>povY for all 
poverty measures belonging to general additive class specified below and for all poverty 
lines between 0 and Zmax. Denote z as the poverty line, iy  as person i’s income, n as the 
total population, ( , )ip z y  as person i’s contribution to the poverty measure, and P as the 
poverty measure for the economy. Then the general additive class is: 
 
(5)    
1
( , ) /
n
i
i
P p z y n
=
= å  such that 
(i) ( , ) 0ip z y = if iy z³ ; 
(ii) ( , )ip z y >0 if iy z£ .  
 
This class includes the commonly used poverty measures such as poverty headcount 
ratio and Pa . We then apply the first-order-poverty-dominance criterion to the three 
income distributions generated by the three policies with the same amount of budget, 
respectively. To make the discussions and graphs clearer, we re-draw the truncated 
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quantile distributions of Y1, Y2 and Y3 and also divide the whole discussion into three 
pair comparisons, including Y1 versus Y2, Y1 versus Y3, and Y2 versus Y3, respectively. I 
conduct the first-order-poverty dominance analysis below by assuming the highest 
poverty line larger than the agriculture wage under the rural development policy but less 
than the discretionary income for rural hukou holders in the SOE sector ( 'AW  <Zmax< 
R
SDI ). People whose income are less than or equal to the specified poverty line are 
considered as poor. From the previous section, we know that the quantile distributions 
generated by the rural development policy would be different for different values of 
multipliers (M). Thus, for each specified highest poverty line Zmax, there would be two 
cases categorized by the values of M. We will show the results of first-order poverty 
dominance for the two respective cases below. 
 
Case 1: M is sufficiently small17.  
In what follows, I compare the truncated quantile distributions generated by the three 
labor market policies. Recall that Y1, Y2, and Y3 denote the quantile distributions resulting 
from rural development, reduced cost, and hukou conversion, respectively. Figure 5.8a 
displays the result of first-order-poverty-dominance analysis of Y1 and Y2, Figure 5.8b 
shows the graphs for Y1 and Y3, and Figure 5.8c is corresponding to Y2 and Y3.  
 
                                                        
17 Precisely, M is sufficiently small meaning that 1 min{ *, **}M M M£ £ ; M is large meaning that 
max{ *, **}M M M³ , where the expressions of M* and M** are given in Appendix 6c and 7c, respectively.  
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In the figures below, we focus on the shaded area for all quantiles whose income are 
below or equal to the pre-specified poverty line (Zmax). One distribution X 
first-order-poverty-dominates another distribution Y if and only if the quantile function 
for X is below or equal to the quantile function for Y and strictly below someplace for all 
quantiles in the shaded area. Using this criterion, none of the three policies (RD, RC and 
HC) with the same budget would result in an income distribution that 
first-order-poverty-dominates either of the other two distributions generated by the other 
two policies. Specifically, Figure 5.8a informs us that although the distribution generated 
by rural development (RD) is higher than that generated by reduced cost policy in AC, it 
is lower in OA, rendering the ambiguous result. Similarly, accordingly to Figure 5.8b and 
5.8c, no distribution is below or equal to the other function and strictly below someplace 
for all quantiles in the shaded area. Thus, in case 1, we cannot make a solid conclusion 
about which policy among the three alternatives the central government should choose 
with the fixed budget using the first-order-poverty-dominance criterion. 
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Figure 5.8a Poverty Dominance Analysis of Rural Development and 
Reduced Cost Policy (M is sufficiently small) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8b Poverty Dominance Analysis of Rural Development and 
Hukou Conversion Policy (M is sufficiently small) 
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Figure 5.8c Poverty Dominance Analysis of Reduced Cost and 
 Hukou Conversion Policy (M is sufficiently small) 
 
Case 2: M is sufficiently large.  
In this case, the graphs for the first two comparisons (RD and RC, RD and HC) 
would be different from Figure 5.8a and 5.8b. Figure 5.8c remains valid for comparing 
reduced cost and hukou conversion in this case. Figure 5.9a and 5.9b show the results of 
first-order-poverty-dominance analysis of RD and RC, RD and HC, respectively for case 
2.  
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Figure 5.9a Poverty Dominance Analysis of Rural Development and 
Reduced Cost Policy (M is sufficiently large) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9b Poverty Dominance Analysis of Rural Development and 
Hukou Conversion Policy (M is sufficiently large) 
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Figure 5.9a shows that the income distribution generated by the reduced cost (RC) 
policy first-order-poverty-dominates the distribution generated by the rural development 
policy in that RC is strictly below RD for all quantiles whose income are below Zmax 
(OC). However, Figure 5.9b shows the two quantile distributions are crossing for 
quantiles in the range OD. The very poor people are richer under RD than HC, but the 
richer of the poor people have higher income under HC than RD. Accordingly, neither 
the RD policy first-order-poverty-dominates the HC policy or dominated it.   
 
Hitherto, we have analyzed the best allocation of B dollars among three alternative 
labor market policies using first-order welfare dominance and poverty dominance 
approach, respectively. Although the first-order-welfare-dominance criterion cannot give 
us the unambiguous result about which policy is the best in terms of improving social 
welfare, the first-order-poverty-dominance approach sheds more light on this policy 
question in different circumstances. Table 5.7 summarizes the results of the first-order 
poverty dominance analysis in a public finance framework.  
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Table 5.7 Results of First-Order-Poverty-Dominance Analysis  
Highest poverty line 
(Zmax) 
Value of M Poverty-dominance result 
Small M 
No policy would generate an income 
distribution that first-order-poverty-dominates 
the distributions resulted from either of the 
other two policies 
'
AW  <Zmax< 
R
SDI  
Large M 
The rural development policy has a larger 
effect on poverty reduction than the reduced 
cost policy. Neither the rural development 
policy first-order-poverty-dominates the 
hukou conversion policy nor dominated by it. 
 Note: 'AW  is the agriculture wage under the rural development policy, which is larger than the 
original wage ( AW ).
R
SDI  is the discretionary income for rural hukou holders working in the 
high-wage sector (SOE) in the urban area. M is the multiplier effect of rural development policy 
meaning that one dollar budget allocated to an agriculture worker could generate M dollar income 
increase.  
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This paper has conducted a careful and comprehensive welfare economic analysis of 
three labor market policies using the new-developed labor market model for current 
China.  
 
The three policies analyzed in this paper include: rural development (RD), reducing 
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the cost of living for rural hukou holders in the city (RC), and converting some rural 
migrants’ hukou status from rural to urban (HC), which are the most discussed and 
relevant policies in the current Chinese labor market policy agenda. However, there has 
been no rigorous analysis using a well-specified China-specific model and 
distributionally sensitive social welfare criteria on whether each of the three policies 
above is desirable for the society or not, and also about which policy among the three 
alternatives should deserve priority. This paper utilizes a five-step policy evaluation 
framework created by Fields (2007a) to carefully investigate these policy questions. In 
Section 2 and 3, by ignoring the costs associated with implementing each policy, we 
adopted two alternative policy evaluation criteria to compare the income distributions 
generated by each of the three policies with the original distribution, respectively, 
answering the question that which policy would increase social welfare and which would 
not. In Section 4, we conducted a social cost-benefit analysis by taking into account of 
the costs of each policy, examining which policy the central government should choose 
given a fixed budget to increase social welfare measured by 
first-order-welfare-dominance and first-order-poverty-dominance approaches, 
respectively. The following conclusions can be drawn from these analyses.  
 
First, according to the first-order-welfare-dominance criterion, none of the three 
policies is welfare-decreasing if the cost of each policy is ignored. However, only the 
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rural development policy yields an unambiguously welfare-improving income 
distribution, in that the income of people in each quantile after the rural development 
policy is at least as great as the income of people with the corresponding quantile in the 
original distribution without any policy change and strictly greater someplace. The 
reduced cost policy and hukou conversion policy have ambiguous effects on social 
welfare using the first-order-welfare-dominance approach in that neither the distribution 
generated by each policy first-order-welfare-dominates the original distribution nor 
dominated by it.  
 
Second, according to the abbreviated social welfare function in which social welfare 
depends positively on total income, and negatively on income inequality and poverty, we 
have obtained similar results that only rural development policy unambiguously increases 
social welfare without taking into account the cost of each policy, while the other two 
policies have ambiguous effects on social welfare. Specifically, the reduced cost policy 
does reduce inequality, but it also makes the total income fall because more rural hukou 
holders would migrate to the city and the market-clearing wages in the urban private 
sector would decrease for workers with either urban or rural hukou. The hukou 
conversion policy has ambiguous effects on total income and income inequality, 
depending on parameters values. 
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Even without considering the cost of each policy, both welfare criteria above give 
ambiguous evaluations about reduced cost and hukou conversion policy. The reasons for 
the ambiguities are not the same in the two cases. In the dominance approach, workers in 
some quantiles have higher income under a proposed policy than under the original 
distribution, while some workers in other quantiles have lower income under the 
proposed policy than the original, rendering the crossing quantile distributions and thus 
ambiguous policy evaluation judgment. In contrast, according to the abbreviated social 
welfare function approach, the smaller total income that the reduced cost policy generates 
is valued negatively but the reduction in rural-urban inequality is valued positively. The 
hukou conversion policy also generates a welfare-ambiguous result in that it has 
ambiguous effects on total income and income inequality, depending on parameters 
values. 
  
Third, we take into account the cost of each policy and examine which policy the 
central government should choose with a fixed budget to increase social welfare the most 
measured by first-order-welfare-dominance and first-order-poverty-dominance criteria, 
respectively. We compare the three hypothetical income distributions resulting from the 
three respective policies using the fixed amount of budget.  
 
According to the first-order-welfare-dominance criterion, none of the three policies 
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with the same fixed budget would generate an income distribution that 
first-order-welfare-dominates the income distributions resulting from either of the other 
two policies. That is, no single policy among the three alternatives is unambiguously 
better than another one in the sense that it can make the income of the person in each 
quantile at least as great as the income of the person with the corresponding quantile in an 
income distribution generated by another policy and strictly greater someplace. 
 
Fourth, by assuming that one dollar budget allocated to an agriculture worker for the 
rural development policy could generate M dollar income increase for each agriculture 
worker, we find that the results using first-order-poverty-dominance approach depend on 
how large the multiplier effect (measured by the value of M) is. If the multiplier is 
sufficiently small, no policy would generate an income distribution that 
first-order-poverty-dominates the distributions resulting from either of the other two 
policies. If the multiplier is sufficiently large, then the rural development policy has a 
larger effect on poverty reduction than the reduced cost policy. However, the rural 
development policy neither first-order-poverty-dominates the hukou conversion policy 
nor is dominated by it, in that the very poor people have higher income under the rural 
development policy than the hukou conversion policy, whereas the richer of the poor 
people have lower income under the rural development policy than the hukou conversion 
policy.   
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In summary, based on the newly-developed labor market model, we have answered 
the questions in this paper such that what would happen if a policy were implemented and 
what policy evaluation judgment could be derived using each specified policy evaluation 
criterion. As it turns out, the welfare evaluation of various policy alternatives depends 
critically on which welfare economic approach is adopted, and also on parameters values.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that the rural development policy is the only policy which 
unambiguously increases social welfare using either first-order-welfare dominance or 
abbreviated social welfare function. Furthermore, the rural development policy is also the 
only policy among the three alternatives that has the desirable effect on each of the 
components in the abbreviated social welfare function approach, increasing total income, 
decreasing urban-rural income inequality, and reducing poverty.  
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Appendix: 
Appendix 1: Proof of the results in Table 2 
First we prove the changes on employment for each group of workers. Differentiate 
equation (A5) in Chapter 4 with respect to AW . We have: 
(A1)  
b * 2( )RUL + 2
*( )( )R RA UW C Lb +
*R
U
A
L
W
¶
¶
+ *( )U SL E-
*R
UL +
* *[( )( ) ]R U R RA S S SW C L E E W Ab b+ - - -
*R
U
A
L
W
¶
¶
0= . 
 
By re-arranging terms, we get: 
 
(A2)  
* * 2 * *
* * *
( ) ( )
2 ( )( ) +[( )( ) ]
R R U R
U U S U
R R R U R R
A A U A S S S
L L L E L
W W C L W C L E E W A
b
b b b
¶ + -
= -
¶ + + - - -
 
        =
* * *
* * *
[ ( )]
2 ( )( ) +[( )( ) ]
R R U
U U S
R R R U R R
A U A S S S
L L L E
W C L W C L E E W A
b
b b b
+ -
-
+ + - - -
 
        =
* *
* * *2 ( )( ) +[( )( ) ]
R
U NS
R R R U R R
A U A S S S
L E
W C L W C L E E W Ab b b
-
+ + - - -
. 
 
The last equality is obtained by re-arranging equation (A2) in Chapter 4, i.e. 
U
UL + b
R
UL - SE = NSE . 
 
Substituting the expression of *RUL  from equation (38) into (A2) above, we get: 
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(A3)      
* * *
2* * * *( )( ) 4 ( ) [( ) ]
R R
U U NS
R R R U R R U RA
S S A S A S S S
dL L E
dW E W A W C L E W C E L E W Ab b b b
-
=
é ù+ - + - + + - -ë û
. 
As can be seen, the numerator is negative, while the denominator is positive. So we 
have  
 
(A4)  
*R
U
A
L
W
¶
¶
<0. 
 
Thus, if the agriculture wage increases, fewer people with rural hukou would migrate 
to the urban area. From equation (35) in Chapter 4, *RNSE  would decrease as 
*R
UL  falls. 
That is, fewer rural hukou holders would be employed in the private sector. Additionally, 
by equation (36), the agricultural employment would increase. Since the employment 
levels in the SOE sector for workers with either hukou type is independent of the 
agricultural wage, they remain unchanged. Finally, by equation (34) in Chapter 4, the 
number of urban hukou holders working in the urban private sector would be unchanged 
as well since the total number of urban hukou holders is a constant.  
 
Then we prove the changes on wages and discretionary income in Table 2. Because 
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there is no change on the cost of living for rural hukou holders in the city, the 
discretionary income moves in the same direction as wages for all groups.  
 
By equation (A3) in Chapter 4, we know that *NSW  inversely depends on 
*R
UL . 
Accordingly, keeping other terms constant, *NSW  would increase if 
*R
UL  falls. By 
equations (16) and (17) in Chapter 4, the wages for workers with urban and rural hukou 
in the private sector would both increase. The wages in the SOE sector are exogenously 
determined and thus unchanged. This completes the proof of the effects of the rural 
development policy, shown in Table 2.  
 
Appendix 2: Proof of the results in Table 3 
We follow similar procedure as in Appendix 1. First we prove the changes on 
employment for each group of workers. Differentiating equation (A5) in Chapter 4 with 
respect to RC  and re-arranging, we obtain: 
 
(A5)  
* * * *
* * *
[ ( )]
2 ( )( ) +[( )( ) ]
R R R U
U U U S
R R R R U R R
A U A S S S
L L L L E
C W C L W C L E E W A
b
b b b
¶ + -
= -
¶ + + - - -
. 
 
Again, substituting equation (A2) in Chapter 4 into the numerator in (A5) above and 
substituting equation (38) into (A5) above, we get: 
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(A6)      
* * *
2* * * *( )( ) 4 ( ) [( ) ]
R R
U U NS
R
R R R U R R U R
S S A S A S S S
L L E
C E W A W C L E W C E L E W Ab b b b
¶ -
=
¶ é ù+ - + - + + - -ë û
. 
As can be seen, the numerator is negative, while the denominator is positive. So we 
have  
 
(A7)  
*R
U
R
L
C
¶
¶
<0. 
 
Thus, if the cost of living in the city falls for rural hukou holders, more people with 
rural hukou would migrate to the urban area. From equation (35) in Chapter 4, *RNSE  
would increase as *RUL  rises. That is, more rural hukou holders would be employed in the 
private sector. Additionally, by equation (36) in Chapter 4, the agricultural employment 
would decrease. Since the employment levels in the SOE sector for workers with either 
hukou type is independent of RC , they remain unchanged. Finally, by equation (34) in 
Chapter 4, the number of urban hukou holders working in the urban private sector would 
be unchanged as well since the total number of urban hukou holders is a constant.  
 
Let us prove the changes on wages for each group of workers in Table 2. Again, by 
equation (A3) in Chapter 4, *NSW  would decrease if 
*R
UL  rises and other terms remain 
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unchanged. Thus, by equations (16) and (17) in Chapter 4, the wages for workers with 
urban and rural hukou in the private sector would both decrease. The wages in the SOE 
sector and agricultural wage are exogenously determined and thus unchanged.  
 
Finally, we prove the changes on discretionary income for each group in Table 2. For 
urban hukou holders in each sector and rural hukou holders in the agricultural sector, their 
wages are equal to their respective discretionary income by Table 1. Thus, they move in 
the same direction as their wage. Rural hukou holders working in the SOE sector would 
experience an increase in discretionary income because their wages remain unchanged 
and the cost of living in the city falls.  
 
Given the available information, it is not straightforward to see whether the 
discretionary income for rural hukou holders working in the private sector (equal to 
R
NSW -
RC ) increases or decreases. As RC  decreases, RNSW  also decreases. Thus, we have 
to do more work to determine how the difference between RNSW  and 
RC  would change. 
Essentially, we examine the sign of the following derivative: 
*( )R RNS
R
W C
C
-
¶
¶
. In what 
follows, I prove that this derivative is in fact small than zero. 
 
(A8)  
*( )R RNS
R
W C
C
-
¶
¶
=
*
1NSR
W
C
b
¶
-
¶
, by equation (17) in Chapter 4 
  
 
295 
 
By re-arranging equation (13) in chapter 4 and substituting it into (A8) above, we 
get: 
 
(A9)  
*( )R RNS
R
W C
C
-
¶
¶
= 2 1( )
NS
R
NS
EA
E C
b ¶
- -
¶
. 
 
Substituting the expression of NSE  from equation (A2) in Chapter 4 (i.e., 
NSE =
U
UL + b
R
UL - SE ) into (A9) above, we obtain: 
 
(A10)  
*( )R RNS
R
W C
C
-
¶
¶
=
*
* 2 1( )
R
U
R
NS
LA
E C
b
b
¶
- -
¶
. 
 
Substituting equation (A5) in Chapter 5 into (A10) and manipulating simple algebra, 
we can simplify our task as follows. 
 
(A11)  2 * * * *2 ( ) ( )( )R R R R U R RNS U U A A S S SW L L W C W C L E E W Ab b b b< + + + - - + . 
 
Substituting UL SE- = NSE - b
R
UL  (re-arranging equation A2 in Chapter 4), and 
A= NSE *
*
NSW  (re-arranging equation 13 in Chapter 4) into equation (A11) above, we 
need to prove: 
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(A12)  * * * * *( ( )) ( ) 0R R R R RU NS A S S NS A NSL W W C E W E W C Wb b b b- + + - + + < . 
 
From Table 1, we know that AW >
R
NSW -
RC , so * ( )RNS AW W Cb - + <0. Therefore, 
our work is simplified to prove *( )R R RS S NS A NSE W E W C Wb b- + + <0. By empirical 
observations, I claim that RSE < NSE . This is because very few people with rural hukou 
holders are working in the SOE sector in the city, so RSE  is a small number. In 
addition, NSE =
U
NSE + b
R
NSE . Indeed, even the number of urban hukou holders working in 
the non-SOE sector ( UNSE ) is larger than 
R
SE  in reality. So we can be very confident to 
argue that RSE < NSE . Then, the task left is to prove: 
 
(A13)  *( ) 0R RS A NSW W C Wb b- + + < .  
 
By the assumption made on Table 1, RSW -
RC < *NSW . Multiplied by b  on both sides, 
we have b ( RSW -
RC )< b *NSW . Therefore, 
*( ) 0R RS NSW C Wb b- + < .So 
*( ) 0R RS A NSW W C Wb b- + + < .  
 
This completes the proof of the effects of the reduced cost policy, shown in Table 3.  
 
Appendix 3: Proof of the results in Table 4 
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We follow similar procedure as in Appendices 1 and 2. First we prove the changes on 
employment for each group of workers. Differentiating equation (A5) in Chapter 4 with 
respect to UL  and re-arranging, we obtain: 
 
(A14)  
* * *
* * *
( )
2 ( ) ( )( )
R R R R R
U S S A U
U R R R U R R
A U A S S S
L E W W C L
L W C L W C L E E W Ab b b
¶ - +
=
¶ + + + - - +
. 
 
Substituting equation (38) in Chapter 4 into (A14) above, we get: 
 
(A15) 
*R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶ 2
( )
( )( ) 4 ( ) [( ) ]
R R R R
S S A U
R R R U R R U R
S S A S A S S S
E W W C L
E W A W C L E W C E L E W Ab b b b
- +
=
é ù+ - + - + + - -ë û
. 
 
The denominator is obviously positive, so we next examine the sign of the numerator. 
Combining equations (23) and (31) in Chapter 4, and re-arranging, we get: 
 
(A16)    AW =
R
SW
R
S
R
U
E
L
+ RNSW (1-
R
S
R
U
E
L
)- RC .  
 
Multiplied by RUL  on both sides, and re-arranging, we obtain: 
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(A17)  ( )R R R RS S A UE W W C L- + = ( )
R R R
NS S UW E L- . 
 
By equation (15) in Chapter 4, we have ( )R RS UE L- = -
R
NSE . Substituting this into 
equation (A17), we have proved: 
 
(A18)  ( )R R R RS S A UE W W C L- + =
R R
NS NSW E- . 
 
Thus, by equation (15), the numerator is negative, and the denominator is positive, so 
we have: 
 
(A19)   
*R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
<0. 
 
Thus, if the number of urban hukou holders in the economy increases due to the 
hukou conversion policy, fewer people with rural hukou would be located in the urban 
area. From equation (35) in Chapter 4, *RNSE  would decrease as 
*R
UL  falls. That is, fewer 
rural hukou holders would be employed in the private sector. Since the employment 
levels in the SOE sector for workers with either hukou type is independent of UL , they 
remain unchanged. Moreover, by equation (34) in Chapter 4, the number of urban hukou 
holders working in the urban private sector would increase as the total number of urban 
hukou holders rises keeping other terms constant.  
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The only employment level not examined yet is agricultural employment. By 
equation (36) in Chapter 4, * *R RR RE L= =
RL - *RUL , it is not easy to see how the agricultural 
employment would change since both RL  and *RUL  would fall due to the hukou 
conversion policy. Combining equation (1) in Chapter 4 and equation (36) above, we 
have * *R RR RE L= =L-
UL - *RUL . Differentiating with respect to 
*R
UL , we get the following 
expression: 
 
(A20)  
*R
R
U
E
L
¶
¶
=-1-
*R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
.  
 
We already know that 
*R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
<0 (by equation A19), and now we prove that 
*R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
>-1. 
Combining equation (A14) and (A18), we have: 
 
(A21)  
*R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
=
* *
* *2 ( ) ( )( )
R R
NS NS
R R R U R R
A U A S S S
W E
W C L W C L E E W Ab b b
-
+ + + - - +
. 
 
Substituting UL SE- = NSE - b
R
UL  (re-arranging equation A2 in Chapter 4) and 
A= NSE *
*
NSW  (re-arranging equation 13 in Chapter 4) into equation (A21) above, we 
obtain: 
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(A22)  
*R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
=
* *
* * * * *( ) [ ( ) ]
R R
NS NS
R R R R R U
A NS S S A U NS NS
W E
W C E E W W C L E Wb
-
+ - - + +
.  
 
Substituting equation (A18) into the denominator of equation (A22) and re-arranging, 
we have: 
 
(A23) 
*R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
=
* *
* * * * *[( )
R R
NS NS
R R R U
A NS NS NS NS NS
W E
W C E E W E Wb b
-
+ + +
.  
 
Because *RNSW =
*U
NSWb  and 
*R
NSE <
*
NSE , 
R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
Î(-1,0). Thus, by equation (A20), we 
have: 
 
(A24)  
*R
R
U
E
L
¶
¶
<0.  
 
Thus, the agricultural employment would fall as the total number of urban hukou 
holders rises.  
 
Next we prove the changes on wages and discretionary income in Table 4. Because 
there is no change on the cost of living for rural hukou holders in the city, the 
discretionary income moves in the same direction as wages for all groups. Again, the 
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wages in the SOE sector and agricultural wage are exogenously determined and thus 
unchanged. According to equation (A3) in Chapter 4, since *SE  and A remain unchanged, 
it is not easy to see whether *NSW  increases or decreases. We have to do more work to 
investigate how the wage would respond to the policy change. According to equation (A3) 
in Chapter 4, we look at the following derivative: 
 
(A25)  
*( )U RU
U
L L
L
b¶ +
¶
=1+ b
*R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
. 
 
Since we have proved above that 
R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
Î(-1,0), along with b <1, we conclude that: 
 
(A26)  
*( )U RU
U
L L
L
b¶ +
¶
>0. 
 
As a result, as UL  rises, *( )U RUL Lb+  would also increase. By equation (A3) in 
Chapter 4, we conclude that *NSW  would fall. By equations (16) and (17) in Chapter 4, 
the wages for workers with urban and rural hukou in the private sector would both 
decrease.  
 
This completes the proof of the effects of the hukou conversion policy, shown in 
Table 4.  
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Appendix 4: Proof of the results in Table 5 
In the abbreviated social welfare function specified in our paper, economic 
well-being depends positively on the total income earned by all workers, negatively on 
poverty, and negatively on income inequality. Again, income in this context will be 
measured by discretionary income defined as previously.  
 
The three components in the abbreviated social welfare function are measured in the 
following way. Since there are five values of income throughout this economy, the total 
income of all workers is the sum of discretionary income earned by each group, and thus 
has the following expression: 
 
(A27)    Total= ( ) ( )U U U U R R R R R R RS S NS NS S S NS NS A RW E W E W C E W C E W E+ + - + - + . 
 
By re-arranging equation (A16) above, we have: 
 
(A28)    ( ) ( )R R R R R R RS S NS NS A UW C E W C E W L- + - = . 
 
Combining equation (A28) with RL = RUL +
R
RL  and 
R
RE =
R
RL , the total discretionary 
income of this economy can be simplified as: 
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(A29)     Total= U U U US S NS NSW E W E+ +
R
AW L . 
 
The second component in the specified welfare function is poverty headcount. Given 
the poverty line equal to AW , the poverty headcount (PH) has the following expression: 
 
(A30)    PH= RNSE +
R
RE . 
 
The third component in the abbreviated social welfare function is income inequality 
measured by the difference in average discretionary income between workers living in the 
urban and rural area. Let UAI  and RAI  denote the average income in the urban and 
rural area, respectively. We know that RAI = AW , and UAI  has the following expression. 
 
(A31)  UAI =
( ) ( )U U U U R R R R R RS S NS NS S S NS NS
U R
U
W E W E W C E W C E
L L
+ + - + -
+
. 
 
Substituting equation (A28) into (A31), we have: 
 
(A32)  UAI    =
U U U U R
S S NS NS A U
U R
U
W E W E W L
L L
+ +
+
. 
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Let “I” represent the measure for income inequality and be calculated as the 
difference in average discretionary income between workers living in the urban and rural 
area. Thus,  
 
(A33)  I= UAI - RAI  
     =
U U U U R
S S NS NS A U
U R
U
W E W E W L
L L
+ +
+
- AW  
      =
U U U U U
S S NS NS A
U R
U
W E W E W L
L L
+ -
+
. 
 
Hitherto, we have specified the measures for each component in the abbreviated 
social welfare function. The results of policy analyses using this abbreviated social 
welfare function are proved in the subsequent sections of this appendix.  
 
Appendix 4a: The results of the rural development policy  
The effect of rural development on total income is easy to see from the result of 
dominance analysis. The total discretionary income is the total area below the quantile 
function. By Figure 5.2, we know that the new distribution lies above the original one. 
This implies that the total discretionary income of all workers would rise due to the rural 
development policy.  
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Poverty would decrease given an increase in AW . Since the poverty line is set at the 
original agriculture wage AW , the only group in poverty under rural development policy 
would be the rural hukou holders employed in the non-SOE sector in the urban area 
( RNSE ’), and workers in the agriculture sector would escape from poverty. Furthermore, 
because there would be fewer workers with rural hukou working in the non-SOE sector 
after the policy change ( RNSE ’<
R
NSE ), the poverty headcount would definitely decrease by 
equation (A30).  
 
In terms of income inequality, we need to calculate the derivative of “I” with respect 
to AW , and then to explore the sign of the derivative. We provide a detailed proof below 
showing that the derivative is indeed negative: 
 
(A34)  
A
I
W
¶
¶
<0.  
 
Differentiate equation (A33) with respect to AW , we get: 
 
(A35)  
A
I
W
¶
¶
= 2
( )( ) ( )
( )
U R
U U U R U U U U UNS U
NS U S S NS NS A
A A
U R
U
W LE L L L W E W E W L
W W
L L
¶ ¶
- + - + -
¶ ¶
+
.  
 
We know that the average urban income is higher than the average of rural income, 
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so I>1, so U RUL L+ <
U U U U U
S S NS NS AW E W E W L+ - . Since the denominator of equation (A35) is 
greater than zero, the only remaining task is to prove 
 
(A36)  ( )
U
U UNS
NS
A
WE L
W
¶
-
¶
<
R
U
A
L
W
¶
¶
.   
 
By equations (A2) and (A3) in Chapter 4, we have 
U
NS
A
W
W
¶
¶
=
U R
NS U
NS A
W L
E W
b ¶
-
¶
. 
Substituting this expression into above and manipulating the algebra, we need to prove: 
 
(A37)  ( 1)
R U U
UU NS NS
A NS
L W E L
W E
b¶
- + <
¶
. 
 
Substituting UL SE- = NSE - b
R
UL  (re-arranging equation A2 in Chapter 4) and 
A= NSE *
*
NSW  (re-arranging equation 13 in Chapter 4) into equation (A2) in this chapter, 
we obtain: 
 
(A38)  
( ) ( )
R R
U U NS
R R R R R U
A A NS A U S S NS NS
L L E
W W C E W C L E W E Wb b
¶ -
=
¶ é ù+ + + - +ë û
. 
 
Substituting equation (A18) in this chapter into the denominator of equation (A38) 
above and re-arranging, we have: 
  
 
307 
 
(A39)  
R
U
A
L
W
¶
¶
=
( )
R
U NS
R R R U
A NS NS NS NS NS
L E
W C E E W E Wb b
-
+ + +
.  
 
Substituting equation (A39) into (A37) and re-arranging, we simplify our task to 
prove the following: 
 
(A40)  ( ) [( ) ]R U U U R R R UU NS NS NS A NS NS NS NS NSL W E E L W C E E W E Wb b b+ < + + + .  
 
It is obvious to see that the inequality above holds, since RUL <
UL , and UNSE < NSE . 
Therefore, we have proved 
A
I
W
¶
¶
<0. This completes the proof. 
 
Appendix 4b: The results of the reduced cost policy 
According to equation (A29), the reduced cost policy would in fact reduce the total 
discretionary income, because UNSW  would decrease given a decline in 
RC  (by Table 3), 
while all other terms on the right hand side of equation (A29) remain the same.  
 
The policy has no effect on poverty in that the total number of workers being in 
poverty keeps constant. To see this more clearly, we look at the following expression: 
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(A41)  PH= RNSE +
R
RE  
         = RL - RSE  (by equations 15 and 19 in Chapter 4). 
 
Obviously, the number of workers with rural hukou ( RL ) and those working in the 
SOE sector ( RSE ) would not change due to the reduced cost policy, so poverty headcount 
would remain the same.  
 
Urban-rural income inequality measured by equation (A33) would fall, because the 
numerator decreases ( UNSW  decreases) while the denominator increases (
R
UL  increases). 
Therefore, the reduced cost policy would reduce income inequality.  
 
According to the abbreviated social welfare function, although income inequality 
reduces with no change on poverty, the total income of all workers falls, rendering the 
social welfare judgment ambiguous.  
  
Appendix 4c: The results of the hukou conversion policy 
First we examine the changes of total income due to the reduced cost policy. 
Differentiating equation (A29) in Chapter 3 with respect to UL , we get:  
 
(A42)  U
Total
L
¶
¶
=
* * *( )U U U U RS S NS NS A
U
W E W E W L
L
¶ + +
¶
. 
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Substituting UL + RL =L (equation 1 in Chapter 4) and UNSE =
UL - USE  (equation 14 
in Chpater 4) into above, we have: 
 
(A43)  U
Total
L
¶
¶
=
U
U UNS
NS NS AU
WE W W
L
¶
+ -
¶
. 
 
By equations (A2) and (A3) in Chapter 4, we have: 
 
(A44)  
U
NS
U
W
L
¶
¶
= (1 )
U R
NS U
U
NS
W L
E L
b
¶
- +
¶
.  
 
Substituting (A44) into (A43), we obtain: 
 
(A45)  U
Total
L
¶
¶
 = (1 )
U U R
UNS NS U
NS AU
NS
W E L W W
E L
b
¶
- + + -
¶
. 
 
Substituting equation (A23) in this chapter into (A45), we have 
 
(A46)  U
Total
L
¶
¶
= [( ) ]
[( ) ]
R U R R R
U A NS NS NS NS
NS AR U R R
A NS NS NS NS
W C W E E WW W
W C W E E W
b b b
b b
+ + +
-
+ + +
. 
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We know that NSE =
U
NSE + b
R
NSE . Denote the ratio 
R
NS
NS
E
E
b  as d . So 0<d <1. We 
consider the two limit values of d  and look at the sign of the derivative above. If 
d approaches to 0, U
Total
L
¶
¶
= - AW <0. If d  approaches to 1, U
Total
L
¶
¶
= UNSW - AW >0. As 
can be seen, the sign of the derivative depends on the hukou composition of labor force in 
the private sector.  
 
The hukou conversion policy unambiguously reduces poverty for the following 
reason. Since UL  increases, holding the constant population, the number of rural hukou 
holders ( RL ) falls. Furthermore, RL  consists of RNSE , 
R
RE , and 
R
SE . Because 
R
SE  does 
not change, the sum of RNSE  and 
R
RL  would decrease. That is, the poverty headcount 
would decrease (by equation (A30) above in this Chapter). 
 
Lastly, we prove the ambiguity of the sign of U
I
L
¶
¶
. Differentiating equation (A33) in 
this chapter with respect to UL , we get: 
 
(A47)  U
I
L
¶
¶
 
= 2
[ (1 ) ]( ) ( )(1 )
( )
U U R R
U U R U U U U UNS NS U U
NS A U S S NS NS AU U
NS
U R
U
W E L LW W L L W E W E W L
E L L
L L
b
¶ ¶
- + + - + - + - +
¶ ¶
+
. 
 
The denominator is positive, so our task is prove the sign of the numerator is 
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ambiguous. From now on, we denote the numerator as “K”. We know from Appendix 3 
that 
R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
Î(-1,0).  Additionally, since K is linear in 
R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
, it is sufficient to consider the 
two extreme cases of 
R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
 and look at the sign of the derivative above.  
 
If 
R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
® -1, K= [ (1 ) ]( )
U U
U U RNS NS
NS A U
NS
W E W W L L
E
b- - + - + . Furthermore, as 
R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
 
approaches to -1, b RNSE ® NSE . That is, workers in the private sector in the urban area 
are mainly rural hukou holders. Because NSE =
U
NSE + b
R
NSE , 
U
NSE ® 0 in this case. Thus, 
K ® ( )( )U U RNS A UW W L L- + >0.  
 
On the other hand, if 
R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
® 0, RNSE ® 0, so 
U
NSE ® NSE . Therefore, K ®  
( )U RA UW L L- + - (
U U U U U
S S NS NS AW E W E W L+ - )= ( )
R U U U U
A U S S NS NSW L W E W E- - + <0. As can be 
seen, the sign of the derivative depends again on the hukou composition of labor force in 
the private sector. If workers in the private sector in the urban area are mainly urban 
hukou holders, the HC policy would reduce inequality. Otherwise, the hukou conversion 
policy will increase inequality.  
 
This completes the proofs of the results in Table 5.  
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Appendix 5a:  
Proof of ( ) ( )R R R RNS RC NS RDW C W C- > - . 
The task is to prove that the discretionary income of rural hukou holders working in 
the non-SOE sector (i.e., R RNSW C- ) is higher under the RC policy than under the RD 
policy. From Figure 2 and 3, we know that both the RD and RC policies increase the 
discretionary income of this group. Thus, it is equivalent to prove that 
( ) ( )R R R RNS RC NS RDW C W CD - > D - , in which ( )
R R
NSW CD -  denotes the post-policy 
discretionary income minus the original one without any policy. Owing to the assumption 
that B is not large enough to alter the order of the discretionary income of the five groups 
listed in Table 1, we use the derivatives to approximate the change in discretionary 
income for RD and RC policies as follows, respectively.  
 
(A48)  ( )( )
R R
R R NS
NS RD A
A
W CW C W
W
¶ -
D - » D
¶
= 
,
( )RNS
R
A R RD
W B
W L
¶
¶
, 
 
(A49)  ( )( ) ( )
( )
R R
R R RNS
NS RC R
W CW C C
C
¶ -
D - » -D
¶ -
= 
,
(1 )
R
NS
R R
U RC
W B
C L
¶
-
¶
. 
 
The last equality of the two equations above comes from the budget constraints 
specified in (2a) and (3a) in this chapter. Thus, our task becomes to prove 
,
( )RNS
R
A R RD
W B
W L
¶
¶
<
,
(1 )
R
NS
R R
U RC
W B
C L
¶
-
¶
. We divide the proof below into two parts. First, we 
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prove 
,
R
R RD
B
L
<
,
R
U RC
B
L
. The second step is to prove ( )
R
NS
A
W
W
¶
¶
< (1 )
R
NS
R
W
C
¶
-
¶
.  
 
Lemma 1: ,
R
R RDL > ,
R
U RCL .  
(A50)  ,
R
R RDL = ,
R R
R R RDL L+ D = ,
R R
R U RDL L- D  
» RRL -
R
U
A
A
L W
W
¶
D
¶
 
= RRL -
R
U
A
L
W
¶
¶ ,
R
R RD
B
L
. 
 
The last equality comes from the budget constraint that B= ,( )
R
A R RDW LD . Thus, we 
have ,
R
R RDL =
R
RL -
R
U
A
L
W
¶
¶ ,
R
R RD
B
L
. Denote
R
U
A
L
W
l
¶
=
¶
, and we can solve for ,
R
R RDL  using 
equation (A50). The solution is as follows: 
 
(A51)  ,
R
R RDL =
2( ) 4
2
R R
R RL L Bl+ - . 
 
We already know that l <0, so we have a positive and real root for ,
R
R RDL  as above. 
Similarly, we can derive the expression for ,
R
U RCL .  
 
(A52)  ,
R
U RCL = ,
R R
U U RCL L+ D  
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» RUL -
,( )
R
U
R R
U RC
L B
C L
¶
¶
. 
 
From equation (A7) in this chapter, we know that 
( )
R
U
R
L
C
¶
¶
<0, so 
,
R
U RCL =
2( ) 4
2
R R
U UL L Bl+ - . 
 
From empirical facts, the number of rural hukou holders in the city is roughly one 
third of the total number of rural hukou holders. Therefore, RRL >
R
UL . Thus, according to 
the expressions of ,
R
R RDL  and ,
R
U RCL  derived above, we have proved that ,
R
R RDL > ,
R
U RCL . 
 
Lemma 2: ( )
R
NS
A
W
W
¶
¶
< (1 )
R
NS
R
W
C
¶
-
¶
.  
Proof: Since 
R
U
A
L
W
¶
¶
=
( )
R
U
R
L
C
¶
¶
, we have ( )
R
NS
A
W
W
¶
¶
=
R
NS
R
W
C
¶
¶
 by equation (A3) in Chapter 
4. Thus, the task is simplified to prove ( )
R
NS
A
W
W
¶
¶
< 1
2
. From the proof in Appendix 4, we 
know： 
 
(A53)  ( )
R
NS
A
W
W
¶
¶
 
=
2
2( )
U R
NS U
R U U R
A NS NS NS NS
W L
W C W E W E
b
b b+ + +
, then substituting equation (11) in Chapter into this, 
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=
2
2( ) 2 ( )
U R
NS U
R U U U R R R
A NS NS NS NS A NS
W L
W C W E W E W C E
b
b b b+ + + + +
.  
<
2
2( ) 2
U R
NS U
R U U U R
A NS NS NS NS
W L
W C W E W E
b
b b+ + +
. 
 
From the conditions for interior solutions examined in Chapter 4, RAW C+ >
U
NSWb , 
so R UA NSW C Wb+ + >2
U
NSWb >2
2 U
NSWb . In addition, the empirical facts in China indicate 
that UNSE is close to
R
UL  in magnitude, so ( )
R U U
A NS NSW C W Eb+ + >2
2 U R
NS UW Lb . Moreover, 
since most of rural hukou holders in the city are working in the private SOE sector, 
R
NSE >
1
2
R
UL . As a result, 
22 U RNS NSW Eb >2
2 U R
NS UW Lb . Thus, we have: 
 
(A54)  ( )
R
NS
A
W
W
¶
¶
 
<
2
2( ) 2
U R
NS U
R U U U R
A NS NS NS NS
W L
W C W E W E
b
b b+ + +
 
< 1
2
.  
 
According to the results from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have proved 
,
R
R RD
B
L
<
,
R
U RC
B
L
, and ( )
R
NS
A
W
W
¶
¶
< (1 )
R
NS
R
W
C
¶
-
¶
. Therefore, 
,
( )RNS
R
A R RD
W B
W L
¶
¶
<
,
(1 )
R
NS
R R
U RC
W B
C L
¶
-
¶
. 
This completes the proof.  
 
Appendix 5b:  
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When M is larger than 1, we have: 
( )( )
R R
R R NS
NS RD A
A
W CW C W
W
¶ -
D - » D
¶
= 
,
( )RNS
R
A R RD
W MB
W L
¶
¶
, 
( )( ) ( )
( )
R R
R R RNS
NS RC R
W CW C C
C
¶ -
D - » -D
¶ -
= 
,
(1 )
R
NS
R R
U RC
W B
C L
¶
-
¶
. 
Clearly, if M is arbitrarily large, ( )R RNS RDW CD - > ( )
R R
NS RCW CD - . Thus, 
( ) ( )R R R RNS RD NS RCW C W C- > - . 
 
Appendix 5c: 
To get the expression of M*, we solve for the following equation.  
,
( )RNS
R
A R RD
W MB
W L
¶
¶
=
,
(1 )
R
NS
R R
U RC
W B
C L
¶
-
¶
. 
Denote ( )
R
NS
A
W
W
¶
¶
=
R
NS
R
W
C
¶
¶
=q = 
2
2( )
U R
NS U
R U U R
A NS NS NS NS
W L
W C W E W E
b
b b+ + +
. 
So M*=( 1 q
q
-
)
2
2
( ) 4
( ) 4
R R
R R
R R
U U
L L B
L L B
l
l
+ -
+ -
,  
where 
R
U
A
L
W
l
¶
=
¶
=
( )
R
U NS
R R R U
A NS NS NS NS NS
L E
W C E E W E Wb b
-
+ + +
. 
 
Appendix 6a:  
Proof of , ,
R R
NS RD NS HCE E> . 
The task is to prove that the number of workers with rural hukou employed in the 
non-SOE sector (i.e., RNSE ) is larger under the RD policy than under the HC policy with 
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the same amount of budget, B dollars. Because both the RD and HC policies decrease 
R
NSE , it is equivalent to prove that the absolute value of the change in 
R
NSE  due to RD 
policy (compared to the original) is smaller than that due to the HC policy (compared to 
the original). That is, we need to prove | | | |R RNS RD NS HCE ED < D . Using the similar 
approximation technique used in Appendix 6, we have the following results:   
 
| |RNS RDED = | | | |
R R
R RD U RDL LD = D
,
| | ( ) | |
R R
U U
A R
A A R RD
L L BW
W W L
¶ ¶
» D =
¶ ¶
, 
| | | | | | ( ) | |
R R
R R UU U
NS HC U HC U U R
L L BE L L
L L C
¶ ¶
D = D » D =
¶ ¶
. 
 
The remaining task is to prove | | 1
| |
R
NS RD
R
NS HC
E
E
D
<
D
. By substituting the expressions of the 
two derivatives from previous sections into this ratio, we obtain: 
 
| |
| |
R
NS RD
R
NS HC
E
E
D
D
=
,
/
R R R
U NS NS NS
R R
R RD
L E W E
L C
. 
 
Again, we need to turn to the empirical facts in current China to approximate the 
magnitude of the parameters above. As is known, the number of rural migrants in the city 
is roughly one third of the total number of rural hukou holders. That is, 1
2
R R
U RL L» . 
Because ,
R
R RDL > 
R
RL , we should have 
,
1
2
R
U NS
NSR
R RD
L E E
L
£ .  
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Furthermore, from empirical observation, the cost of living for rural hukou holders is 
no more than one half of their wage. That is, 
R
NS
R
W
C
 ³ 2, so 
R R
NS NS
R
W E
C
 ³ 2 RNSE . In addition, 
NSE =
U
NSE + b
R
NSE . We know that 
U
NSE  is similar to 
R
NSE  in magnitude, so it is safe to 
claim that UNSE <2
R
NSE . As a result, NSE <(2+ b )
R
NSE <3
R
NSE . In summary, 
,
1
2
R
U NS
NSR
R RD
L E E
L
£ < 3
2
R
NSE , whereas 
R R
NS NS
R
W E
C
 ³ 2 RNSE . Thus, 
,
R
U NS
R
R RD
L E
L
<
R R
NS NS
R
W E
C
. Hitherto, 
we have proved 
,
/
R R R
U NS NS NS
R R
R RD
L E W E
L C
<1. That is, | | 1
| |
R
NS RD
R
NS HC
E
E
D
<
D
. This completes the proof.  
 
Appendix 6b:  
When M is larger than 1, we have: 
| |RNS RDED = | | | |
R R
R RD U RDL LD = D
,
| | ( ) | |
R R
U U
A R
A A R RD
L L MBW
W W L
¶ ¶
» D =
¶ ¶
, 
| | | | | | ( ) | |
R R
R R UU U
NS HC U HC U U R
L L BE L L
L L C
¶ ¶
D = D » D =
¶ ¶
. 
Clearly, if M is arbitrarily large, | |RNS RDED > | |
R
NS HCED . Thus, , ,
R R
NS RD NS HCE E< . 
 
Appendix 6c: 
To get the expression of M**, we solve for the following equation.  
,
| |
R
U
R
A R RD
L MB
W L
¶
¶
=| |
R
U
U R
L B
L C
¶
¶
. 
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Denote 
R
U
U
L
L
¶
¶
=f =
[( ) ]
R R
NS NS
R U R R
A NS NS NS NS
E W
W C W E E Wb b
-
+ + +
. 
So M**=
2[ ( ) 4 ]
2
R R
R R
R
L L B
C
lf
l
+ -
=
R R
NS NS
R
U NS
E W
L E
2[ ( ) 4 ]
2
R R
R R
R
L L B
C
l+ -
, 
where 
R
U
A
L
W
l
¶
=
¶
=
( )
R
U NS
R R R U
A NS NS NS NS NS
L E
W C E E W E Wb b
-
+ + +
. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This dissertation elaborates in great detail on how the current Chinese labor market is 
functioning and what policy actions should be taken to achieve distributional objectives 
in China.  
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 provided a detailed investigation of these 10 
features and served as a solid foundation for constructing a theoretical labor market 
model. These ten features are listed as below.  
 
1. Nearly half of total labor force in China is working in rural areas and the other half 
is working in urban China; Within rural areas, more than one half of the rural labor force 
is still working in agriculture sector, and the rest is working in rural non-agriculture 
sector concentrated in eastern China; Within urban labor force, more than three quarters 
are working in private sector. 
 
2. Urban and rural wages have been both increasing, but urban wages have grown 
much faster than rural wages, and now the average urban wage is approximately four 
times as high as the average rural wage. 
 
3. Workers with different hukou face different costs of living in cities and have 
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different access to government-provided public service and welfare programs in the urban 
area.  
 
4. Workers with rural hukou earn lower wages and are less likely to be hired in the 
high-wage sector in urban areas compared to workers with local urban hukou due to both 
differences in human capital and labor market discrimination. 
 
5. The phenomena of urban labor shortage and rural labor surplus are co-existent in 
the current Chinese labor market.  
 
6. Open unemployment is low in China and is mainly concentrated in cities of central 
and western China. 
 
7. There exists labor market segmentation between rural and urban labor market as 
well as within urban labor market between different ownerships  
 
8. Wages in urban private sector are largely market-determined, and institutional 
interventions play a small role in wage-setting mechanism. 
 
9. Skilled workers have experienced a much larger wage increase than unskilled 
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workers.  
 
10. Only about 10 percent of urban labor force in China is self-employed, but a 
substantial share of urban workers is not covered by social insurance programs.   
 
Chapter 3 makes a comparison of hukou-based labor market discrimination against 
rural hukou holders in two ownership sectors (SOE and private) by using a 
double-selectivity approach to account for the endogenity of hukou status as well as 
sector determination. The results show that for observationally-equivalent workers, urban 
hukou holders earn about 50% more than rural hukou holders do in the SOE sector, but 
only 5% more in the private sector. In addition, there exists obvious hiring discrimination 
against rural hukou holders in the SOE sector. Comparable workers with rural hukou are 
35 percentage points less likely to be hired in the high-wage SOE sector than urban 
hukou holders. This phenomenon can be best explained by the tasted-based 
discrimination theory. The SOEs discriminate rural hukou holders more than the private 
firms do because they are protected by the government and shielded from competitive 
market forces. 
 
Based on central features of the current Chinese labor market, Chapter 4 of the 
dissertation constructed a three-sector labor market model with wage dualism, unique 
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hukou system, and labor market discrimination, which is the hitherto most detailed and 
rigorous theoretical model particularly for the Chinese labor market.  
 
The model makes large contributions to the current literature and provides several 
valuable insights on the current Chinese labor market at least in the following aspects.  
 
First, this model elaborates how the hukou system indeed affects the functioning of 
the current Chinese labor market. Almost all of the previous literature on modeling 
Chinese labor market only claimed that hukou system was a major institutional restriction 
on labor mobility, but did not explain how it actually works. The hukou system was 
similar to a black box which previous researchers had never explored for the purpose of 
modeling China’s labor market.  
 
Second, this model explains the puzzle of the co-existence of urban labor shortage 
and rural labor surplus. As we know, the wage in the coastal cities of China is obviously 
higher than that in the inland rural area. Furthermore, the non-SOE sector in the coastal 
urban area pays the market-clearing wage to avoid unemployment. However, why do a 
considerable number of rural hukou holders still choose to stay in the poor rural area and 
earn very little, instead of migrating to the coastal city for higher wages and guaranteed 
employment? The model developed in this chapter exactly answered this question. There 
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are two suggested reasons. One is that the labor market discrimination in the SOE sector 
limits the opportunities for rural hukou holders and thus reduces their expected payoffs 
associated with migrating to the city. Another reason is that due to hukou constraints, 
rural hukou holders have to bear a large amount of cost in the city, but cannot enjoy much 
social benefit as urban hukou holders does. These two reasons together reduce rural 
migrants’ expected payoffs, and thus make some rural hukou holders prefer to stay in the 
rural area with lowest wages in the economy.  
 
Finally, the model developed in this chapter could serve as a solid foundation for 
helping us analyze income distribution of an economy from labor market perspective.  
The multi-sector model constructed in this chapter with the central features of the current 
Chinese labor market enables us to analyze the effects of labor market policies on the 
whole income distribution.  
 
Based on the newly-developed theoretical model, Chapter 5 then conducted a careful 
and comprehensive welfare economic analysis of three labor market policies, including 
rural development (RD), reducing the cost of living for rural hukou holders in the city 
(RC), and converting some rural migrants’ hukou status from rural to urban (HC).  
 
In the first place, by ignoring the costs associated with implementing each policy, I 
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adopt two alternative policy evaluation criteria including first-order welfare dominance 
approach and abbreviated social welfare function to compare the income distributions 
generated by each of the three policies with the original distribution, respectively, 
answering the question that which policy would increase social welfare and which would 
not. Secondly, I conduct a social cost-benefit analysis by taking into account of the costs 
of each policy and using a public finance framework, examining which policy the central 
government should choose given a fixed budget to increase social welfare the most 
measured by first-order-welfare-dominance and first-order-poverty-dominance criteria, 
respectively. The following conclusions are drawn from these analyses.  
 
First, according to the first-order-welfare-dominance criterion, only the rural 
development policy yields an unambiguously welfare-improving income distribution. The 
reduced cost policy and hukou conversion policy have ambiguous effects on social 
welfare using the first-order-welfare-dominance approach in that neither the distribution 
generated by each policy first-order-welfare-dominates the original distribution nor 
dominated by it. None of the three policies is welfare-decreasing using the first-order 
welfare dominance criterion.  
 
Second, according to the abbreviated social welfare function in which social welfare 
depends positively on total income, and negatively on income inequality and poverty, we 
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obtain similar results as above that only rural development policy unambiguously 
increases social welfare, while the other two policies have ambiguous effects on social 
welfare.  
 
Third, we take into account the cost of each policy and examine which policy the 
central government should choose with a fixed budget to increase social welfare the most 
measured by first-order-welfare-dominance and first-order-poverty-dominance criteria, 
respectively. We compare the three hypothetical income distributions resulting from the 
three respective policies using the fixed amount of budget. The budget is assumed to be 
not large enough to change the ordering of discretionary income among groups in the 
original equilibrium before any policy interventions. 
 
According to the first-order-welfare-dominance criterion, none of the three policies 
with the same fixed budget would generate an income distribution that 
first-order-welfare-dominates the income distributions resulting from either of the other 
two policies. That is, no single policy among the three alternatives is unambiguously 
better than another one.  
 
Fourth, by assuming that one dollar budget allocated to an agriculture worker for the 
rural development policy could generate M dollar income increase for each agriculture 
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worker, we find that the results using the first-order-poverty-dominance approach depend 
on how large the multiplier effect (measured by the value of M) is. If the multiplier is 
sufficiently small, no policy would generate an income distribution that 
first-order-poverty-dominates the distributions resulting from either of the other two 
policies. If the multiplier is sufficiently large, then the rural development policy has a 
larger effect on poverty reduction than the reduced cost policy. However, neither the rural 
development policy first-order-poverty-dominates the hukou conversion policy nor 
dominated by it, in that the very poor people have higher income under the rural 
development policy than the hukou conversion policy, whereas the richer of the poor 
people have lower income under the rural development policy than the hukou conversion 
policy.   
 
I hope that this dissertation can serve as a solid theoretical foundation which may 
lead to at least three strands of future research. First, this dissertation serves as a basis for 
more empirical studies on the Chinese labor market in the future. By reviewing numerous 
articles and books on the Chinese labor market, I find that the labor market research is 
still in its infancy in China. The critical literature review in Chapter 2 sheds light on what 
empirical questions need to be further addressed on the current Chinese labor market.  
 
Second, the theoretical model constructed in the dissertation can be extended in 
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several important ways to capture some other features of the Chinese labor market. For 
example, the model contains only one urban area in eastern China and one rural area in 
inland China. As we know, the rural non-agriculture employment (called township and 
village enterprises, TVE for short) is widespread in rural areas of eastern China, which is 
not included in the model. Another possible extension of the model is to allow for 
on-the-job search meaning that workers located in rural areas have a positive chance of 
being hired by urban employers.  
 
Third, analyses of other policies can be conducted using an extended theoretical 
model. One possibility is to provide rural hukou holders with more education and training 
(increase b ), and to test its welfare consequence. In addition, it would be also interesting 
to examine the labor market outcomes and welfare consequences of removing labor 
market discrimination in state-owned enterprises in urban China. In summary, we can 
conduct additional policy analyses based on the theoretical model constructed in this 
paper.  
 
 
